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Abstract 
This study seeks to assess the effect of public spending on economic growth, employment, and 
poverty reduction. The co-existence of a sound fiscal policy and a substantial government 
expenditure but insignificant returns in terms of social development suggests the potential of a 
dilemma that needs to be investigated, and to reflect on the dynamics of selected marginalised 
groups of people and marginalised areas. Hence, the “social inclusion” strategy of the RDP in 
1994, and the “inclusive economy” strategy of the NDP in 2014 were implemented with one 
single objective in mind, that is to narrow the gaps associated with the legacy of apartheid. 
Despite the implantation of government plans like the RDP and recently the NDP, and regardless 
of the effective use of fiscal policy, low growth has continued during the post-recession era; 
unemployment and inequality have persistently remained at high levels. This paradox has led to 
controversies around fiscal policy’s dual role of stimulating economic growth and income 
redistribution. 
To achieve the research objective, the study employs four types of empirical techniques: the 
nonlinear autoregressive distributive lag (N-ARDL) cointegration model; the economy-wide 
Leontief approach calibrated on the supply and use tables (dynamic SUT model); a partial 
general equilibrium approach based on the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM model) used for 
micro-simulations; and lastly a contemporaneous dynamic computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model to assess the effect of fiscal policy on macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables. 
The study found that during the post-recession era, expansionary fiscal policy had a positive but 
minute effect on growth, employment and poverty reduction. The effect of government spending 
has had a minimal effect on historically marginalised groups of people and marginalised areas. 
This is why a tortoise pace in reducing poverty and inequality has persisted. So, the study 
recommends that governments should follow a priorities-based government spending policy 
which fits well with the current situation of the country. Moreover, South Africa needs to adopt 
international standards and best practices of “science-based strategic” rather than that of 
“evidence-based strategy” and ensure that only programmes that have proved to be effective 
be financed in the fiscal budget. 
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CHAPTER 1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background, statement of the problem, and research question 
 
1.1.1 Background 
 
A persisting triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality in the post-apartheid 
regime, coupled with limited resources and/or budget constraints has remained a complex 
hurdle constraining development in South Africa (Ramon, Vinond, and Yan, 2010). Despite the 
effective use of fiscal policy, high spending on strategic social programmes, and its role of 
stimulating growth and achieving redistribution, a low growth path has continued during the 
post-recession era; unemployment and inequality have persistently remained at high levels. For 
example, in 2014, the World Bank noted that the Gini coefficient of consumption, 0.65, made 
South Africa one of the world’s most unequal countries (World Bank, 2014). The co-existence of 
a sound fiscal policy and substantial government expenditure but insignificant returns in terms 
of social development suggests the potential of a dilemma that needs to be investigated. It is a 
serious problem that this study intends to probe. 
 
Also, South Africa is viewed worldwide as one of the largest economies on the continent, the only 
G20 member, and also a member of BRICS with a great potential for growth and a high Human 
Opportunity Index (Newman and John, 2012). But South Africa’s post-recession economy has 
been characterised by the dual threat of a low growth path and a rising unemployment rate which 
erode the tax base and contribute to declining government revenue. This twofold threat of low 
growth and high unemployment is a perilous challenge that this study will explore by ascertaining 
whether Okun’s law holds across the nine provinces of South Africa. 
 
While this dual threat contributes to low revenue on one hand, rising unemployment and in-
equality, on the other hand, it contributes to high demand for government spending. About a-
third of South Africans receive social grants (OECD, 2015). The country spends more than 60% of 
the budget on social programmes, which is higher than what other African countries spend 
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(National Treasury, 2017). Rising government expenditure and declining government revenue are 
together a critical issue that makes South Africa’s budget sustainability suspicious, and this study 
will investigate it further. The research question: “Are fiscal budgets sustainable in South Africa?” 
is an important one given current austerity measures and budget ceilings recently implemented 
by the National Treasury. 
 
1.1.2 Problem statement 
 
The South African government’s overarching policies of RDP, GEAR, AsgiSA, NGP, NDP, and re-
cently the “Vision for 2030” are being implemented with a single objective: to stimulate growth 
and employment, reduce unemployment, poverty and inequality. For example, the most recent 
National Development Plan and Vision 2030 emphasise inclusive growth strategy to ensure that 
everyone actively takes part in the mainstream economy (ECSECC, 2018). The implementation of 
these policies was backed up with fiscal policy biases towards social development (National 
Treasury, 2017). Persistent unemployment and poverty disparities between: youth and adult, 
black and white, rural and urban, wealthy provinces and less wealthy provinces, poor households 
and well-off households . . . suggest that the inclusive growth strategy approach is not achieving 
the desired outcomes. Perhaps it could be an indication that additional income in the fiscus is not 
reaching the targeted population. The research question will be probed by assessing the outcome 
of government spending on vulnerable groups.  
 
South Africa is perceived as an African country with great development potential and a high 
human opportunity index, with a colossal budget. However, post-recession analysis reveals that 
the country is trapped in a low growth path, high levels of poverty and inequalities, and an 
inability to create adequate jobs. The paradox of a colossal budget, high poverty levels and 
inequality and declining growth have led to controversy concerning the fiscal policy’s dual role of 
stimulating economic growth and fair redistribution of income. So, the outcomes of government 
spending on both macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables remain a research question, and 
this study will attempt to investigate it further. 
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1.1.3 Research question 
 
In line with all the paradoxes mentioned above, the following research questions, which form the 
basis of this study, emerge:  
 
Is South Africa’s budget sustainable? How does it contribute to the achievement of the macro-
economic objective? Does economic growth contribute to a reduction in unemployment? What 
is the effect of government revenue on economic growth? What is the effect of public spending 
on economic growth? What is the effect of public spending on employment? What is the effect 
of public spending on poverty and inequality? Will the current government policy perspective 
achieve the desired outcomes? These research questions are addressed by the objectives which 
follow. 
 
 1.2 Research objectives 
 
1.2.1 Primary objective  
 
The primary objective of this study is to assess the effect of public spending on economic growth, 
employment, and poverty reduction. 
 
1.2.2 Secondary objectives 
 
From the primary objective, seven secondary objectives emerge. More specifically, the study 
seeks to: 
a) Investigate the validity of Okun’s law in each of South Africa’s provinces. This objective seeks 
to assess the relationship between growth and unemployment in the nine provinces of South 
Africa.  
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b) Ascertain whether the fiscal budgets in South Africa’s nine provinces are sustainable. This 
objective aims at gauging the relationship between government revenue and government 
expenditure in South Africa’s nine provinces. 
c) Investigate the validity of both Wagner’s law and Scully’s theory in South Africa. With 
Wagner’s law, the objective is to evaluate empirically the relationship between growth and 
government spending. With Scully’s theory, the objective is to assess the relationship 
between government revenue (taxes) and economic growth, and to empirically estimate the 
optimal tax in South Africa. Firstly, the study will investigate the cyclicality of fiscal 
expenditure by estimating NARDL regressions of the different versions of Wagner’s law. 
Secondly, the study will estimate optimal growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tax 
rates by estimating ARDL regressions for ‘Scully’s’ parsimonious growth maximizing model. 
 
d) Assess the effect of public spending on economic growth, employment, taxes, and invest-
ment. The aim of this objective is to show in which among the 62 economic sectors public 
spending has the greatest effect in terms of gross value added, and employment. 
e) Demonstrate the hierarchy of compilation approaches leading to the CGE model: that is from 
the national accounts (with the use of Integrated Economic Accounts) to the SUT (including 
the traditional input output model), from the SUT to the SAM; and from the SAM to the CGE 
model. 
f) Assess the effect of government spending on welfare, poverty and vulnerable groups. So, the 
impact analysis is disaggregated by: age group (youth v adults); area (rural v non-rural); skills 
levels (low skilled v high skilled labour); population groups (black or African v other population 
groups); and by income groups (poor households v non-poor households). 
g) Explore the effect of public spending on both macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the effect of public spending on economic growth, employment 
and poverty reduction. The previous section highlighted seven auxiliary objectives. To achieve 
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these objectives, the study will employ four types of empirical approach. These are firstly, the 
non-linear autoregressive distributive lag (N-ARDL) cointegration model; secondly, an economy-
wide Leontief approach calibrated on supply and use tables (dynamic SUT); thirdly, a partial 
general equilibrium approach based on the social accounting matrix (SAM) will be used for micro-
simulations; and lastly a contemporaneous dynamic computable general equilibrium approach. 
The first method falls under econometric techniques, the second and third under partial 
equilibrium techniques, and the last is a general equilibrium approach. 
These four empirical approaches do not conflict but complement each other. For example, while 
the N-ARDL provides high-level aggregated results, the SUT breaks it down for the 62 sectors of 
the economy to show which sector has the highest growth, employment or investment 
multipliers. It also adds institutions like households and government. The SAM builds from the 
SUT by adding a demographic dimension so that empirical results can show the effect of age 
group (youth v adults), gender (male and female), race (African, white, Indian, and Coloured). It 
also adds other dimensions, for instance spatial (rural and urban). The CGE builds on the SAM by 
adding the behaviour of institutions (producers, consumers), the price dimension and various 
elasticities. In this way, the study provides a holistic approach where findings are economy-wide 
and multidimensional, and results comprise the macro- and microeconomic aspects, the 
socioeconomic aspect, sectors and institutions.  
 
Starting with the econometric techniques, the N-ARDL model of Shin et al (2014) was specifically 
chosen among other cointegration models because the N-ARDL model presents functional 
advantages such as allowing the modelling of both short- and long-run cointegration effects 
among a mixture of levels stationary and first difference stationary variables. It assumes that 
varying equilibrium dynamics dependent on whether the economy is in an expansionary or 
recessionary phase of the business cycle. The study will also employ the Corbae-Ouliaris filter, 
which is superior to preceding filters commonly used in similar studies and can efficiently seg-
regate cyclical and trend patterns in all series analysed, regardless of whether the raw data is 
levels stationary or first difference stationary. 
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Econometric tools will be used to investigate the validity of relationships underpinned by Okun’s 
law, Wagner’s law and Scully’s law, and for each empirical assessment, a sensitivity analysis will 
be performed to check the robustness of the models. 
 
To justify why, for panel analysis, the study uses time series spans over a short period, it is 
important to understand post-apartheid demarcation changes that took place in the country. 
Soon after South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, the newly elected government 
reviewed the demarcations and names of some provinces. Consequently, data at provincial level 
could consistently be collected only from 1995 onward. Fortunately, the N-ARDL model, on 
account of being an asymmetric extension of the ARDL model of Pesaran et al (2001), it performs 
exceptionally well even when it uses time-series spans over a short period. This last feature of 
the model enables one to perform our analysis using annual data collected over a relatively short 
period (1995-2015). The time series data available for provincial use is short and is only available 
from 1994. 
 
In terms of a partial equilibrium model, the methodology used in this study is consistent with the 
latest System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) released by the United Nations. Hence, both the 
dynamic SUT and the SAM-Leontief models comply with the United Nations’ 2008 SNA and 
international best practices (United Nations, 2008). The SUT and SAM are extensions of the 
traditional Input-output model. Leontief introduced the input-output table in August 1936, in 
recognition for which he received a Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1973 (Miller and Blair, 
2009). He further transformed the I-O tables into a practical tool for economic analysis and 
published the first input-output model for the US economy based on census data for the year 
1919 in 1936 (Leontief, 1936). 
 
The SUT approach has an advantage over the traditional input-output model (Siddiqi and Salem, 
1995). The main difference between the two types of tables is that the symmetrical input-output 
does not reflect the production (supply-side) or the origin of the goods and services produced in 
the economy. So only limited analyses are feasible, because the input-output concept omits the 
7 
 
interaction between industries and commodities (Siddiqi and Salem, 1995). However, the SUT 
approach allows multiplier calibration from both supply and demand sides, which are used to 
produce both forward and backward multipliers (Madsen and Jensen, 1998). 
 
The data used for the SUT was collected directly from Statistics South Africa. Each year, Statistics 
SA develops an SUT. In this study, I used nine SUTs from 2007 to 2015 and developed an individual 
SUT model for each year to compare Wassily Leontief Type I and Type II multiplier prior- and 
post-recession trends. 
However, from the nine SUTs, only the latest (2015 SUT) will be used as the database to develop 
the SAM. Put differently, the 2015 SUT is converted into a 2015 SAM, as most literature suggests 
that the SAM is an extension of the SUT.  
 
Both the SUT and the SAM will be balanced using cross-entropy techniques. To run simulations, 
the study will use SimSIP SAM, a computer software tool for the analysis of input-output tables 
and social accounting matrices (Juan Carlos Parra Osorio and Quentin Wodon: World Bank, 2010). 
It will also make use of Wassily Leontief Type I and Type II multipliers calibrated from the SUT 
and the SAM to show the effect of government spending on growth, employment, taxes, poverty 
and inequality. 
 
In terms of the general equilibrium model, the SAM will be used as the database to develop the 
CGE model. The study will demonstrate the methodology used to transit from the SUT to the 
SAM, and from the SAM to the CGE.  
 
The contemporaneous CGE model was pioneered by Leon Walras in 1874 (Shoven & Whalley 
1992) and it has since evolved over time. The CGE model that this study will use is based on the 
standard CGE model by Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2001), as well as the standard CGE model 
for South Africa by Thurlow and Van Seventer (2002). However, some modifications will be made 
for the purposes of this study. The CGE model will be solved using the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS) computer software systems. The CPI published by Stats SA will be considered in 
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this model as the numéraire. In selecting macro closure rules, the study will attempt not to 
deviate much from the anatomy and structure of South Africa’s economy. For example, the 
determination of factor market closures will be guided by the realities in the labour market, such 
as the oversupply of unskilled labour and undersupply of highly skilled labour. The results of the 
simulations will be interpreted under different macro closure and constraint rules. 
 
The study will use the contemporaneous dynamic CGE model to investigate the effect of gov-
ernment spending on selected macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables. 
 
1.4 Rationale, gap in the literature, relevance and contribution of the study 
 
1.4.1 Rationale 
 
In the South African context, given the historical background of apartheid, econometric studies 
that apply econometric models; as well as economy-wide empirical studies that apply input-
output, SUT, SAM and CGE models to assess the effect of government strategies on socio-
economic variables have failed to reflect the dynamics of selected marginalised groups of people 
and marginalised areas. For example, due to the apartheid system, black households were 
historically marginalised from the mainstream economy. Even now, after 20 years of democracy, 
poverty and inequality have not been reversed among black households. The analysis of poverty 
and inequality must show the economy-wide effects of racial, gender, age disparities and spatial 
incongruences.  
 
Secondly, disparities between urban and non-urban, formal and informal, skilled and unskilled 
are prominent in South Africa and the impact assessment must quantify how these variables 
respond to changes in government spending. Given spatial disparities, provincial imperatives on 
budget sustainability cannot be ignore. Assessing at provincial level the validity of Okhun’s law, 
Wagner’s law, and Scully’s ideology in the current situation facing South Africa is crucial.   
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The study focuses on the cyclicality of fiscal expenditure for all six versions of Wagner’s law, and 
the optimal growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tax rates of Scully’s model.  
 
Thirdly, youth unemployment is increasingly becoming a thorn for the South African economy. 
What is the effect of government spending on youth employment? Or its effect in urban and non-
urban areas? In which economic sectors is the effect of government spending more prominent? 
These questions have not been investigated empirically by economy-wide partial or general 
equilibrium models for South Africa. Fourthly, given the fourth industrial revolution and 
technology advancement, employment must be created but most importantly, skills develop-
ment that responds to innovations and rapidly changing technology must be assessed. An em-
pirical impact study ought to quantify, for each sector, the number of jobs created for workers 
with no education against workers with tertiary education resulting from changes in government 
spending. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no single study in South Africa that 
has used an economy-wide impact assessment to address the four areas mentioned. The next 
section deals with gaps in the literature. It shows how most studies in the literature lack 
disaggregation of marginalised groups, making the monitoring of the inclusive growth strategy 
advocated in the NDP-Vision 2030 difficult. 
 
1.4.2 Gap in the literature 
 
The gap in the literature is diverse. Starting with the issue of budget sustainability, the study finds 
not only whether budgets are sustainable, but further prescribes what course of action (whether 
from the expenditure or the revenue side) the government should take to make the budgets 
more sustainable. Previous studies did not focus on provinces and could not prescribe specific 
courses of action for the government to take. Secondly, looking at the macroeconomic objectives 
of the relationship between GDP and unemployment, in terms of assessing the validity of Okun’s 
law in South Africa, previous studies have not focused on South Africa’s nine provinces. Using the 
NARDL model, the study is able to distinguish between unemployment gains/losses during 
expansions and recessions and so showing that Okun's law is sensitive to business cycles. Moving 
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on to Wagner’s law, no previous study has looked at how government spending is influenced by 
economic activity during different phases of the business cycle. Lastly, regarding Scully’s model, 
the study estimated not only the long- and short-run cointegration estimates, but also went one 
step further to compute different optimal tax rates for different types of taxes, making the study 
unique. Scully’s model differentiates between the optimal tax rate which maximizes economic 
growth and the optimal tax rate which maximizes fiscal revenue collections.  
To fill these gaps, the study used the N-ARDL model to assess whether Okun’s law, Wagner’s law 
and Scully’s law hold in South Africa. 
 
There are also diverse gaps in the literature with regard to partial and general equilibrium 
models. For example, previous studies that applied Leontief-based multiplier models for the 
South African economy generally focused either on one sector, for example the mining sector 
(Stillwell, 1999), real estate (Boshoff and Seymore, 2016), the automotive sector (Kavese, 2015), 
or the agriculture sector (Phoofolo, 2018); or their analysis was static, based on a single year. 
Examples include the study by Davis and Thurlow (2013) and that by Cloete and Rossouw (2014). 
There are other studies that focused only on a few aggregated generic multipliers. For example, 
the study by Burrows and Botha (2013) focused only on the GDP multiplier for South Africa, while 
Phoofolo (2018) measured output and GVA multipliers, and income and employment multipliers. 
Also, all the abovementioned studies are aggregated at national level, and only very limited 
shocks in the exogenous variables were carried out, which then narrowed policy intervention due 
to the limited number of multipliers used in the model. 
 
Studies similar to this one, that apply the general equilibrium model in South Africa, are very 
limited. For example, studies by Erero (2015), Fourier and Burger (2003), Lumengo, (2003) and 
Mabugu, Robichaud, Maisonnave and Chitiga (2013) have the following in common: Firstly, they 
are well-structured and provide useful analysis of the effect of fiscal policy on macroeconomic 
variables, but they do not show all the methodological steps (IEA, SUT, SAM, CGE) leading to the 
final CGE model. Secondly, their CGE models use an existing SAM database which limits them to 
do simulations beyond what is contained in the structure of the SAM. Thirdly, or consequently, 
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their results lack disaggregation that shows effects on marginalised groups. So policy 
recommendations on inequality and inclusivity are shortsighted. According to the ILO (2015), the 
construction of the SAM database alone requires a minimum of six months, two senior 
economists and two statisticians. To save time and costs, most researchers prefer to use an 
existing SAM. 
To fill these gaps, the study firstly goes beyond the traditional static input-output framework and 
uses a dynamic SUT (2007-2015) economy-wide model which accommodates 104 sectors 
(products). Both the econometric models and the SUT models provide results disaggregated at 
provincial level which unveil the pattern of each province. Secondly, the Leontief-based multi-
pliers are not limited to the generic three multipliers (output, employment, income), but provides 
a holistic approach that includes a series of 47 different multipliers of which each could be a 
paper on its own – for example, tax multipliers. In this way the study could respond to a variety 
of strategic policies. Thirdly, the researcher did not use the old 2010 SAM but developed an 
updated version SAM calibrated for the reference year 2015. This SAM is extended to include 
external matrices for micro-simulations that enable analysis of vulnerable groups like young 
people, black households, rural communities and the informal sector. A new extended SAM is 
used as a database for the CGE model. These additional features add a new dimension to strategic 
policy, one of inequality and inclusivity. The next section shows how filling these gaps in the 
literature set this study apart and make its contribution unique. 
1.4.3. Uniqueness and major contribution of the study 
The purpose of this study is to add to the body of knowledge and to fill the gap in the literature 
on the effect of public spending on economic growth, employment, and poverty reduction in 
South Africa. The study is unique in its attempt to compare empirical results from econometrics 
(using N-ARDL model), partial equilibrium (SUT and SAM) models, and a general equilibrium (CGE) 
model. The application of these combined techniques will contribute to the body of knowledge, 
especially to researchers involved in economic modelling. To avoid a one size fits all approach, 
the study is disaggregated to unveil the patterns of each province. It feeds on the advantages of 
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the N-ARDL cointegration approach. Its exhaustive full range and variety of multipliers is critical 
in informing most strategic policies in the country, including fiscal, macroeconomic, labour, trade, 
industrial, youth and other development policy strategies. 
 
The contribution of this study will add to the body of knowledge in four areas: 
• N-ARDL cointegration techniques that show provincial disparity and defy aggregation bias 
and the shortcomings of linearity (linear ARDL) 
• Partial equilibrium models (SUT and SAM) which include external matrices that allow for 
micro-simulations. This extended feature allows the modeller to add variables that are 
not in the standard SAM. 
• The construction of a new SAM and a methodology showing all the steps leading to the 
CGE model 
• The application of the CGE in assessing the effect of public spending on macroeconomic 
and socioeconomic variables. 
 
1.4.4 Relevance of the study for strategic policy analysis 
 
The importance of this study is multidimensional. It has implications for a variety of policy 
interventions, like fiscal policy (using tax multipliers), labour policy (using employment 
multipliers), poverty and development policy (using income multipliers), investment policy (using 
investment multipliers), trade policy (using export multipliers), growth and industrial policy (out-
put multipliers, gross value added multipliers, gross domestic product multipliers, and gross 
operating surplus multipliers), small, medium and micro-sized enterprises policy (using SBS tax 
multipliers), youth development strategy (using youth multipliers), rural development strategy 
(using rural employment multipliers), education and skill development strategy (using multipliers 
by levels of education and by skills levels), Black Economic Empowerment et cetera. 
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More specifically, on the fiscal policy front, the study not only provides various tax multipliers, 
but also in its analysis of budget sustainability, it recommends what course of action provincial 
governments should take to make provincial budgets more sustainable. Based on Wagner’s law, 
policymakers are shown how government spending is influenced by economic activity during 
different phases of the business cycle, that is in both economic contraction and expansion. Based 
on Scully’s model, it also computes the optimal growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tax 
rates for South Africa. 
In terms of the current NDP’s inclusive economy ideology, the study empirically quantifies the 
outcome gaps resulting from government interventions, showing for example the effect of ex-
pansionary fiscal policy on marginalised groups, on youth v adults, urban v non-urban, and poor 
v non-poor households. When it comes to the NDP’s quest for reducing poverty and inequality, 
the CGE model provides the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on the Gini-coefficient. And for 
macroeconomic policy, the CGE simulation results provide a series of macroeconomic variables 
like GDP, investment and employment – and shows how these variables respond to changes in 
fiscal instruments. 
 
1.5 Layout of the study 
 
Chapter 2 will look at the relationship between economic growth and unemployment, testing the 
extent to which Okun’s law holds in the nine provinces of South Africa. Fiscal policy is an 
important instrument that governments use to address inequality, promote economic growth, 
and to reduce unemployment and poverty (Jibril, 2012). The study will start off by investigating 
the long- and short-run cointegration relationship between economic growth and 
unemployment. The study will employ the nonlinear autoregressive distributive lag (N-ARDL) 
cointegration model and the analysis of the relationship is carried out from a provincial 
perspective to address the issue of an aggregation bias and disparities between provinces. 
Government spending should stimulate growth which translates into addressing the major 
challenge of unemployment. However, given the historical background of apartheid that led to 
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spatial inequality, policy efforts towards addressing the country’s high unemployment and low 
economic growth dilemma should be concentrated at provincial level. 
 
Chapter 3: Are fiscal budgets sustainable in South Africa? In this chapter, the researcher will 
investigate whether individual provincial governments have attained higher levels of budgetary 
sustainability in both the short and the long-run. To achieve this goal, the study will apply an 
econometric model, the nonlinear autoregressive distributive lag (N-ARDL) cointegration model, 
to analysis the relationship between government expenditure and government revenue. The N-
ARDL model is preferred because it includes the unique feature of identifying whether increases 
or decreases in provincial budgets will improve or deteriorate the ability of provincial 
governments to sustain their respective budgets over the short- and long-runs. The question of 
budget sustainability is crucial, especially in the post-recession era, where low growth and fiscal 
austerity measures are constraints to achieving national development goals. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the procycality of fiscal spending and optimal tax rates in South Africa. 
Firstly, the study examines the cyclicality of fiscal expenditure by estimating NARDL regressions 
of the different versions of Wagner’s law during different phases of the business cycle. It shows 
the extent to which the cyclicality of fiscal activity possibly diverges when the economy is on the 
upswing or when the economic cycle is on the downswing phase. Secondly, the study estimates 
optimal growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tax rates by estimating ARDL regressions for 
‘Scully’s’ parsimonious growth maximizing model. 
The optimal tax are estimated by disaggregating the measure of tax rates according to its 
different revenue sub-classes, including: taxes on income, profits and capital gains, taxes on 
property, value added tax (VAT), general fuel levy,  excise duties, and  taxes on international trade 
and transactions. 
To supplement the empirical evidence obtained through econometric models in chapters 2 to 4, 
the study will employ both partial and general equilibrium models, namely, economy-wide 
Leontief multiplier-based models calibrated on the supply and use tables (SUT) and on the social 
accounting matrix (SAM) in Chapter 5, as well as a general dynamic computable general 
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equilibrium (D-CGE) model in Chapter 6, to assess the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on 
macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables. 
 
Chapter 5 will empirically assess post-recession (2007-2015) effects of government spending on 
economic growth, employment, taxes, and investment. The study will employ a dynamic SUT 
economy-wide Leontief multiplier-based model, to achieve three scenarios of effect. The first will 
estimate the effect of changes in exogenous final demand (for example, change in government 
spending) on economic sectors’ output, gross value added, compensation of employees, and 
gross operating surplus. The second effect will be on employment. Employment multipliers will 
be disaggregated to display the effect of government spending on employment by sectors, skill 
level, province, occupation, level of education, and by Expanded Public Works Programmes 
(EPWP). Due to high levels of inequality in the South Africa, the National Development Plan and 
Vision 2030, it was decided to focus on inclusive growth strategy. So in this study, employment 
multipliers are further derived and presented in such a way as to distinguish effects between 
formal and informal employment multipliers; rural and urban employment multipliers; and youth 
and adult employment multipliers. The third effect will measure the influence of changes in 
exogenous final demand on taxes. Four scenarios will be conducted: a 5% increase in government 
spending, a 5% increase in exports, a 5% increase in investment, and a 5% increase household 
spending, to assess post-recession (2007-2015) effects on taxes and on other macroeconomic 
variables. Lastly, the study will contrast, at economic sector level, tax backward multipliers 
against tax forward multipliers in terms of company tax, value-added tax (VAT); pay-as-you-earn 
(PAYE) tax; and Small Business Corporation (SBC) tax multipliers. 
 
Chapter 6: In this chapter, the researcher will employ a micro-simulation model based on the 
social accounting matrix (SAM), and a contemporaneous dynamic computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model to achieve two objectives. Firstly to examine the impact of expansionary 
fiscal policy on macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables, and secondly to demonstrate the 
methodology of various stages that lead to the CGE model, including integrated economic 
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accounts (IEA), the construction of the supply and use tables (SUT), and finally the SAM, which is 
used as a database for developing a CGE model. 
 
Given South Africa’s historical background of apartheid, any meaningful impact assessment 
model ought to reflect the dynamics of marginalised groups and marginalised areas. In the spirit 
of inclusive economy, government strategic interventions must concurrently address the 
sidelined without neglecting the bourgeoisie. 
 
To achieve the research objectives set in this study, five policy simulations were conducted: 
The first scenario will aim at assessing the extent to which an additional R1 in government 
spending reaches the targeted group –poor households. The second scenario will assess the 
effect of government spending on youth employment. The third scenario will seek to ascertain 
whether expansionary fiscal policy affects employment in urban and non-urban areas. The fourth 
and fifth scenarios will consist respectively of a 5% and a 10% increase in government spending 
and the effect on macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables. 
 
Chapter 7: The study will end with a conclusion and recommendations.  Further areas of study 
will be presented. 
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CHAPTER 2. A PROVINCIAL PERPSECTIVE OF NONLINEAR OKUN’S LAW FOR EMERGING 
MARKETS: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2015), the current unemployment rate 
in South Africa stands at 26%, a figure more than four times the global average of 6%. For this 
reason, South African policymakers have prioritised the mandate of job creation through 
strategic fiscal spending and investment. On the philosophical front, Okun’s law could be used as 
a yardstick for informing policymakers how much economic unemployment can be gained or lost 
when the economy is below or above its natural rate. However, it is not very clear whether the 
persisting low growth path and chronic high unemployment in South Africa are affected by 
Okun’s law or whether this occurrence is purely coincidental. This question remains pertinent 
today as measures to boost growth and reduce unemployment in the country continue to be 
futile. 
 
Over the past two decades, South Africa’s government has developed five strategic policy pro-
grammes: the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) in 1994; the Growth, Employ-
ment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) in 1998; the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
for South Africa (AsgiSA) in 2004, the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 and most recently the 
National Development Plan (NDP) in 2014. These five strategies have had one objective in 
common: to stimulate economic growth and so reduce the continuing challenge of poverty and 
unemployment. For example, the most recent NDP strategy envisaged creating 11 million jobs by 
2030 and reducing the unemployment rate from 25% in 2010 to 6% in 2030. The outcome of 
efforts made over the past two decades reveals that, despite the implementation of these five 
policies, the desired growth target of 6% and an unemployment rate below 20% have not been 
achieved. 
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The historical evolution between unemployment and economic growth in South Africa in the 
post-apartheid period 1994-2016 is depicted in Figure 2.1. As can be observed the time series 
plot is marked by three distinct eras. During the first (1994-2003), both unemployment and GDP 
variables rose. Unemployment rate increased by eight percentage points from 21% to 29% 
between 1994 and 2003 and GDP rose by one percentage point from 2% to 3% over the same 
period. During the second era (2003-2008), unemployment declined but GDP rose. Un-
employment declined by four percentage points from 29% to 25% between 2003 and 2008, while 
over the same period, GDP rose by two percentage points, reaching its highest level, 5%, in 2008. 
During the third era, corresponding to the post-recession era of 2010-2016, unemployment rose 
but GDP declined. Unemployment increased by one percentage point but GDP fell by three 
percentage points. Such inconsistency in the relationship between unemployment and GDP 
makes Okun’s law questionable for South Africa in the post-apartheid era. 
 
Figure 2.1: Unemployment rate and economic growth in South Africa (1996-2016) 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2017) 
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This study argues that the problems observed so far do not end here. In particular, the 
aggregation of the unemployment and economic growth rates at national level consequently ne-
glects provincial specifics. In considering South Africa’s high level of inequality between the 
provinces, the omission of regional variances could lead to inappropriate policy interventions. 
This study measures Okun’s coefficient at provincial level for South Africa using annual data 
collected over the post-apartheid period, 1996-2016. To the best of my knowledge, this study is 
the very first to take this empirical approach and in doing so, the empirical analysis could be used 
to inform provincial governments in their development aspirations. In realising the short time 
span of the available empirical data, one employs the recently developed nonlinear 
autoregressive distributive lag (N-ARDL) model of Shin et al (2014), which produces strong 
asymptotic properties even with a relatively small sample size. In also differing from other 
cointegration models found in the literature, the framework permits the modelling of nonlinear 
long- and short-run cointegration relations among a combination of I(0) and I(1) time series vari-
ables. This is important for this study since the different series for different provinces possibly 
have differing integration properties. 
 
Having provided background to this study I organise the rest of the paper as follows: The next 
section presents the evolution of output and unemployment for the nine provinces of South 
Africa. The third section presents a review of the related literature. My empirical methodology is 
outlined in the fourth section of the paper. The presentation of the data and the general empirical 
analysis is conducted in section five and conclusions are drawn in the sixth section. 
 
2.2 Historic and current trends in South African GDP and unemployment at provincial level  
 
The South African economy comprises nine provinces – in descending order from the largest 
geographically to the smallest are the Northern Cape (NC), Eastern Cape (EC), Free State (FS), 
Western Cape (WC), Limpopo (LMP), North West (NW), Mpumalanga (MPL), KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) 
and Gauteng (GP). The most populous provinces are the smaller Gauteng and KZN provinces, 
which account for roughly 40% of the total population, followed by the Eastern Cape, Western 
20 
 
Cape, Limpopo, Mpumalanga, North West, Free State and Northern Cape (StatsSA, 2017). The 
size, distribution and historical trends for unemployment and GDP for all nine provinces of South 
Africa are shown in Figure 2.2 below for the period 1996-2016. 
 
Figure 2.2: Performance, development and trends in South Africa’s GDP and unemployment (1995-
2016) 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 2017 
 
With regard to economic growth trends, soon after the 1994 elections and the launch of the RDP 
and GEAR policies, economic growth in all South African provinces declined in 1998, due mainly 
to the Asian crisis. The Free State was the province most affected by this crisis. While a mixed 
recovery occurred in most provinces until 2001, due to episodes of drought and severe oil price 
hikes in 2002-2003, the GDP dropped for a while in most provinces. Nevertheless, this was 
followed by a prosperous period of high growth until 2007, mainly due to a strong global 
economy and favourable Southern African Customs Union (SACU) trade activity. As the recession 
kicked in, economic activities and GDP declined sharply in all South African provinces, reaching 
bottom in 2009, especially in North West and Northern Cape. After that, economic growth 
recovered slowly in all provinces in 2010. To accelerate economic activity, the New Growth Path 
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was introduced in 2010. However, between 2010 and 2016, despite reliance on the NGP policy 
framework, a low growth path averaging 1.6% a year has persisted. Nevertheless, domestic 
policymakers have remained optimistic as it is anticipated that the National Development Plan 
(NDP) and Vision 2030 will bring radical change to the economy. 
 
In terms of historic unemployment trends, Figure 2.1 shows that unemployment rates in all 
provinces have followed a trajectory different from that of gross domestic product (GDP). For the 
period under review (1996-2016), unemployment in South Africa divides into three distinct eras. 
Despite the RDP and GEAR policies that aimed at boosting employment growth above the rise in 
the economically active population, during the first period (1996-2003), unemployment 
increased, more specifically in KwaZulu-Natal. After 2003, with the introduction of AsgiSA, South 
Africa experienced a period of slight decline in unemployment in all provinces, yet these positive 
developments were not sustained due to the 2008 recession. The third period of post-recession 
was marked by a rise in unemployment, especially in the Free State. However, unemployment in 
Limpopo has been an exception to this trajectory. 
In terms of current trends, Figure 2.1 further shows that percentage share of GDP and percentage 
share in the number of people unemployed is distributed unevenly across the nine provinces. In 
particular, Gauteng (35%), KwaZulu-Natal (16%) and the Western Cape (14%) have kept the 
leading position in terms of percentage share of total GDP – these provinces alone account for 
more than two-thirds of South Africa’s GDP. At the same time these three provinces together 
generate about 60% of total unemployment in South Africa. On the other hand, the remaining 
provinces collectively account for 35% of GDP (Northern Cape 2%, Free State 5%, North West 6%, 
Limpopo 7%, Mpumalanga 7%, Eastern Cape 8%) while also accounting for about 40% of 
unemployment (Northern Cape 2%, Limpopo 6%, North West 6%, Free State 7%, Mpumalanga 
8% and Eastern Cape 11%). 
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2.3 A brief overview of the associated literature 
 
Okun’s law assumes the existence of an inverse relationship between cyclical output and cyclical 
unemployment. In his original manuscript Okun (1962) discovered that a 1% increase in GDP 
growth above its natural rate leads to a 3% reduction in unemployment below its potential. 
However, a percentage increase in unemployment implies more than a 3% loss in GDP growth. 
Although Okun’s law was originally introduced in 1962 (Okun 1962) strictly for US data, many 
recent studies still base their research on this law. Recent empirical contributions include those 
of Malley and Molana (2008) and Pierdzioch et al (2011) for G7 countries; Moazzami and 
Dadgostar (2009); Zanin (2014); Dixon et al (2016) for OECD countries as well as Grant (2017) for 
the US. Despite the discrepancies in their results, these studies commonly reveal that the 
relationship between growth and unemployment has a permanent and stable character and also 
confirm that Okun’s law is still recognised as one of the fundamental macroeconomic laws. 
 
Even though most literature is dedicated to industrialised economies, there has been a handful 
of previous empirical works conducted for the South African economy (Geldenhuys and Marinkov 
[2007]; Moroke et al [2014]; Phiri [2015]; Madito and Khumalo [2014]; and Banda et al [2016]). 
In general, these previous South African studies have applied different empirical methodologies, 
like piecewise OLS estimates (Geldenhuys and Marinkov), VECM model (Moroke et al), Madito 
and Khumalo and Banda et al) and Phiri’s momentum threshold autoregressive model, which 
have been applied to various sample periods using different measures of unemployment and 
GDP gap variables. Unsurprisingly, the obtained empirical results of these studies have been 
mixed, controversial and inconsistent. 
In using the most recent developments in the literature as a guide in rectifying the inconsistencies 
observed in these previous South African studies we follow two routes. Firstly, a number of 
studies have emerged that have argued for provincial-level analysis providing a better picture of 
Okun’s law (see Apergis and Rezitis [2003], for Greek regions; Adanu [2005] for Canadian 
provinces, Villaverde and Maza [2007, 2009] for Spanish provinces, Huang and Yeh (2013) for 
eight US regions; Durech et al [2014] for provinces of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Melguizo 
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[2017] for Spanish provinces, and Guisinger et al [2018] for US states). Most of these studies 
confirm an aggregation bias for Okun’s coefficient for the countries investigated. 
 
Secondly, we follow a host of more recent studies that advocate for nonlinearity in Okun’s 
relationship (see Lee [2000], Viren [2001] and Harris and Silverstone [2001] for OECD countries, 
Crespo-Cauresma [2003] and Holmes and Silverstone [2008] for the US, and Phiri [2014] for South 
Africa). These “nonlinear” studies tend to provide more powerful inferences on the 
unemployment-growth relationship compared with the linear-based econometric studies by 
implying that Okun’s law applies differently depending on which phase of the business cycle the 
economy has reached. Notably, most of these nonlinear studies rely on the momentum threshold 
autoregressive (MTAR) model of Enders and Silkos (2001) to establish dynamic asymmetries over 
the short run, yet retaining linearity in the long-run regression. As mentioned in the introduction, 
this study employs the N-ARDL model of Shin et al (2014), which allows for modelling of both 
short- and long-run cointegration relations between unemployment and economic growth. To 
the best of my knowledge, this model has not been used in previous literature despite its 
technical superiority over other competing nonlinear cointegration frameworks. 
 
The emerging consensus in the literature is that Okun’ law remains the most widely tool used by 
policy makers to measure the cost of unemployment and the gain of economic growth. However, 
the law has received criticisms in recent era of the fourth industrial revolution. Mckinsey, (2017) 
expressed that output estimates emanating from technological changes and automation, and 
their links to unemployed people with various skill levels is ambiguous. 
 
2.4. Empirical specifications 
 
From an empirical perspective there are two function specifications of Okun’s law. The first is the 
first differences model: 
 
U = α + β Y + et                 (1) 
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where U = (Ut – Ut-1), Y = (Yt – Yt-1) and et is a well-behaved error term. The second 
specification in the literature is the gap model, which can be expressed as: 
 
Ugap = α + β Ygap + et         (2) 
 
where Ugap = (U – UT), Ygap = (Y – YT), UT is the natural rate of unemployment and YT is the 
natural rate of output which are both unobservable variables. In regressions (1) and (2), the value 
of the β, which is defined as Okun’s coefficient, is expected to be negative and significant (I e β < 
0). Knotek (2007) points out that the original versions of Okun’s law were problematic since they 
both ignored important dynamics in which both past and current output can affect the current 
level of unemployment. This has led more recent researchers, like Huang and Yeh (2013) and 
Amor and Hassine (2017), to rely on the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) model of Pesaran 
et al (2001) to model both short- and long-run dynamic versions of Okun’s specification. The 
typically dynamic ARDL regression model of Okun’s law takes this form: 
 
𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕 = 𝟎 +∑𝟏
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋 +∑𝟏
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏
𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋 + 𝜷𝟏𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒆𝒕 
(3) 
 
where  denotes a first difference operator, 1 and 2 are the short-run coefficient parameters, 
β2 is the long run regression coefficient which is normalised on β1 and et is a normally distributed 
residual term. The unrestricted error correction model (UECM) formed from regression 3 can be 
specified as: 
 
𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕 = 𝟎 + ∑ 𝟏
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋 + ∑ 𝟏
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏 𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋 + 𝑬𝑪𝑻𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒖𝒕  (4) 
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with ECTt-1 being the error correction term which measures the speed of adjustment back to 
steady-state equilibrium following a shock to the system and ut ~ N(0, 2). Note that the above 
framework is a linear one which presupposes that Okun’s coefficient remains the constant during 
recessionary and expansionary phases of the business cycle. However, as was first noted by 
Keynes (1936) and later theoretically refined by Courtney (1991), Palley (1993) and more recently 
Lang and De Perretti (2009), variations in unemployment and output vary along different phases 
of the business cycle and so exhibit nonlinearities. Shin et al (2014) provide a method of capturing 
such asymmetries which involves decomposing the Ygap variable into positive and negative 
partial sum processes i.e. 𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕
+ = ∑ 𝒊𝒋=𝟏 𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒋
+ = ∑ 𝐦𝐚𝐱⁡𝒊𝒋=𝟏 (Ygap,j, 0) and 𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕
− =
∑ 𝒊𝒋=𝟏 𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒋
− = ∑ 𝐦𝐢𝐧⁡𝒊𝒋=𝟏 (Ygap,j. So equation 4 can be re-specified as the following nonlinear 
ARDL (N-ARDL) (p, q) regression:  
 
𝑼𝟐𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕 = ∑ 𝝍𝒊𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋 +
𝒑
𝒋=𝟏 ∑ (𝒋
+𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋
+ + 𝒋
−𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋
− ) + 
𝒕
𝒑
𝒋=𝟏    (5) 
 
whereas the associated error correction representation can be denoted as: 
𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕 = ∑ 𝒊𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋 + 𝒋
+𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋
+ + 𝒋
−𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋
− +
𝒑
𝒋=𝟏 ∑ 𝒊𝑼𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋 +
𝒑−𝟏
𝒋=𝟏
∑ (𝒋
+𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋
+ + 𝒋
−𝒀𝒈𝒂𝒑,𝒕−𝒋
− )
𝒒−𝟏
𝒋=𝟎 +𝑬𝑪𝑻𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒕      (6) 
 
where the long-run regression coefficients are computed as β+ = -(+/) and β- = -(-/). From 
the N-ARDL model encompassed in regressions 5 and 6, the following three empirical hypotheses 
are tested. The first hypothesis tests for asymmetric N-ARDL effects using the following null 
hypothesis: 
 
H00:  = + = -.         (7) 
 
The second hypothesis tested is that for no long-run asymmetric effects: 
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H01: β- = β+          (8) 
 
The third null hypothesis tested concerns no short-run asymmetries: 
 
H02: ∑ 𝒋
+𝒒−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎  = ∑ 𝒋
−𝒒−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎         (9) 
 
2.5. Data and empirical results 
 
2.5.1 Data description and unit root tests 
 
We collected annual data of total unemployment and real GDP growth rates for all nine South 
African provinces on an annual frequency ranging from 1996 to 2016. All data has been sourced 
from the Statistics SA online database. The first element of complexity is approximating the 
potential unemployment (Ugap) and potential GDP (Ygap) variables. I employ the filter of Corbae 
and Ouliaris (2006), which assumes that a time series Xt is nonstationary so that its first difference 
has a Wold representation with a spectral density fw () > 0. In denoting   = 2s/n as a Fourier 
transformation of Xt is given by: 
 
𝒘(𝑿) = (𝟏 − 𝒆
)−𝟏𝒘𝒗() − 𝒆
(𝟏 − 𝒆)−𝟏
𝑿𝒏−𝑿𝒐
√𝒏
     (10) 
 
For s= 0,1,…, n-1 frequency components. Corbae and Ouliaris (2006) demonstrate that imposing 
restrictions (Xn – X1) = (Xn – X0) will yield superior filtering properties in comparison with 
traditional filters like the Hoddrick-Prescott and Baxter-King filters and its compatibility with 
stationary or first differenced time series. So we apply the Corbae-Ouliaris (2006) filter to the 
empirical time series and extract the unemployment gap and GDP gap variables for the nine 
provinces. The summary statistics of the extract variables are reported in Table 2.1, while the 
time series plots are found in Figure 2.3. 
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Table 2.1 shows for the period under review that unemployment mean gap across provinces is 
asymmetrical, ranging from 18.3 in the Western Cape province to 28.9 in the Eastern Cape 
province.  For GDP gap across provinces, it ranges from 1.5 in North West province to 3.2 in the 
Western Cape province. The standard deviation statistics is most volatile for unemployment in 
the Western Cape and least volatile in the Eastern Cape. For GDP, it is most volatile in Free state 
and least volatile in Gauteng. 
 
Table 2. 1: Summary statistics of time series variables  
Province variable mean median maximum minimum Std. dev. Jb 
(p-value) 
WC Ugap 18.30 18.18 23.29 13.55 3.20 0.47 
 Ygap 3.19 3.48 5.11 -1.15 1.52 0.06 
EC Ugap 28.98 28.88 30.61 28.10 0.70 0.40 
 Ygap 2.42 2.34 4.92 -1.39 1.43 0.46 
NC Ugap 28.22 28.13 32.57 23.57 1.87 0.54 
 Ygap 1.96 2.48 4.31 -1.88 1.67 0.10 
FS Ugap 27.34 27.96 33.60 20.26 3.52 0.76 
 Ygap 1.73 2.18 5.58 -4.22 2.39 0.24 
KZN Ugap 25.99 25.93 30.96 21.46 3.09 0.56 
 Ygap 2.95 3.10 6.54 -1.48 1.78 0.78 
NW Ugap 25.52 25.49 29.67 21.49 1.77 0.80 
 Ygap 1.51 1.68 5.57 -3.45 2.37 0.77 
GP Ugap 25.26 25.34 28.09 19.64 2.03 0.05 
 Ygap 3.16 3.44 6.03 -1.79 1.52 0.00 
MPL Ugap 28.01 27.99 30.76 25.11 1.03 0.01 
 Ygap 2.29 2.83 6.11 -0.95 1.62 0.87 
LIM Ugap 26.40 26.15 32.10 20.50 4.08 0.44 
 Ygap 2.53 2.00 7.96 -1.17 2.17 0.25 
Source: Own computation 
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Figure 2.3: Extracted unemployment and output gap variables v original time series 
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Source: Own computation 
 
Even though the empirical model (the N-ARDL model) does not require any formal testing of unit 
roots in the time series, it is important that the variables are not integrated of an order higher 
than I(1). So as a precaution, we test the unit roots on the time series variables using the ADF and 
DF-GLS test, and the results of this empirical exercise are reported in Table 2.2 below. As can be 
clearly observed, the time series for most of the provinces unanimously rejects the unit root null 
hypothesis regardless of whether the tests are performed with a drift or whether a trend is 
included. 
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Table 2.2: Unit root tests on first differences of time series 
Time 
series 
Unit root 
test 
Province 
  WC EC NC FS KZN NW GP Mpl Lim 
 ADF -6.01*** -1.77 -2.61 -2.66* -1.97 -2.86* -3.40** -3.22** -2.16 
 (intercept)          
 ADF -5.80*** -1.68 -2.57 -2.58 -1.3 -1.92 -3.25 -3.03 -1.98 
Ugap (trend)          
 DF-GLS  -6.07*** -2.43** -2.70*** -2.75*** -2.05** -2.09** -3.34*** -3.07*** -1.63* 
 (intercept)          
 DF-GLS  -4.54*** -2.96* -2.73 -2.72 -2.04 -2.12 -3.49*** -3.23** -2.2 
 (trend)          
 ADF -5.39*** -6.22*** -5.65*** -6.95*** -4.97*** -9.78*** -6.14*** -4.87*** -6.02*** 
 (intercept)          
 ADF -5.29*** -6.06*** -5.49*** -6.73*** -4.79*** -9.38*** -5.96*** -4.69*** -4.15*** 
Ygap (trend)          
 DF-GLS  -4.96*** -4.11*** -5.62*** -6.71*** -4.39*** -9.19*** -6.32*** -4.30*** -6.42*** 
 (intercept)          
 DF-GLS  -5.18*** -5.68*** -5.69*** -7.03*** -4.46*** -9.24*** -6.33*** -4.70*** -5.36*** 
 (trend)          
Source: Own computation 
Notes: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels respectively. 
 
2.5.2 Empirical estimates 
 
Having ruled out the possibility of the time series being integrated of an order higher than I(1), 
we confidently proceed towards modelling Okun’s relationship for the nine South African 
provinces using the N-RADL model. Table 2.3 presents the three tests for nonlinear cointegration 
effects, which if one is to recall are tests for i) general N-ARDL effects ii) long-run asymmetries 
and iii) short-run asymmetries. Note that the optimal lag length chosen for each regression was 
determined through a minimisation of the AIC and SC. As can be generally observed, the reported 
statistics unanimously reject all associated null hypotheses for all provinces at all critical levels. 
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Table 2.3: N-ARDL cointegration test results 
Province ARDL 
specifications 
H00: H01: H02: 
   = + = -. β- = β+ 
  
 
     
Western Cape ARDL(1,0,0) 6.09*** 6.09*** 9.51*** 
Eastern Cape ARDL(1,0,0) 7.05*** 9.02*** 7.35*** 
Northern Cape ARDL(1,0,0) 3.79*** 4.01*** 6.07*** 
Free State ARDL(1,0,0) 11.53*** 5.27*** 8.85*** 
KwaZulu-Natal ARDL(1,0,0) 13.58*** 12.69*** 15.23*** 
North West ARDL(1,0,0) 4.57*** 12.09*** 15.72*** 
Gauteng ARDL(1,0,0) 4.02*** 4.20*** 3.36*** 
Mpumalanga ARDL(1,0,0) 8.34*** 5.82*** 7.56*** 
Limpopo ARDL(1,0,0) 8.09*** 4.15*** 4.98*** 
Source: Own computation 
Notes: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels respectively.  
 
The long- and short-run asymmetric coefficients highlight the discrepancies in Okun’s law for the 
different South African provinces. For instance, we find insignificant long-run asymmetric 
coefficients for two-thirds of the country’s provinces (Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, North West, 
Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo) and this finding is in line with that of Madito and Khumalo 
(2014) and Banda et al (2016) for similar South African data. On the other hand, I find statistically 
significant coefficients for the Western Cape, Free State and KZN provinces, although the 
obtained coefficients are negative for Western Cape and KZN as in Phiri (2015) and yet being 
positive for the Free State as in Geldenhuys and Marinkov (2007) and Moroke et al (2014). 
However, in differing from previous studies, our findings point to asymmetric long-run effects for 
the three provinces in which the effect of recessionary periods (positive output gap) or 
expansionary periods (negative output gap) on unemployment are not uniform. For instance, a 
percentage increase in the output gap decreases the unemployment gap by 0.51% for the 
Western Cape and 1.91% for KZN, with these coefficients being statistically significant at a 10% 
critical level. Conversely, a percentage decrease in the output gap increases the unemployment 
gap by 0.51% for the Western Cape and 1.12% for KZN, yet causing a decrease of 1.66% in the 
Free State. 
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The short-run estimates are more encouraging as all provinces, with the sole exception of the 
Free State, have a correct negative and statistically significant for either one of the Y+gap or Y-
gap coefficients. In particular we note that short-run Okun effects are most prominent for the 
Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape, whereas short-run effects are partial (that is, 
Okun’s relationship exists either in the upswings or downswings but not throughout all cycles) 
for the Northern Cape, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. Note that no significant 
short-run estimates are established for the Free State. In turning my attention to the error 
correction estimates, we find that reversions to equilibrium after a shock varies between South 
African provinces, with Limpopo having the highest equilibrium reversion (-1.70), followed by the 
Western Cape (-1.07), Eastern Cape (-1.02), Free State (-0.72), North West  
(-0.72), Mpumalanga (-0.69), Northern Cape (-0.22), Gauteng (-0.18) and KZN (-0.17). 
 
Table 2.4: N-ARDL long-run, short-run and diagnostic tests 
Province Model 
specification 
Long-run estimates Short-run estimates Diagnostics (p-values) 
  Ygap+ Ygap- Ygap+ Ygap- ECT Nor SC HET FF 
Western 
Cape 
ARDL(1,0,0) -0.51 
(0.06)* 
-0.50 
(0.07)* 
-0.47 
(0.00)*** 
0.44 
(0.00)*** 
-1.29 
(0.00)*** 
0.83 0.67 0.21 0.18 
Eastern Cape ARDL(1,0,0) -0.15 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(0.87) 
0.23 
(0.06)* 
-0.91 
(0.02)** 
-1.02 
(0.02)** 
0.27 0.92 0.77 0.46 
Northern 
Cape 
ARDL(1,0,0) -0.76 
(0.16) 
-0.71 
(0.20) 
-0.03 
(0.74) 
-0.15 
(0.06)* 
-0.22 
(0.00)*** 
0.30 0.18 0.23 0.74 
Free State ARDL(1,0,0) 1.91 
(0.06)* 
1.66 
(0.06)* 
-0.03 
(0.42) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.72 
(0.01)** 
0.60 0.89 0.35 0.46 
KwaZulu-
Natal 
ARDL(1,0,0) -1.91 
(0.02)** 
-1.12 
(0.02)* 
-0.89 
(0.00)*** 
-0.18 
(0.00)*** 
-0.17 
(0.00)*** 
0.32 0.65 0.13 0.45 
North West ARDL(1,0,0) 0.22 
(0.70) 
0.89 
(0.36) 
0.06 
(0.43) 
-0.73 
(0.07)* 
-0.72 
(0.07)* 
0.83 0.11 0.13 0.47 
Gauteng ARDL(1,0,0) -3.76 
(0.21) 
-3.48 
(0.24) 
-0.29 
(0.13) 
-0.14 
(0.02)** 
-0.18 
(0.00)*** 
0.77 0.65 0.48 0.97 
Mpumalanga ARDL(1,0,0) -4.01 
(0.17) 
-4.31 
(0.18) 
-0.73 
(0.06)* 
-0.08 
(0.23) 
-0.69 
(0.05)* 
0.78 0.66 0.50 0.47 
Limpopo ARDL(1,0,0) -1.24 
(0.17) 
-1.07 
(0.19) 
-0.62 
(0.07)* 
0.48 
(0.11) 
-1.70 
(0.05)* 
0.40 0.99 0.66 0.52 
Source: Own computation 
Notes: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels respectively. p-values reported in (). The Jarque 
Bera (J-B) statistic, the Breusch-Godfrey (B-G) test, the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) tests 
and the Ramsey RESET test indicate that all estimated regressions are devoid of normal errors, serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity and incorrect functional form. 
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2.5.3 Sensitivity analysis: Is there an aggregation bias in Okun’s law? 
 
In this section of the paper, we explore the possibility of an aggregation bias by re-estimating 
Okun’s law using an aggregated approach to the analysis. To achieve this, we estimate two 
aggregated regressions; the first being a N-ARDL model estimating to pooled data of the nine 
provinces; and the second a conventional N-ARDL estimate of “aggregated” national time series 
data. The findings from this empirical exercise are reported in Table 2.5. As was the case for the 
individual provinces, Panel A of 2.5 indicates that the null hypothesis of no N-ARDL effects, no 
long-run asymmetries and no short-run asymmetries are mutually rejected for both estimate 
“aggregate” models at all levels of significance. 
 
Nevertheless, the same optimism is unobserved for the long-run Okun coefficients as only one of 
the produced long-run estimates reported in Panel B of Table 2.5 is significant, that being the 
Y+gap for the N-ARDL estimates of national data which produces the correct negative estimate. 
Similarly, the short-run estimates reported in Panel B provide very mild evidence of any 
significant short-run Okun effects, with the Y+gap variable producing the only coefficient with a 
correct negative and statistically significant coefficient. The error terms further provide evidence 
on the disequilibrium correction behaviour in both regressions, even though the speeds of 
adjustment differ widely between the two estimated regressions. Collectively the sensitivity 
analysis leads to a conclusion of an aggregation bias in Okun’s law for South Africa in the 
democratic era. 
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Table 2.5: Panel N-ARDL Okun estimates for South Africa 
  Panel N-ARDL (1,0,0) estimates for 
all provinces 
 N-ARDL (1,0,0) estimates of 
aggregated data 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Panel A: 
cointegration  
tests 
      
H00:  
 = + = -. 
 6.19 0.00  5.64 0.00 
H01:  
β- = β+ 
 6.57 0.00  4.15 0.00 
H02:  
∑ 𝒋
+𝒒−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎  = 
∑ 𝒋
−𝒒−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎  
 7.19 0.00  8.63 0.00 
Panel B: 
long-run 
estimates 
      
Ygap+  -3.87 0.54  -0.40 0.02** 
Ygap-  -2.60 0.48  -0.16 0.56 
Panel C: 
short-run 
estimates 
      
Ygap+  -0.02 0.32  -0.61 0.28 
Ygap-  -0.41 0.00***  -0.49 0.68 
ECT  -0.04 0.00***  -1.05 0.00*** 
Panel D: 
diagnostic tests 
      
Nor  0.37 0.83  3.76 0.15 
SC  0.97 0.43  0.94 0.45 
Het  2.43 0.11  0.28 0.96 
FF  1.63 0.15  0.43 0.68 
Source: Own computation 
Notes: “***”, “**”, “*” represent the 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels respectively.  The Jarque Bera (J-B) statistic, the 
Breusch-Godfrey (B-G) test, the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) tests and the Ramsey RESET 
test indicate that all estimated regressions are devoid of normal errors, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and 
incorrect functional form. Optimal lag length for both models is determined through the minimisation of the AIC 
and SC. 
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2.6. CONCLUSION 
In focusing on a 20-year post-apartheid period covering 1996-2016, this study sought to con-
tribute to the ongoing debate on Okun’s law for South Africa based on three modifications over 
the previous domestic literature. Firstly, we provide an analysis of the relationship from a 
provincial level, so addressing the issue of an aggregation bias commonly highlighted in the 
foregoing international literature. Indeed, the sensitivity analysis confirms this phenomenon for 
South Africa as the panel estimates of Okun’s law for all domestic provinces produce insignificant 
long-run estimates. Secondly, we employ a nonlinear ARDL cointegration model to estimate both 
long- and short-run equilibrium relations for each province. In contrast with other linear 
cointegration frameworks employed in previous studies, the N-ARDL model assumes varying 
equilibrium dynamics depending on whether the economy is in an expansionary or recessionary 
phase. Moreover, the model is compatible with a combination of time series data integrated of 
order I(0) or I(1). Lastly, we employ the Corbae-Ouliaris filter, which is superior to preceding filters 
commonly used in previous studies and can efficiently segregate cyclical and trend patterns in 
the unemployment and GDP series, regardless of whether the raw data is levels-stationary or 
first difference stationary. 
 
The obtained empirical results point to a couple of interesting realisations. Firstly, a negative and 
significant long-run relationship with regard to Okun’s original finding is established for only two 
provinces, the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. we also find significant long-run asymmetric 
relationships for the Free-State, although these estimates are positive. On the other hand, over 
the short-run we observe significant asymmetric Okun estimates, with the sole exception of the 
Free-State where no significant short-run effects are identified. As indicated by the error 
correction estimates, Limpopo, Western Cape and the Eastern Cape adjust soonest back to 
steady-state equilibrium in the face of exogenous shocks to the economy, which is lagged by 
other provinces. Collectively, the empirical results imply that in most provinces over the short 
run, economic growth assists in reducing unemployment more prominently during upswings of 
the economic cycle and recovering from vulnerabilities presented during the downswings. 
Reserve dynamics apply to the Free State over the long-run. 
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From a policy viewpoint, the results indicate that the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal are the 
most efficient provinces in translating increased economic activity into reduced unemployment 
over both the long and short run. In most of the remaining provinces, and in particular the Eastern 
Cape, North West, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, Gauteng and Limpopo, economic growth is 
partially translated into reduced unemployment over the short run. Meanwhile, the Free-State 
is a controversial province in which the provincial government’s efforts to influence 
unemployment through increased economic activity in the short run appears futile, which has 
resulted in both economic growth and unemployment increases during expansionary periods, 
yet both variables are decreased during recessions. So the authorities in the Free-State are 
encouraged to develop more finessed short- to-medium-term policy plans which address the 
issue of irregular government spending which increases provincial activity and yet fails to reduce 
unemployment. 
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CHAPTER 3: ARE FISCAL BUDGETS SUSTAINABLE IN SOUTH AFRICA? EVIDENCE FROM 
PROVINCIAL-LEVEL DATA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Since the advent of full democracy in South Africa in 1994, the quest for all-inclusive growth, 
reducing poverty, inequality and unemployment through discretionary fiscal policy, has been the 
cornerstone of most development policies. To attain these objectives, the South African 
government has implemented various large scale expenditure programmes, specifically the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994; the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution strategy (GEAR) in 1998; the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South 
Africa (AsgiSA) in 2004, the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 and most recently, the National 
Development Plan (NDP) in 2014. To raise the necessary revenues for these fiscal expenditure 
programmes, taxation governing bodies like the Katz Commission and its successor the Davis tax 
committee have been mandated with the responsibility of ensuring the functionality and 
efficiency of tax revenue collection. 
 
The economic meltdown of 2008-09 has aggravated the persisting triple challenge of 
unemployment, poverty and low growth path with the economic crisis driving unemployment in 
South Africa to unprecedentedly high levels from 23% in 2008, with 4.3 million people 
unemployed, to 26% in 2016 with 5.5 million people unemployed, whereas GDP growth has sim-
mered from 5.4% in 2006 to 0.3% in 2016. At a fiscal level, the twin dilemma of high spending on 
social programmes and constrained resources has resulted in the paradox of the government 
trying to improve the lives of South African citizens through increased expenditure projects 
which, in turn, are financed by increased tax collections which eventually deteriorate the welfare 
of economic agents. Moreover, following the 2008 crisis, there has been an increasing gap 
between expenditure and revenues, which has resulted in a widening budget deficit, so creating 
a hurdle which constrains economic development, especially at provincial level. This realisation 
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has prompted fiscal authorities to implement fiscal austerity measures as a means of attaining a 
sustainable budget over the steady-state. 
 
In this paper we argue that the effect of such austerity practices on budget sustainability can be 
evaluated empirically through implementing appropriate econometric analysis. Even though 
previous studies have been conducted on the subject matter for South Africa (for instance 
Narayan and Nayaran [2006], Nyamongo et al [2006], Lusinyan and Thornton [2007], Ndahiriwe 
and Gupta [2010], Ghartey [2010], Jibao et al [2012], Baharumshah et al [2016] and Phiri [2017]), 
we point out that these studies suffer some fundamental shortcomings. Firstly, most of these 
studies assume linearity in the cointegration analysis (Narayan and Nayaran [2006], Nyamongo 
et al [2006], Lusinyan and Thornton [2007], Ndahiriwe and Gupta [2010], Ghartey [2010], Jibao 
et al [2012], Baharumshah et al [2016]), a feature which may be oversimplifying the issue (see 
Bajo-Rubio et al [2006] and Ewing et al [2006] for a discussion). Secondly, even when nonlinearity 
has been taken into consideration (as in Phiri [2017]), such asymmetry is assumed to exist in the 
short run while symmetry is retained over the long run. Lastly, all previous studies focus on 
national aggregated data while ignoring province-specific relations. This latter point has 
important policy implications since each province is faced with different budget constraints 
which may exhibit varying levels of sustainability. 
 
This study contributes to the existing body of empirical literature for expenditure-revenues by 
employing the recently introduced nonlinear autoregressive distributive lag (N-ARDL) model of 
Shin et al (2014) to South African provincial data collected between 2000 and 2006. To the very 
best of my knowledge, this becomes the first study to employ this econometric model to the 
expenditure-revenue relationship within the broader empirical literature. In differing from a host 
of other nonlinear cointegration models, the N-ARDL model presents functional advantages such 
as allowing the modelling of both short- and long-run cointegration effects among a mixture of 
levels-stationary and first-difference stationary variables. Moreover, the N-ARDL model, on 
account of being an asymmetric extension of the ARDL model of Pesaran et al (2001), performs 
exceptionally well even when the time series used spans a short period. This last feature of the 
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model enables me to perform my analysis using annual data collected over a relatively short 
period, 2000-2016. 
 
Having provided a background to the study, the rest of the paper is arranged as follows: the 
following section presents the methodology of the paper, the third section of the paper presents 
the data and empirical results, and the paper is concluded in the fourth section. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
In the spirit of Hakkio and Rush (1991), I consider that the South African provincial governments’ 
one period budget constraint is formulated as: 
 
Bt = (GEt + iBt-1) – Rt         (1) 
 
where Bt is government debt, GEt is real government expenditure exclusive of interest payments, 
Rt are real tax revenues, and it is the real interest rate which is assumed to be a stationary process 
around a mean of i*. By defining Gt = GEt + (it – i*) Bt-1, and applying forward substitution results 
in the following intertemporal budget constraint: 
 
B0 =  (Rt+j+i – Gt+j+i) + 𝐥𝐢𝐦
𝒋→
 Bt+j+i       (2) 
where = ∑ (
𝟏
𝟏+𝒊
)𝒋+𝟏𝒋=𝟎 . Sustainability of a budget deficit occurs when: 
 
𝐥𝐢𝐦
𝒋→
 Bt+j+i = 0          (3)  
That is when the current budget can be financed by future surpluses. Considering further that it 
~ I(0), and taking the first differences of equations (1) through (3), Quintos (1995) demonstrates 
that the following reduced-form long-run cointegration equation can be deduced: 
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Rt = 0 + βGt + et         (4) 
 
Where 0 is regression intercept, et is a well-behaved disturbance term and β the long-run 
regression coefficient which is assumed a priori to positive and bounded between 0 and 1. If β = 
1, government deficit is high sustainable and reflects a highly efficient fiscal régime which 
practices strict fiscal discipline. However, as β approaches zero, government debts become in-
creasingly unsustainable so that the intertemporal budget constraint (2) is less likely to hold. In 
such instances, government debt may be financed by raising interest rates to service debt 
obligations (Papeologou, 2013). 
 
3.3 N-ARDL model  
 
Using intuition provided by Shin et al (2014), I suppose that Gt can be decomposed into partial 
sum processes of positive and negative changes (Gt = G0 + 𝑮𝒕
++ 𝑮𝒕
−), so that equation (3) can be 
re-specified as the following long-run asymmetric model: 
 
Rt = 0 + β+𝑮𝒕
++ β-𝑮𝒕
− + et        (5) 
 
where 𝑮𝒕
+ = ∑ 𝒊𝒋=𝟏 𝑮𝒋
+ = ∑ 𝐦𝐚𝐱⁡𝒊𝒋=𝟏 (Gj, 0) and 𝑮𝒕
− = ∑ 𝒊𝒋=𝟏 𝑮𝒋
− = ∑ 𝐦𝐢𝐧⁡𝒊𝒋=𝟏 (Gj, 0). The 
NARDL (p, q)-in-levels transformation of regression (4) can be given as: 
 
𝑹𝒕 = ∑ 𝝍𝒊𝑹𝒕−𝒋 +
𝒑
𝒋=𝟏 ∑ (𝒋
+𝑮𝒕−𝒋
+ + 𝒋
−𝑮𝒕−𝒋
− ) + 
𝒕
𝒑
𝒋=𝟏                 (6) 
 
Whereas the associated error correction representation can be denoted as: 
 
𝑹𝒕 = ∑ 𝒊𝑹𝒕−𝒋 + 𝒋
+𝑮𝒕−𝒋
+ + 𝒋
−𝑮𝒕−𝒋
− +
𝒑
𝒋=𝟏 ∑ 𝒊𝑹𝒕−𝒋 + ∑ (𝒋
+𝑮𝒕−𝒋
+ + 𝒋
−𝑮𝒕−𝒋
− )
𝒒−𝟏
𝒋=𝟎 + 𝒕
𝒑−𝟏
𝒋=𝟏   
           (7) 
The asymmetric long-run parameters of interest from equations 5 are then computed as β+ =  
-(+/) and β- = -(-/). To validate the NARDL long- and short-run effects, Shin et al (2014) 
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propose the testing of three empirical hypotheses. The first is an asymmetrical extension of the 
conventional bounds test for cointegration (Pesaran et al, 2001) and tests the null hypothesis of 
 = + = -. The second hypothesis tests the null of no long-run cointegration effects (i.e. β- = 
β+), while the third tests the null hypothesis of no short-run asymmetric effects (∑ 𝒋
+𝒒−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎  = 
∑ 𝒋
−𝒒−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎 ).  
 
3.4 Data and empirical results 
3.4.1. Data description 
The data used in this study has been collected from Statistics SA’s online statistical database. The 
time series collected includes total government expenditure (Gt) and total government revenues 
(Rt) for all nine provinces (Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-
Natal, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. All time series are collected on an 
annual basis frequency from 2000 to 2016 and both series are measured in their actual rand 
value, which is then converted into its natural logarithms. 
3.4.2 Empirical data and unit root tests 
As previously mentioned, the N-ARDL model is fully operational with a mixture of levels-statio-
nary and first-difference-stationary variables. However, the model is not compatible with second-
difference stationary time series, so before any estimation can be made it is essential to ensure 
that none of the time series is integrated of order I(2). To this end we perform the ADF, PP and 
DF-GLS unit root tests on the first differences of all observed time series and each test is 
conducted with i) an intercept and ii) a trend. The results of this empirical exercise are reported 
in Table 3.2 and, as can be observed, all the tests performed reject the null hypothesis of the time 
series being integrated of an order higher than I(1) at significance levels of at least 5%. In the light 
of these results, we conclude that all the time series are suitable for N-ARDL modelling. 
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Table 3.1: Unit root test results on second differences on time series 
  ADF PP DF-GLS 
Province  intercept Trend intercept trend intercept trend 
WC Gt -4.77*** -4.52*** -6.32*** -6.01*** -4.88*** -4.94*** 
Rt -5.21*** -4.97*** -7.93*** -7.66*** -5.36*** -5.42*** 
EC Gt -5.51*** -5.30*** -11.19*** -11.68*** -5.73*** -5.76*** 
Rt -5.38*** -5.20*** -10.15*** -11.10*** -5.59*** -5.64*** 
NC Gt -6.70*** -6.46*** -14.03*** -14.93 -6.91*** -6.96*** 
Rt -5.74*** -5.53*** -8.99*** -11.31*** -5.93*** -5.99*** 
FS Gt -5.83*** -5.69*** -7.75*** -10.26*** -6.05*** -6.19*** 
Rt -5.50*** -5.31*** -8.95*** -10.95*** -5.70*** -5.75*** 
KZN Gt -4.82*** -4.62*** -9.82*** -9.69*** -5.01*** -5.02*** 
Rt -4.79*** -4.62*** -7.83*** -8.78*** -4.98*** -5.02*** 
NW Gt -4.67*** -4.35*** -19.52*** -18.57*** -4.88*** -4.86*** 
Rt -4.90*** -4.66*** -18.74*** -18.09*** -5.15*** -5.04*** 
GP Gt -5.23*** -5.04*** -7.60*** -7.03*** -5.44*** -5.48*** 
Rt -6.16*** -5.88*** -14.45*** -13.86*** -6.33*** -6.39*** 
Mpu Gt -3.88** -3.72*** -6.55*** -6.22*** -4.03*** -4.04*** 
Rt -4.83*** -4.63** -9.21*** -9.28*** -5.02*** -5.04*** 
Lim Gt -6.86*** -6.57*** -9.32*** -10.74*** -7.05*** -7.12*** 
Rt -5.62*** -5.40*** -11.54*** -11.93*** -5.84*** -5.87*** 
Source: Own computation 
Note: “***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels respectively. 
 
3.5 Empirical analysis 
Having assured that none of the time series variables is second-difference stationary, I proceed 
to a formal empirical analysis, starting by reporting on the results obtained from the 
asymmetrical cointegration tests as performed on the empirical N-ARDL regressions for all nine 
provinces. As shown in Table 3.2, we find extremely encouraging results in the sense that the test 
statistics produced for all three tested hypotheses reject the null hypotheses of i) no nonlinear 
ARDL effects ii) no long-run asymmetric effects and iii) no short-run asymmetric effects. We 
particularly note that all statistics manage to reject their respective null hypotheses at all levels 
of significance. This permits me to proceed to estimate the N-ARDL models for expenditure-
revenue regression for all nine South African provinces. 
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Table 3.2: N-ARDL cointegration tests 
Province  = + =  β- = β+ ∑ 𝒋
+𝒒−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎 =∑ 𝒋
−𝒒−𝟏
𝒊=𝟎  
WC 17.96*** 15.79*** 19.74*** 
EC 10.48*** 8.22*** 11.57*** 
NC 13.00*** 21.98*** 16.64*** 
FS 7.40*** 10.73*** 6.54*** 
KZN 13.33*** 4.54*** 7.89*** 
NW 6.16*** 6.74*** 7.56*** 
GP 22.59*** 4.28*** 5.46*** 
Mpu 15.96*** 8.58*** 9.87*** 
Lim 6.49*** 14.32*** 10.32*** 
Source: Own computation 
Note: “***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ denote the 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels respectively.  
 
Before providing a discussion of the long- and short-run regression estimates, reported 
respectively in panels A and B of Table 3.3, it is essential that we provide a brief description of 
the manner of interpreting the estimated coefficients. The positive and highly significant coeffi-
cient estimates associated with G+ (G+) and the G- (G-) variables imply that increases in 
government expenditure are associated with increases in government revenues, while falls in 
expenditure are accompanied by falls in revenue collection. Recall, from the earlier discussion of 
the study’s theoretical underpinnings, that higher coefficient estimates imply higher levels of 
budgetary sustainability. So when G+(G+) > G-(G-), increased government expenditures and 
revenues would result in higher levels of budget sustainability. Conversely when G+(G+) < G-
(G-), decreases in expenditure and revenues would ensure increased budget sustainability. 
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Table 3.3: N-ARDL estimates 
 WC EC NC FS KZN NW GP MPL LIM 
Panel A: 
long-run 
estimates 
         
G+ 1.03 
(0.00)*** 
1.04 
(0.00)** 
0.99 
(0.00)*** 
0.98 
(0.00)*** 
1.00 
(0.00)*** 
1.02 
(0.00)*** 
1.11 
(0.00)*** 
1.00 
(0.00)*** 
1.06 
(0.00)*** 
G- 1.51 
(0.00)*** 
0.74 
(0.00)*** 
0.64 
(0.00)*** 
0.85 
(0.00)*** 
0.96 
(0.00)*** 
1.14 
(0.00)*** 
1.77 
(0.00)*** 
1.17 
(0.00)*** 
1.08 
(0.00)*** 
Panel B: 
short run 
estimates 
         
G+ 1.01 
(0.00)*** 
0.74 
(0.00)*** 
0.93 
(0.00)** 
1.07 
(0.00)*** 
0.88 
(0.00)*** 
0.91 
(0.00)*** 
0.72 
(0.00)*** 
1.00 
(0.00)*** 
0.90 
(0.00)*** 
G- 1.49 
(0.00)*** 
0.68 
(0.00)*** 
0.71 
(0.00)*** 
-0.79 
(0.00)** 
1.07 
(0.00)*** 
1.33 
(0.00)*** 
1.63 
(0.00)*** 
1.27 
(0.00)*** 
1.16 
(0.00)*** 
ectt-1 -0.94 
(0.01)** 
-0.79 
(0.00)*** 
-0.96 
(0.00)*** 
-0.99 
(0.00)*** 
-0.91 
(0.00)*** 
-0.75 
(0.00)*** 
-0.64 
(0.00)*** 
-0.90 
(0.00)*** 
-0.98 
(0.00)*** 
Panel C: 
diagnostic 
tests 
         
𝑵𝑶𝑹𝑴
𝟐  1.27 
(0.53) 
0.99 
(0.61) 
2.40 
(0.30) 
5.34 
(0.07) 
21.11 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.93) 
0.27 
(0.87) 
0.73 
(0.69) 
0.26 
(0.87) 
𝑺𝑪
𝟐  0.87 
(0.45) 
0.62 
(0.56) 
0.07 
(0.94) 
1.89 
(0.20) 
0.37 
(0.70) 
1.24 
(0.33) 
2.85 
(0.11) 
0.23 
(0.80) 
0.93 
(0.43) 
𝑯𝑬𝑻
𝟐  2.39 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.98) 
0.40 
(0.54) 
0.04 
(0.85) 
0.08 
(0.78) 
8.58 
(0.01) 
1.72 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.96) 
0.03 
(0.86) 
𝑭𝑭
𝟐  0.76 
(0.46) 
0.63 
(0.54) 
3.85 
(0.00) 
1.46 
(0.17) 
2.21 
(0.05) 
2.87 
(0.02) 
0.30 
(0.77) 
0.75 
(0.47) 
1.18 
(0.26) 
Source: Own computation 
Note: p-values reported in parentheses. “***”, “**”, “*” denote the 1%, 5% and 10% critical levels respectively. 
 
So in collectively summarising the findings, we firstly note that over the long run, as shown in 
Panel A of Table 3.3, the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Free-Sate and KwaZulu-Natal would exert 
higher levels of budget sustainability by increasing government expenditure and revenues, since 
the estimated coefficients satisfy the condition G+ > G-. Conversely, for the remaining provinces 
where G+ < G- (Western Cape, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo), higher 
budgetary sustainability can be attained by lowering expenditure and revenues. 
Moreover, we also point out that the Western Cape, North West, Gauteng and Mpumalanga and 
Limpopo have extremely efficient budgets in the long run, since the coefficient values of both G+ 
and G- produce values equal to or greater than unity. These “above-unity” estimates are not 
strange findings since our estimation timeframe covers a period in which most provincial 
governments recorded surpluses in their respective budgets (the fiscal years 2005/2006 and 
2006/2007). On the other hand, the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Free-State and KwaZulu-Natal 
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appear to be the provinces with the least sustainable budgets, as at least one of the G+ or G- 
coefficients produces values less than unity. However, we are quick to point out that for the cases 
of the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, the G+ values are equal to or exceed unity, implying that 
complete budget sustainability can be achieved in theses provinces on the condition that local 
governments increase expenditures and revenues in these provinces. Nevertheless, for the case 
of the Northern Cape and Free-State, complete budget sustainability cannot be attained since 
neither G+ nor G- estimates exceed unity. 
 
In turning our focus towards the short-run dynamics, as reported in Panel B of Table 3.3, we firstly 
note that short-term budgets can be improved by reducing expenditure and revenues in the 
Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. Conversely, 
short-term budgets in the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Free-State can be improved by 
increasing short-term expenditure and revenues. We also observe short-term complete budget 
sustainability only for the Western Cape and Mpumalanga data since both G+ and G- produce 
values which exceed unity for these provinces. On the other hand, we note that short-term 
budgets in the Eastern Cape and Northern Cape cannot achieve complete budget sustainability 
regardless of decrease or increase in expenditures and revenues since the values on the G+ and 
G- variables are both lower than unity. 
 
We further observe that the error correction terms, which provide a measure of the speed of 
adjustment back to equilibrium subsequent to a shock to the economy, all produce significant 
estimates which are of the correct negative values. However, the speed of adjustment varies for 
each province, with the Free-State having the highest adjustment speed at 99% a year, followed 
by Limpopo (98%), Northern Cape (96%), Western Cape (94%), KwaZulu-Natal (91%), 
Mpumalanga (90%), Eastern Cape (79%), North West (75%) and Gauteng (64%). 
 
As the last step in this empirical analysis, we perform diagnostic tests for the estimated 
regressions. we particularly test for normality, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and 
functional form, the results of these tests being reported in Panel C of Table 3.3. As can be easily 
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observed none of the extracted errors from the estimated N-ARDL regressions suffers from non-
normality, autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity. Moreover, none of the estimated regressions is 
of an incorrect functional form. Collectively, this presents sufficient evidence that all estimated 
N-ARDL models conform to the conditions stipulated under the classical regressions model 
assumptions, so the estimations can be interpreted with non-spurious meaning. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This study has taken a different empirical approach to analysing the expenditure-revenue nexus 
for the South African economy by examining the relationship from a provincial perspective using 
annual data collected between 2000 and 2016. The mode of empirical investigating is the N-ARDL 
model of Shin et al (2016), which contains a unique feature of identifying whether increases or 
decreases in provincial budgets will improve or deteriorate the ability of provincial government 
authorities to sustain their respective budgets. In this sense, the model is able to identify which 
provinces need to increase their expenditure-revenue budgets and which need to reduce their 
budgets. 
 
The empirical results specifically imply that over the long run, the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, 
Free-Sate and KwaZulu-Natal should reduce their budgets to attain greater budget sustainability, 
whereas the Western Cape, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo need to lower their 
expenditure-revenue budgets to be more sustainable over the long run. However, over the short 
run, the Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Free-State need to increase their budgets to attain 
higher levels of sustainability whereas Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, North West, Gauteng, 
Mpumalanga and Limpopo are advised to decrease their budgets to be more sustainable. Overall, 
the “one-rule-fits-all” strategy as suggested by previous South African studies provides limited 
information about provincial governments as the provinces require varying strategies for 
improving the sustainability of their respective budgets. 
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CHAPTER 4. PROCYCALITY OF FISCAL SPENDING AND OPTIMAL TAX RATES IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
SOME NEW INSIGHTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing or emerging economies is a universally recognized 
economic tenet which has been emphatically embraced within the scholarly paradigm (Gavin and 
Perotti (1997), Talvi and Vegh (2005), Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), Carmignani (2010), Erbil (2011), 
Frankel et al. (2013) and Vegh and Vuletin (2015)). The most recent global economic meltdown 
of 2008-2009 stands to serve as a convenient litmus test for these allegations as fiscal 
governments in both industrialized and developing countries continue to struggle with 
implementing appropriate fiscal stimulus packages as a recovery measure. For the case of South 
Africa, being the nation with most sophisticated fiscal system in the Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) 
region, both growth performance and growth outlooks/forecasts by global governing bodies such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in the post-crisis era has 
been nothing short of disappointing. Notably, this has been accompanied with a worsening trend 
in fiscal expenditure as well as a slowdown of tax revenue, all which are leading signs of an 
undesirable procyclical fiscal stance. 
 
The performance and development trends of government expenditure, government revenue and 
economic growth in South Africa between 2000 and 2017 are portrayed in Figure 4.1 below. From 
the diagram, three different trend patterns over the time series can be identified. Firstly, 
between 2000 and 2007 (before the recession), GDP and government expenditure followed a 
similar upward trajectory, whereas GDP and government revenue had mixed fluctuation 
patterns. Secondly, between 2008 and 2009 (during the recession), a hybrid pattern was 
observed where growth in GDP was associated with a mixed fluctuation in government 
expenditure and revenue. Lastly, between 2011 and 2017 (post-recession), the decline in GDP 
was associated with a decline in both government expenditure and revenue. This latest pattern 
implies the co-existence of declining growth in the three variables and solely based on the visual 
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appreciation of the series, one might be tempted to conclude on the procyclicality of fiscal policy 
in South Africa. However, with little country-specific empirical backings to these 
visualizations/visual impressions, especially for periods corresponding to the post-crisis era, the 
subject remains open to further academic scrutiny.   
 
Figure 4.1: Government expenditure and revenue growth rates and economic growth rate in South 
Africa (2000-2017) 
  
Source: Statistics South Africa (2018), and national Treasury (2018) 
 
Against these observations, the purpose and contribution of the study is twofold. Firstly, we 
investigate the cyclicality of fiscal expenditure for the South African economy by testing nonlinear 
versions of Wagner’s law in which we design to articulate the dependency of government size on 
economic growth during different phases of the business cycle. In differing from conventional 
studies in the literature, which tend to rely on filtering methods to extract the cyclical 
components of government consumption and economic growth priori to estimation, the 
econometric design of our study rather allows for the business cycle to be modelled from within 
the estimated regression. To this end, we rely on the recently introduced nonlinear 
autoregressive distributive lag (NARDL) model of Shin et al. (2014) which presents a formidable 
framework for our objectives. For instance, the model is accommodative of a mixture of 
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stationary and first difference series in the cointegration matrix hence relieving pressure on 
econometrician in ensuring that series are mutually integrated of similar order. Moreover, the 
NARDL allows to model short-run and long-run cointegration effects between fiscal spending and 
income during different phases of the business cycle. This enables us to gear our rationale 
towards testing a new hypothesis of the cyclicality of fiscal activity possibly differing depending 
on whether the economy is on the upswing or the downswing phase of the economic cycle. If 
this hypothesis is true, then it would imply that conventional symmetric fiscal rules may need to 
be revised to accommodate for existing asymmetries caused by cyclical fluctuations/distortions. 
Our empirical strategy by itself present a novelty to the academic literature.  
 
The second purpose of study is to test the efficiency of government revenue collections within a 
growth-maximizing context. Traditionally, a procyclical fiscal stance is hypothesized to emulate 
from limited access to international credit markets to political distortions and institutional 
weaknesses that tend to encourage luscious fiscal spending during boom periods . This eventually 
leads to an inefficiency of resource allocations in markets, problems of collective choice, rent-
seeking behaviour, and this ultimately reflected in a weakened taxation system (Scully, 1995). 
For instance, procyclical fiscal stance would have government increasing expenditures during 
economic booms on the backbone of healthy tax receipts, which end up ‘fuelling’ the economic 
cycle. Eventually, as the economy enters into the downswing of the economic cycle, instead of 
government protecting citizens by lowering taxes rates, revenue authorities are forced to raise 
tax rates, due to insufficient revenue savings from the boom period. This course of action 
(increasing taxes) may worsen the recessionary period hence amplifying the negative 
externalities of tax rates.     
 
An optimal fiscal policy would balance the positive-negative externality effects of on taxation on 
patterns of economic growth during the economic cycles by keeping the tax rate in line with some 
optimal rate. Scully (1995, 1996) presents a parsimonious growth maximizing model which he 
used to estimate the optimal tax rates for the United States and New Zealand, respectively. 
Notably, a handful of previous empirical studies have used Scully’s (1996,1998) framework to 
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estimate the optimal tax rate for South Africa (Schoeman and van Heerden (2009) and Saibu 
(2015)) [and collectively these studies provide estimates] but/and yet these studies do so at a 
‘hypothetical’ aggregated level. In our study, we provide more realistic optimal tax estimates by 
disaggregating the measure of tax rates according to its different revenue sub-classes (i.e. i) taxes 
on income, profits and capital gains ii) taxes on property iii) value added tax (VAT) iv) general fuel 
levy v) excise duties vi) taxes on international trade and transactions). This is an important 
distinction since fiscal authorities tend to control disaggregated tax rates in their quest to provide 
fiscal income receipts in the interest of maximizing economic growth. As far as we are concerned, 
our study becomes the first study in the literature to estimate optimal growth-maximizing tax 
rates for disaggregated classes of taxes. To deal with possible endogeneity effects, differences in 
the integration orders of the time series as well as our relative small sample size (46 
observations), we rely on the traditional ARDL model of Pesaran et al. (2001) which overcomes 
all these empirical deficiencies.   
 
We proceed with reminder of our study as follows.  The follow section of the paper starts with 
the literature review followed by the methodological framework of the study. The next section 
describes the data used and presents our empirical findings of the study. The last section 
concludes the work.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
The debate on the procyclicality of fiscal policy in developing economies gained prominence 
following the Latin American debt crisis of 1980’s. Gavin and Perotti (1997) were amongst the 
first to empirical uncover procyclical fiscal policy as a stylized fact for Latin economies. According 
to the authors, the consequential severity of procyclical fiscal policy in Latin American economies 
was reflected in the ensuing Latin-American currency crisis of the 1990’s. Talvi and Vegh (2005) 
later demonstrated that the procyclicity of fiscal policy is not only constrained to Latin American 
countries but also to other developing regions such as African and Asian economies and to a 
lesser extent non-G7 industrialized economies. Using a larger dataset of developing and 
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emerging economies, this finding was further supported by Kaminsky et al. (2004) who find that 
fiscal procyclicality practiced in developing economies reinforces the business cycle fluctuations 
by amplifying booms and worsening recessions, a phenomenon which the authors describe as 
“when it rains, it pours”. Indeed, the procyclicality of fiscal policy in non-industrialized economies 
as observed by these previous researchers further contradicts conventional Keynesian and 
Neoclassical theoretical prescriptions, which hypothesize on countercyclical or ascyclical policies 
being the optimal choice for fiscal authorities over the steady-state equilibrium. On one hand, 
standard Keynesians argue that in the presence of sticky prices and wages, the optimal fiscal 
policy is countercyclical (Christiano et al. (2011)). On the other hand, the Neoclassicals argue that 
optimal policy to be ascyclical as in the tax smoothing model of Barro (1979) or countercyclical 
as in the general equilibrium model of Baxter and King (1993). 
 
Besides the conventional Keynesian and Neoclassical theories of fiscal cyclicality, there are 
several more detailed hypotheses which attempt to explain the observed procyclicality of fiscal 
policy in developing countries. For instance, Gavin and Perotti (1997) argue that borrowing 
constraints and the lack of access to international financial markets faced by fiscal authorities in 
developing countries during contractionary periods force government to primarily rely on tax 
revenues to finance fiscal expenditures required to rescue the economy out of the recession. 
Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) further demonstrate on how developing economies characterized 
by incomplete asset markets can lead to fiscal procyclical. In their model, fiscal authorities behave 
like a ‘tormented insurer’ who relies on risk-free debt instruments to smooth payments to the 
private sector despite large cyclical variability in public revenues and this results in a negative 
correlation between fiscal debt and revenues i.e. procyclical fiscal policy. Alesina et al., (2008) 
suggest information asymmetry existing in the political economy as a significant source of 
procyclical fiscal behaviour in developing economies. Whilst voters are unaware of the rents 
appropriated by corrupt governments during the upswing of the business cycle, they are 
observant of the state of the economy, that is, they can distinguish whether the economy is in 
the upswing or the downswing phase of the business cycle. Once voters realize that they are in a 
recession, they pressurize the government to provide more public goods to society, hence 
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‘starving the Leviathan’ and forcing government to act procyclical. Illzetzki (2011) model a more 
encompassing political economy in which successive governments with divergent distributive 
objectives produces political frictions resulting in fiscal procyclicality. For instance, the ‘former’ 
government may save more and borrow less during economic expansions in order to provide its 
citizens with public goods as a substitute for private consumption goods during recessions whilst 
the ‘new’ government may use the savings gathered by the former government to benefit its 
own political constituency through rent-seeking behaviour. In implementing numerical 
calibirations to the theoretical model, Illzetzki (2011) further demonstrates on how political 
polarization is a more plausible explanation for procyclical fiscal policy in developing economies 
as opposed to arguments based on financial market frictions or high levels of macroeconomic 
volatility.  
 
Notably, the assumption of fiscal procyclicality in developing and emerging markets is not 
altogether conclusive within the academic paradigm. For instance, Frankel et al. (2013) recently 
demonstrate that at least a third of the developing world (24 out of 73 countries) have escaped 
the procyclical trap and ‘graduated’ into counter cyclical fiscal policy mainly due to vast 
improvements in institutional quality. Moreover, Balassone et al. (2010) argue that during the 
most recent recessionary stretch both developing and industrialized economies have 
implemented procyclical fiscal policy, and it is only during previous expansionary periods have 
industrialized economies being countercyclical whilst fiscal policy in developing economies were 
partially procyclical. The authors conclude on the asymmetry of fiscal cycalicity over various 
states of the business cycle of which they provide empirical evidence for 14 EU countries. 
Sorensen and Yosha (2001) have identified at least three explanations for such existing 
asymmetries in fiscal cyclicality. Firstly, balanced budget rules imposed by state institutions 
would limit the ability of government to incur debt during recessionary periods and hence 
government would be constrained by the amount of surpluses accumulated during expansions. 
Therefore, budget rules limit the amount of flexibility afforded to governments who display 
weaker fiscal disciplines during ‘good times’ hence inducing asymmetric fiscal behaviour. 
Secondly, politically-based economies in which previous governments make it more difficult for 
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successive governments/their successors to increase spending during recessions whilst 
‘voracious’ pressure groups may it more difficult to accumulate surpluses during economic 
expansions. Thirdly, governments may have ‘sacred cows’ such as welfare programs in poor 
countries of which expenditure on such social items cannot be cut even during ‘bad times’. In 
such instances, increases in such ‘sacred cow’ expenditure items may experience increases during 
both the upswing and downswing of the business cycle, although differing in magnitude across 
various phases of the economic cycle.  
 
Regardless of whether fiscal policy is deemed to be symmetric or asymmetric, the literature is in 
consensus of tax smoothing policies as suggested by Ramsey (1927), Barro (1979), Lucas and 
Stokey (1983), Bohn (1990) as being a more desirable revenue collection strategy for fiscal 
governments as it more efficiently ‘smooths out’ the deadweight burden of taxes over time 
(Niepelt, 2004). Tax smoothing states that government can minimize tax distortions by keeping 
tax rates relatively smooth or constant rather than rising them in some periods and lowering 
them in other periods. In this regard, optimal tax policy balances out two objectives; one being a 
lower income maximizing tax rate which minimizes the deadweight burden on taxpayers and the 
other being a higher revenue-maximizing rate which places a higher burden on taxpayers 
especially in ‘lower-income brackets’ (Diamond and Saez, 2011). Scully (1995, 1996, 2003) 
presents a parsimonious growth maximizing model which distinguishes between two optimal tax 
rates; a higher revenue-maximizing rate and lower growth maximizing rate. Based on the model, 
taxes which exceed the optimal growth-maximizing rate channels resources away from the 
private sector to informal sector as economic agents try to escape high taxes hence causing an 
inefficiency of resource allocations. Besides provided by Scully (1995, 1996) initial application of 
the optimal growth maximizing tax rates for New Zealand and the US respectively, his framework 
has been extended to other countries such as Canada (Chao and Grubel, 1998); EU countries 
(Forte and Magazzino, 2011); Ivory Coast (Keho, 2010); South Africa (Schoeman and van Heerden, 
2009) and Nigeria (Saibu, 2015). Notably, three shortcomings are identified with these previous 
studies. Firstly, the data used in these previous works strictly covers the pre-2007 global financial 
crisis era, which is well known to represent an important structural break in macroeconomies 
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worldwide. Secondly, none of the previous studies has provided corresponding estimates for the 
revenue-maximizing tax rates which is important for analytical purposes. Thirdly, the previous 
works are limited in scope to aggregated levels of tax rates and this undermines the role of 
disaggregated tax revenue classes used by fiscal authorities in reality. As mentioned before, our 
study takes into consideration all these shortcomings identified from previous literature and 
provides estimates based on rigorous econometric models. 
 
 
4.3. Theoretical framework 
 
4.3.1. Nonlinear Wagner’s specifications 
 
So far, the literature has identified six versions of Wagner’s law which articulate the dependency 
of government size on output using different functional forms. The first is the Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961) version in which total government expenditure (GE) is dependent on economic 
output (GDP): 
  
Log (GEt) = a1 + b1Log (GDPt) + u1t`       (1) 
The second is the Gupta (1976) version in which per-capita government expenditure (GE/P) is 
dependent on per capita GDP (RGDP/P): 
 
Log⁡(
GEt
Pt
 ) = a2 + b2 Log⁡(
GDPt
Pt
 )+ u2t       (2) 
 
The third is the Goffman (1968) version in which total government expenditure (RE) is dependent 
on GDP per capita (GDP/P): 
 
Log (GEt) = a3 + b3 Log (
GDPt
Pt
 )+ u3t       (3) 
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The fourth is the Pryol (1969) version in which government consumption expenditure (CGE) is 
dependent on the growth in GDP: 
 
Log (CGEt) = a4 + b4Log (GDPt) + u4t       (4) 
 
The fifth is the Musgrave (1969) version in which the share of government expenditures in GDP 
(GE/GDP) depends on the per capita GDP (RGDP/P): 
 
Log (
GEt
𝐺𝐷𝑃1
) = a5 +b5 Log ( 
GDPt
Pt
) + u5t       (5) 
 
The sixth is the Mann (1980) version in which the share of nominal government expenditures in 
GDP (GE/GDP) depends on GDP: 
 
Log (
GEt
GDP1
) = a6 + b6Log (GDPt)+u6t       (6) 
 
However, regressions (1) to (6) are purely procyclical in nature in the sense of ruling out any 
possible countercyclical fiscal effects. In our study, we propose a modification of these 6 Wagner 
regressions which are designed to capture the varying impacts of economic activity on 
government size during expansionary and recessionary phases in the business cycles. The idea is 
that the procycacility or countercyclicality of fiscal policy may differ depending on whether the 
economy is on the upswing or the downswing of the business cycle. In order to incorporate the 
business cycle within Wagner’s specifications, we partition the general measure of activity (i.e. 
dependent variable in regressions (1) to (6)) into its partial sum processes of positive and negative 
changes, representing upswings and downswings of the business cycle, respectively i.e. 
 
𝑌𝑡
+ = ∑ 𝑖𝑗=1 𝑌𝑗
+ = ∑ max⁡𝑖𝑗=1 (Yj, 0)       (7)  
 
𝑌𝑡
− = ∑ 𝑖𝑗=1 𝑌𝑗
− = ∑ min⁡𝑖𝑗=1 (Yj, 0)       (8)  
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Where  is a first difference operative measuring the change in economic activity, Y as a general 
measure of economic activity, Y+ is the Wagner’s coefficient during the upswing of the cycle and 
Y- is Wagner’s coefficient during the downswing of economic cycle. In taking the partial sum 
processes in equations (7) and (8) and substituting them into the baseline Wagner’s specifications 
represented in equations (1) through to (6), we can specify the following nonlinear regression 
specifications:  
 
𝑔𝑒 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ (𝑏𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ + 𝑏𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− )𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1     (9) 
 
𝑔𝑒
𝑝 𝑡
= ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+ ∑ (𝑏𝑗
+ 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑏𝑗
− 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
)𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1     (10) 
 
𝑔𝑒𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ ∑ (𝑏𝑗
+ 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑏𝑗
− 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
)𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1     (11) 
 
𝑐𝑔𝑒 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ (𝑏𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ + 𝑏𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− )𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1     (12) 
 
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
= ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ ∑ (𝑏𝑗
+ 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑏𝑗
− 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
)𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1     (13) 
  
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
= ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ (𝑏𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ + 𝑏𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− )𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1     (14) 
 
Where the ‘lowercase’ term denotes the logarithm transformation of the variable. Regressions 
(9) to (14) can be re-specified as the following NARDL-ECM (p, q) estimation regressions: 
 
𝑔𝑒𝑡 = ∑ 𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 +𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ +𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− +𝑝𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 +
∑ (𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ +𝑞−1𝑗=0
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− ) + 𝑣𝑡    
= ∑ 
𝑖
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ (𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ + 𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− )𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1  (15) 
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
𝑔𝑒
𝑝 𝑡
= ∑ 
𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+ 𝑗
+ 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑗
− 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
+𝑝𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+ ∑ (𝑗
+
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+𝑞−1𝑗=0
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑗
−
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
) + 𝑣𝑡    
= ∑ 
𝑖
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+∑ (𝑗
+
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑗
−
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
)𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1  (16) 
 
𝑔𝑒𝑡 = ∑ 𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑗
+ 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑗
− 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
+𝑝𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ (𝑗
+
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+𝑞−1𝑗=0
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑗
−
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
) + 𝑣𝑡    
= ∑ 
𝑖
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ (𝑗
+
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑗
−
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
)𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1  (17) 
 
𝑐𝑔𝑒𝑡 = ∑ 𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ +𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− +𝑝𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 +
∑ (𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ +𝑞−1𝑗=0
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− ) + 𝑣𝑡    
= ∑ 
𝑖
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝑐𝑔𝑒𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ (𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ + 𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− )𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1  (18) 
 

𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
= ∑ 
𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ 𝑗
+ 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑗
− 𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
+𝑝𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ ∑ (𝑗
+
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+𝑞−1𝑗=0
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑗
−
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
) + 𝑣𝑡    
= ∑ 
𝑖
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ ∑ (𝑗
+
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
+
+ 𝑗
−
𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑝 𝑡−𝑗
−
)𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1  (19) 
 

𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
= ∑ 𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ +𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− +𝑝𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ ∑ (𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ +𝑞−1𝑗=0
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− ) + 𝑣𝑡    
= ∑ 
𝑖
𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜓𝑖
𝑔𝑒
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ ∑ (𝑗
+𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
+ + 𝑗
−𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗
− )𝑞−1𝑗=0 + 𝑣𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1  (20) 
 
Where ectt is the nonlinear error correction term and asymmetric long run coefficients are 
computed as LY(+) = -(+/) and LY(-) = -(-/). There are four operational testing procedures for 
asymmetric cointegration based on the NARDL-ECM’s. The first is an adaptation Banerjee et al. 
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(1998) cointegration which is a t-test on the coefficient of the error correction term (i.e.  = 0). 
The second test is an extension of the joint F-test of Pesaran et al. (2001) which tests the null 
hypothesis of no asymmetric cointegration effects as  = + = - = 0 against the alternative   
+  -  0. Since the asymptotic distributions of the tests are non-standard, the ‘bounds testing’ 
approach of Pesaran et al. (2001) is used to accommodate for two extreme cases amongst the 
regressors, that is, when all regressors are I(0) and when they are all I(1). The last two tests, as 
proposed by Shin et al. (2014) separately test for long-run asymmetric effects (i.e. LY(+) = LY(-)) 
and for short-run cumulative asymmetries (i.e. αi+ = αi- for all i=0,…,q-1. The statistics testing the 
aforementioned asymmetric hypotheses are denoted as tBDM, FPSS, WLR and WSR, respectively.   
 
4.3.2. Scully’s (1995, 1996, 2003) optimal tax model  
 
The second model framework we use in our study is Scully’s (1995, 1996, 2003) growth-
maximizing tax model which is founded on a two-sector economy consisting of a public 
(government) and a private sector. On one hand, the public sector provides public goods, Gt-1, 
which are produced with labour and capital input which is financed from revenue collections,  Y 
t-1, where r is the tax rate such that the equality G = Yt, holds. On the other hand, the private 
sector produces private goods using the after tax income of the previous period, (1-)Y t-1, such 
that the both private and public goods collectively account for national output and mutually  
enter the production function as follows: 
 
Yt = a(Gt-1)b[(1-)Yt-1]c         (21) 
 
Where b,c < 1. From equation (21) the growth rate is then computed as: 
 
Yt/Yt-1 = 1+g = a(Gt-1)b(1-)c(Yt-1)c-1       (22) 
 
By simply differentiating g with to G as well as g with respect to r, Scully (1995, 1996) proves that 
g/G > 0, 2g/2G < 0, g/ < 0, 2g/2 < 0, hence implying that i) the effect of increased G on 
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growth is positive but at a diminishing rate ii) the effect of an increase in the tax rate, , on growth 
is negative at an increasing rate. This enables for the computation of two tax maximizing rates. 
The first optimal tax rate is the growth maximizing rate, G, which is obtained by substituting the 
equality G=Y into the growth equation (22), yielding: 
 
Yt/Yt-1 = 1+g = ab(1-)c(Yt-1)b+c-1       (23) 
 
And then differentiating g with respect to  and setting to zero (i.e. g/=0) and solving for , 
will yield the growth maximizing tax rate, G, as: 
 
G = b/(b+c)          (24) 
 
The second optimal tax rate is the revenue maximizing rate, R, which is obtained by 
substituting the equality G=Y into the production function equation (21), and re-arranging i.e. 
 
G t-1 = ab(1-)c(Yt-1)b+c        (25) 
 
And then solving for G with respect to r and then equating to zero and solving, for the 
revenue maximizing rate, R, will yield: 
 
R = (1+b)/(b+c+1)         (25) 
 
To obtain the coefficient elasticities b and c, Scully (1995, 1996, 2000) suggests estimating the 
following log-linear production function: 
 
Ln (Yt) = a + b Ln(t) + c Ln(1-)t + et       (26) 
  
However, as argued by Scully (2003), estimating the log-linear regression (26) using cointegration 
framework is usually problematic seeing that conventional cointegration frameworks require the 
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observed time series to be integrated of similar order. As mentioned earlier in the paper, we 
employ the ARDL model to circumvent all these empirical shortcomings. Therefore, in 
transforming equation (26) into its ARDL(p, q) form would result in: 
 
𝐿𝑛(𝑌𝑡) = 0 + ∑ 1
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 2
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝐿𝑛𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 3
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝐿𝑛(1 − )𝑡−𝑖 + 1𝑌𝑡−1 + 2𝑡−1 +

3
𝐿𝑛(1 − 𝑟)𝑡−1 + 𝑡         (27) 
 
Where  is a first difference operator, 0 is the intercept term, the parameters 1, …, 2 and 1, 
…, 2 are the short-run and long-run elasticities, respectively, and t is a well-behaved error term. 
From equation (27), Pesaran et al. (2001) suggest the bounds test for cointegration which 
involves testing the joint null hypothesis of no cointegration effects (i.e. 1 = 2 = 0) against the 
alternative hypothesis of ARDL cointegration effects (i.e. 1 ≠ 2 ≠ 0). Since the asymptotic 
properties of the proposed test are non-standard, Pesaran et al. (2001) derive two sets of critical 
values (i.e. upper and lower critical) for the tests which are applicable regardless of whether the 
regressors are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated. The rule of thumb is that cointegration effects 
are validated only if the F-statistic exceeds the upper critical bound level. In the presence of 
significant cointegration effects, the long-run level relationship between the time series can be 
specified as: 
 
Ln (Yt) = 0 + 1 Ln(t) + 2 Ln(1-)t + et      (28) 
 
Where, the long-run regression coefficients are computed as 1 = -2/1 and 2 = -3/1. Note 
that based on these long-run coefficients can we obtain our optimal growth- maximizing tax 
estimates (G = 1/(1+2)) as well as the optimal revenue-maximizing tax estimates (R = 
(1+b)/(b+c+1)). Moreover, from regression (28), the error correction term (i.e. ect) is extracted 
as ect = Ln (Yt) - 0 - 1 Ln(t) - 2 Ln(1-)t and substituted into the following error correction 
model:  
 
𝐿𝑛(𝑌𝑡) = 𝜓0 ++⁡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜓2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝐿𝑛(1 − )𝑡−𝑖+𝑡  (29) 
60 
 
Where ectt-1 is the error correction term, which is measures the speed of adjustment back to 
equilibrium subsequent to a shock to the system. From equation (29), Pesaran et al. (2001) 
consider the cointegration test of Banerjee et al. (1998) as which is essential a t-statistic testing 
the hypothesis  = 0.  Peseran et al. (2001) derive the asymptotic distribution of the t-test for 
cases where the time series are I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated.  
 
4.4. Data and results 
 
4.4.1 Empirical data 
 
Our empirical time series consists of two data sets; the first for the Wagner’s specification and 
the second for the Scully’s optimal tax growth regressions. All time series is collected on a 
quarterly basis over the period 2002Q1 to 2017Q4 from the South African Reserve Bank online 
statistical database  
(https://www.resbank.co.za/Research/Statistics/Pages/OnlineDownloadFacility.aspx).  
For convenience sake, Table 4.1 sums up the codes and description of the time series variables 
collected from the SARB website and used in our empirical study.  
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Table 4.1: Description of time series variables used in the study 
Variable 
 
Code Description 
Panel  A:  
‘Wagner’ variables 
  
gdp KBP6006 Gross domestic product at market 
prices 
ge KBP4601 National government: Total 
expenditure 
ge/gdp KBP4434 National government expenditure as 
percentage of GDP 
cge KBP6005 Final consumption expenditure by 
general government 
Panel B:  
‘Scully’ variables 
  
GREV KBP4595 Total national government tax 
revenue 
TIPCG KBP4570 Total taxes on income, profit and 
capital gains 
TPROP KBP4577 
 
Total taxes on property 
TVAT KBP4578 Taxes on goods and services – Value 
added Tax 
TFEUL KBP4579 Taxes on goods and services – 
General fuel levy 
TEXCD KBP4580 Taxes on goods and services – Other 
excise duties 
TITRTR KBP4592 Total taxes on international trade and 
transactions 
Source: Own computation 
 
 
4.4.2. Investigating the cyclicality of fiscal spending 
 
In this section, we investigate the cyclicality of fiscal spending by estimating the asymmetric 
versions of Wagner’s law specifications previous described in our methodology section. Recall 
that we estimate six NARDL-ECM regressions modelled cointegration effects between different 
combinations government assize and economic activity over the upswing and downswings of the 
business cycle. The main advantage with this cointegration framework is its applicability 
regardless of whether the investigated time series are purely stationary, purely first differenced 
stationary or mutually cointegrated. However, to ensure complete compatibility of the series 
with the cointegration regression models, it is important to validate that none of the variables is 
second-differenced stationary. The ADF, PP and DF-GLS unit root tests performed on the first 
differenced transformations of the time series are reported in Table 4.2 below. As can be 
observed the reported test statistics unanimously reject the null hypothesis of an I(2) process at 
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significance levels of at least 10 percent and this findings holds regardless of whether the test is 
performed with a drift or inclusive of a trend.   
 
Table 4.2: Unit root test results on first differences on time series for ‘Wagner’s’ specifications 
series   ADF  PP  DF-GLS 
        
GE 
 
Intercept  -2.705**  -2.596**  -2.795*** 
Trend  -3.027**  -3.058*  -3.206** 
GE/P Intercept  -2.823*  -2.733**  -2.912*** 
Trend  -3.080*  -3.107*  -3.261** 
GE/Y Intercept  -3.850***  -3.708**  -3.847*** 
Trend  -3.769**  -3.644**  -3.950*** 
GC Intercept  -2.333**  -3.146*  -2.450* 
Trend  -2.615*  -3.456*  -2.812* 
Y Intercept  -2.916**  -2.926**  -2.813*** 
Trend  -3.493**  -3.531**  -3.639** 
Y/P Intercept  -2.915**  -2.915**  -2.868*** 
Trend  -3.376*  -3.376**  -3.519** 
Source: Own computation 
Notes: GE = Government expenditure, P = Population, Y = GDP, GC = Government consumption 
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level 
 
Before presenting our main empirical findings, we provide baseline symmetric ARDL model 
estimates of the traditional, linear Wagner specifications. Bear in mind that the underlying 
intuition behind these traditional specifications is that fiscal spending is purely procyclical such 
that the long-run ‘Wagner’ coefficients are hypothesized to be positive. Our baseline long-run 
ARDL estimates reported in Table 4.3 generally oppose this speculation/intuition as 3 out of the 
6 specifications produce negative and highly statistically significant ‘Wagner’ coefficient 
estimates (i.e. Gupta (Model 2); Musgrave (Model 5); and Mann (Model 6) versions) whereas the 
remaining three versions either produce insignificant estimates (i.e. Goffman (Model 3)) or find 
the expected significant and positive coefficient estimate  (i.e. Peacock and Wiseman (Model 1) 
and Pryol (Model 4) versions).  
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Despite the bounds F-statistics and BDM t-statistics testing for significant long-run and short-run 
cointegration effects producing encouraging estimates, a number of the estimated regressions 
are plagued with non-normal, serially correlated and heteroscedastic disturbance terms, which 
we attempt to circumvent by providing HAC corrected regression estimates. However, most of 
the models simultaneously suffer from incorrect functional form as indicated by the reported 
RESET tests statistics. Moreover, our efforts in attempting to improve these later diagnostic 
statistics by adding more lags to the ARDL regressions are futile, as at higher lags the F-statistics 
testing for cointegration effects produce insignificant estimates whilst bringing little change to 
the RESET tests statistics.  
 
Table 4.3: Baseline ARDL regression estimates of Wagner’s specifications  
equations  ge=f(gdp) ge/p=f(gdp/p) ge=f(gdp/p) cge=f(gdp) ge=f(gdp/p) ge/gdp=f(gdp) 
        
Short-run        
yt-1  0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.29 
(-1.19) 
0.13 
(2.18)*** 
0.09 
(0.33) 
-0.29 
(-1.19) 
-0.28 
(-1.29) 
Long-run        
Ly  0.17 
(14.16)*** 
-0.07 
(-6.80)*** 
-0.56 
(-0.04) 
0.22 
(13.66)*** 
-0.07 
(-6.80)*** 
-0.07 
(-6.71)*** 
Diagnostics        
 2nor  16.43 
[0.00]*** 
8.68787 
[0.01]** 
6.871844 
[0.03]* 
5.63833 
[0.06]* 
8.68787 
[0.01)** 
16.43 
(0.00]*** 
2sc  0.23 
[0.87] 
1.266256 
[0.03]** 
0.557571 
[0.58] 
0.132597 
[0.29] 
1.266256 
[0.03]* 
0.23 
(0.87] 
2het  0.28 
[0.60] 
0.16958 
[0.68] 
0.248947 
[0.14] 
0.26184 
[0.61] 
0.16958 
[0.68] 
0.28 
(0.60] 
2ff  2.41 
[0.03]** 
2.85132 
[0.00]*** 
2.25391 
[0.00]*** 
2.88913 
[0.00]*** 
2.80379 
[0.01]** 
1.95 
(0.06]* 
tBDM  -0.06 
(-4.74)*** 
-1.09 
(11.02)*** 
-1.57 
(-15.32)*** 
-1.64 
[-16.85]*** 
-1.43 
[-14.95]*** 
-1.63 
(-16.86)*** 
FPSS  6.7936 
[0.00]*** 
4.26716 
[0.00]*** 
5.56730 
[0.00]*** 
6.36923 
[0.00]*** 
4.26716 
[0.00]*** 
6.798 
[0.00]*** 
Source: Own computation 
Notes: “***”, “***”, “*” denote 1, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. t-statistics reported in (). P-values reported in []. 2nor, 2sc, 2het and 2ff denote the Jarque-
Bera test for normality, the test for serial correlation, the tests for heteroscedasticity, the Ramsey RESET tests for correct function form. 
 
In recognition of the linear ARDL Wagner specification functions being misspecified, we proceed 
to model estimates for the NARDL-ECM regressions and we report the findings from this 
empirical exercise in Table 4.4 below. For all versions of Wagner’s specifications, the bounds F-
tests and the BDM t-tests for asymmetric cointegration effects produce statistics, which exceed 
their corresponding upper bound 1 percent critical value reported in Pesaran et al. (2001). 
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Similarly, the Wald test statistics for long-run regression symmetries manages to reject the null 
hypothesis of symmetric long-run effects in estimated regressions at all levels of significance. In 
further appraising the long-run coefficients, we observe positive and highly significant estimates 
on the Y+ variable, with associated estimates of 3.21, 4.38, 3.79,4.95, 2.86 and 2.18 for the 
Peacock and Wiseman (Model 1); Gupta (Model 2); Goffman (Model 3); Pryol (Model 4); 
Musgrave (Model 5); and for Mann (Model 6) versions, respectively.  
 
Collectively, these results provide evidence in support of government’s procyclical behaviour of 
fiscal expenditure during the upswing of the business cycles. On the other end of the spectrum, 
the coefficient estimates associated with the Y-variable, for the most part produce negative 
estimates of -10.85, -6.87, -8.86, -8.79, -11.93 and -12.35 for the Peacock and Wiseman (Model 
1); Gupta (Model 2); Goffman (Model 3); Pryol (Model 4); Musgrave (Model 5); and for Mann 
(Model 6) versions, respectively, albeit the coefficient estimates being statistically significant for 
the Gupta (Model 2) and Pryol (Model 4) versions. Nonetheless, we treat these later finds as 
evidence in favour of countercyclical fiscal spending during the downswing of the business cycle. 
 
The results corresponding to the short-run asymmetric effects are not as encouraging as those 
observed for the long-run, as the Wald test statistic for short-run asymmetries is only significant 
in two out of the six estimated models (i.e. Gupta (Model 2) and Musgrave (Model 5)). 
Nevertheless, we consider our overall results satisfactory as none of the estimated NARDL-ECM 
regressions suffers from incorrect functional form as judged by the reported RESET test statistics. 
Moreover, the remaining diagnostic chi-square statistics fail to detect non-normality, serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity within any of the estimated regression error terms.   
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Table 4.4: NARDL estimates of Wagner’s specifications 
Equations  ge=f(gdp+, 
gdp-) 
ge/p=f(gdp/p+, 
gdp/p-) 
ge=f(gdp/p+, 
gdp/p-) 
cge=f(gdp+, 
gdp-) 
ge=f(gdp/p+, 
gdp/p-) 
ge/gdp=f(gdp+, 
gdp-) 
ARDL 
specifications 
 (1,2,0) (1,1,0) (1,1,0) (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (1,2,0) 
Short-run        
yt (+)  0.42 
(2.50)** 
0.33 
(1.44) 
0.37 
(1.97)* 
0.26 
(1.17) 
-0.03 
(0.79) 
-0.61 
(-3.61)*** 
yt-1 (+)  0.23 
(1.09) 
0.58 
(2.21)* 
0.41 
(1.65) 
  0.22 
(1.01) 
yt-2 (+)  0.8 
(2.50)** 
    0.49 
(2.51)** 
Long-run        
L(+)  3.205399 
(26.51)*** 
4.385147 
(8.07)*** 
3.795273 
(17.29)*** 
4.951951 
(7.05)*** 
2.861805 
(7.31)*** 
2.180979 
(19.92)*** 
L(-)  -10.85 
(-2.99)*** 
-6.87439 
(-1.47) 
-8.85972 
(-2.23)*** 
-8.790045 
(-1.41) 
-11.93044 
(-3.25)*** 
-12.35293 
(-3.67)** 
Diagnostics        
 2nor  0.788229 
(0.67) 
0.862211 
(0.65) 
0.8722865 
(0.65) 
0.882362 
(0.64) 
0.98984 
(0.95) 
0.525914 
(0.77) 
2sc  0.022491 
(0.98) 
0.075551 
(0.93) 
0.0482625 
(0.96) 
0.020974 
(0.98) 
0.007955 
(0.99) 
0.010053 
(0.99) 
2het  2.834517 
(0.11) 
0.433556 
(0.52) 
0.710073 
(0.42) 
0.986590 
(0.33) 
0.007508 
(0.93) 
2.237180 
(0.15) 
2ff  0.613350 
(0.45) 
3.072298 
(0.10) 
2.9881 
(0.10) 
2.903902 
(0.11) 
2.757741 
(0.12) 
0.290129 
(0.59) 
tBDM  -0.22 
(-10.21)*** 
-0.16 
(-11.44)*** 
-0.131605 
(-12.71)*** 
-0.11 
(-13.97)*** 
-0.21 
(-8.05)*** 
-0.23 
(-10.54)*** 
FPSS  22.15845 
[0.00]*** 
27.80393 
[0.00]*** 
34.65172 
[0.00]*** 
41.49951 
[0.00]*** 
13.48804 
[0.00]*** 
23.60649 
[0.00]** 
WLR  5.01 
[0.00]*** 
4.65 
[0.00]*** 
8.56 
[0.00]*** 
5.23 
[0.00]*** 
7.76 
[0.00]*** 
8.82 
[0.00]*** 
WSR  2.51 
(0.09] 
2.06 
[0.13] 
3.95 
[0.05]* 
1.52 
[0.17] 
2.11 
[0.12] 
3.89 
[0.05]* 
Source: Own computation. 
Optimal lag length determined by the AIC and SC information criterion. 
t-statistics reported in () and p-values reported in []. 
2nor, 2sc, 2het and 2ff denote Jarque-Bera statistics for normality, BGM statistics for serial correlation, ARCH 
statistics for heteroscedasticity and Ramsey RESET statistics for functional form.    
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
4.4.3. Estimates of optimal tax rates 
 
Having validated that the cyclicality of fiscal expenditure varies during different phases of the 
business cycle we now turn our attention towards examining the optimal as dictated by Scully’s 
framework. Recall, that the model distinguishes between the optimal tax rate which maximizes 
economic growth and the optimal tax rate which maximizes fiscal revenue collections. Moreover, 
our empirical exercise is performed for 7 broad classes of tax revenues used by South African tax 
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authorities. As a preliminary exercise, we investigate the time series for their integration 
properties prior to the estimation of the optimal tax regressions. Bearing in mind that our 
empirical estimates are obtained from ARDL regression, we find it necessary to only perform unit 
root test on the first differences of the observed time series. The ADF, PP and DF-GLS unit root 
test results reported in Table 4.5 present encouraging results as none of the series is found to be 
integrated of order I(2) or higher hence ensuring the compatibility of the variables with the 
chosen econometric model.  
 
Table 4.5: Unit root test results on first differences on time series for ‘Scully’s’ model 
Series   ADF  PP  DF-GLS 
GREV Intercept  -3.613**  -3.609**  -3.663*** 
Trend  -3.590**  -3.581**  -3.875*** 
TIPCG 
 
Intercept  -4.32**  -4.507**  -4.439** 
Trend  -4.324**  -4.837**  -4.64** 
TPROP 
 
Intercept  -4.795**  -7.276**  -6.476** 
Trend  -4.438**  -7.511***  -5.244** 
TVAT 
 
Intercept  -1.922*  -1.988*  -1.994** 
Trend  -2.653*  -2.576*  -2.824** 
TFUEL 
 
Intercept  -3.303**  -3.279**  -3.289** 
Trend  -3.417**  -4.431**  -3.600** 
TEXCD 
 
Intercept  -2.286*  -2.286*  -2.371* 
Trend  -3.243*  -4.114**  -3.446** 
TITRTR 
 
Intercept  -3.9335  -2.077641  -3.573051 
Trend  -3.1342  -2.58278  -1.560531 
Source: Own computation 
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level 
 
We commence our modelling process by determining the optimal lag length of the estimated 
ARDL regressions. To this end, we specify ARDL (4, 4, 4) models and trimming down on the lags 
until we obtain the respective ARDL regressions which minimize the AIC and SC information 
criterion. The optimal lag models are reported in the upper row of Table 4.6 and we are satisfied 
with the selected ARDL regressions, as none of them suffer from serial correlation, non-
normality, heteroscedasticity or incorrect function form. We are further encouraged by our 
choice of regression as they further produce bounds F-statistics and BDM t-statistics, which reject 
the respective null hypotheses of no ARDL cointegration effects and these statistics hold 
significance at critical levels of at least 5 percent.  
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In scrutinizing through our empirical findings, as reported in Table 4.6, we first observe that over 
the long-run all coefficient estimates on the L and the L(1-) variables produce their a priori 
expected positive values albeit these being statistically significant for 4 classes of tax revenues 
(i.e. total revenues, excised duties, VAT, and property taxes). Nevertheless, we compute both the 
growth-maximizing (G) and revenue-maximizing (R) tax rates for all tax categories. On one hand, 
we find revenue maximizing tax rates of 6.57% (total revenues), 0.21% (excised duties), 0.31% 
(fuel), 2.28% (VAT), 0.11% (property), 2.22% (income, profit and capital gains) and 0.19% 
(international trade and transactions). On the other hand, we obtain revenue-maximizing 
estimates of 12.02% (total revenues), 0.32% (excised duties), 0.59% (fuel), 5.03% (VAT), 0.17% 
(property), 2.57% (income, profit and capital gains) and 0.66% (international trade and 
transactions). Note that for all cases, G < R, hence implying a trade-off between growth 
maximizing at relatively lower tax rates and revenue maximizing objectives at higher tax rates.  
 
Table 4.6: Optimal growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing ARDL estimates 
equations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ARDL 
specifications 
ARDL(1,0,0) ARDL(1,0,0) ARDL(1,0,0) ARDL(1,1,0) ARDL(1,0,0) ARDL(1,0,0) ARDL(1,0,0) 
Short-run        
yt-1 0.43 
(3.94)*** 
 0.46 
(4.30)*** 
0.33 
(2.97)*** 
0.40 
(3.68)*** 
0.41 
[3.65]*** 
0.36 
(3.20)*** 
 0.02 
(1.23) 
 0.01 
(1.26) 
0.04 
(3.33)*** 
0.04 
(1.51) 
0.02 
[1.10] 
0.01 
(0.71) 
(1-) 0.34 
(1.48) 
 5.37 
(1.05) 
2.11 
(3.31)*** 
32.13 
(1.12) 
0.49 
[1.32] 
-2.02 
(-0.91) 
Long-run        
L 1.06 
(3.79)** 
1.91 
(1.93)* 
1.13 
(1.54) 
0.79 
(5.97)*** 
1.68 
(2.22)** 
6.14 
[0.07] 
0.41 
[0.81] 
L(1-) 15.08 
[2.42]** 
916.94 
(1.76)* 
359.78 
[0.31] 
33.83 
(3.43)*** 
1587.17 
[1.73]* 
270.88 
[0.06] 
213.04 
[0.59] 
Optimal tax        
G 0.0657 
[6.57%] 
0.002078 
[0.2078%] 
0.00313 
[0.313%] 
0.022819 
[2.2819%] 
0.001057 
0.1057%] 
0.02216 
[2.216%] 
0.00192 
[0.192%] 
R 0.1202 
[12.02%] 
0.003164 
0.3164%] 
0.005885 
[0.5885%] 
0.05025 
[5.025%] 
0.001686 
[0.1686%] 
0.02568 
[2.568%] 
0.00657 
[0.657%] 
Diagnostics        
 2nor 1.78 
[0.28] 
1.57 
[0.32] 
1.79 
[0.26] 
1.53 
[0.36] 
1.04 
[0.48] 
1.21 
[0.39] 
3.82 
[0.15] 
2sc 0.42 
[0.66] 
0.49 
[0.62] 
0.51 
[0.60] 
0.73 
[0.49] 
0.45 
[0.64] 
0.72 
[0.49] 
0.52 
[0.60] 
2het 1.95 
[0.12] 
1.02 
[0.39] 
1.88 
[0.12] 
1.75 
[0.14] 
1.32 
[0.27] 
1.84 
[0.13] 
1.55 
[0.14] 
2ff 0.96 
[0.34] 
1.06 
[0.29] 
2.31 
[0.02]** 
0.30 
[0.76] 
0.91 
[0.37] 
1.30 
[0.19] 
1.94 
[0.13] 
tBDM -4.30 
[0.00]*** 
-4.29 
[0.00]*** 
-4.12 
[0.00]*** 
-5.27 
[0.00]*** 
-4.24 
[0.00]*** 
-4.23 
[0.00]*** 
-4.36 
[0.00]*** 
FPSS 4.51*** 39.10*** 4.04** 5.15*** 40.38*** 4.44** 4.47** 
Source: Own computation 
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Notes: (GREV – Model 1): Total government revenue,  (TEXCD – Model 2); taxes on general fuel levy (TFUEL – Model 
3); value added tax (TVAT – Model 4); tax on properties (TPROP – Model 5); taxes on international trade and 
transactions (TITRTR – Model 6); and tax on profits and capital gains (TIPCG – Model 7). 
Optimal lag length determined by the AIC and SC information criterion. 
t-statistics reported in () and p-values reported in []. 
2nor, 2sc, 2het and 2ff denote Jarque-Bera statistics for serial correlation,  statistics for serial correlation, ARCH 
statistics for heteroscedasticity and Ramsey RESET statistics for functional form.    
* Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level 
 
In attempting to gather a more realistic feel of our results, we create (from our original time 
series data) a profile of growth maximizing and revenue maximizing based on the estimated 
optimal tax rates previously computed in Table 4.6. Furthermore, these profiles presented in 
Table 4.7 are accompanied with scatter plots fitted with a non-parametric Kernel regression to 
graphically capture the potential nonlinear correlations between the different categories of taxes 
and the rate of economic growth rate (see Figures 4.1 to 4.7). Our observations can be broadly 
summarized in three important findings. Firstly, we note that the growth maximizing periods for 
all categories of tax revenues, generally correspond to the pre-crisis period of 2003 to 2008 and 
the average tax rates computed closely resemble the optimal tax rate estimates reported in Table 
4.6. Exceptions are noted for the fuel, VAT and income categories of taxes. For the fuel and 
income tax categories, this result can be explained be the insignificant long-run regressions times 
associated with tax revenue categories reported in Table 4.6.  For the VAT category, our 
observation implies that VAT revenue collections have been below both the growth-maximizing 
and revenue-maximizing optimal rates in the pre-crisis period.  
 
Secondly, the revenue-maximizing periods for all tax categories correspond to the post-crisis 
period of 2013 to 2017. Similarly, we find that during this period the computed optimal revenue-
maximizing tax rates are line with the optimal rates reported in Table 4.6 with the exception of 
the VAT category. We note that computed revenue-optimal VAT tax rate of 5.03 percent of GDP 
does not correspond to the tax rates averaged over the actual series, hence indicating that 
revenue authorities have used VAT revenues for growth maximizing purposes as opposed to 
revenue-maximizing objectives in the post-crisis period. Thirdly, in contextualizing these findings 
in terms of business cycles, we find growth maximizing tax revenues being targeted during the 
expansionary cycle prior to the financial crisis (i.e. 2003-2007) whereas revenue-maximizing 
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objectives are being pursued in the recessionary cycle corresponding to the post-crisis period (i.e. 
2011-2017).  In collectively contextualizing our findings in light of our entire study, we observe 
that during recession periods, fiscal expenditures have been predominantly pro cyclical whilst tax 
rates have been geared towards lower, growth-maximizing rates. Conversely, during 
expansionary periods, fiscal spending is at least countercyclical with tax rates been drift towards 
revenue-maximizing, higher tax rates which have compromised maximized economic growth 
rates.  
 
Table 4.7: Profile of growth and revenue maximizing periods (2002-2017) 
Tax category Growth-maximizing periods Revenue-maximizing periods 
 Period Average Tax 
(% of GDP) 
Average GDP Period Average Tax 
(% of GDP) 
Average GDP 
GREV 2004Q1-
2008Q3 
5% 5.23% 2015Q3- 
2017Q4 
9% 1.25% 
TEXCD 2003Q3-
2006Q4 
0.21% 5.1% 2013Q4-
2017Q4 
0.31% 1.16% 
TFUEL 
 
2009Q3-
2012Q2 
0.31% 2.95% 2015Q4-
2017Q4 
0.52% 1.37% 
TVAT 
 
2013Q1-
2017Q4 
2.2% 1.58% N/A N/A N/A 
TPROP 
 
2004Q4-
2008Q2 
0.11% 5.04% 2015Q2-
2017Q4 
0.13% 0.95% 
TIPCG 2001Q4-
2007Q2 
2.2% 4.6% 2005Q4-
2006Q4 
0.26% 5.38% 
TITRTR 
 
2003Q3-
2008Q2 
0.20% 5.08% 2008Q4-
2012Q4 
0.25% 1.68% 
Source: Own computation 
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Figure 4.1: Total revenue as percentage of GDP and GDP growth 
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                                      Source: Own computation 
 
Figure 4.2: Excise duty as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth 
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                                      Source: Own computation 
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Figure 4.3: Fuel levy as percentage of GDP and GDP growth 
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                                  Source: Own computation 
 
Figure 4.4: VAT as percentage of GDP and GDP growth 
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                                   Source: Own computation 
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Figure 4.5: Property taxes as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth 
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Figure 4.6: Income taxes as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth 
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73 
 
 
Figure 4.7: International trade taxes as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth 
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
Against the presupposition of fiscal policy being prominently procyclical in developing and 
emerging economies, the objective of our study has been two-fold. Firstly, we investigated the 
cyclicality of fiscal revenues by estimating NARDL regressions of the different versions of 
Wagner’s law. The second objective of the study was to estimate optimal growth-maximizing and 
revenue-maximizing tax rates by estimating ARDL regressions for ‘Scully’s’ parsimonious growth 
maximizing model. The scope of our study covers time series quarterly data spanning from 
2002Q1 to 2017Q1. Collectively, our empirical exploration can be summarized in two important 
findings. Firstly, we find evidence of cyclicality of fiscal revenues is asymmetric in nature, with 
South African fiscal authorities pursuing procyclical fiscal expenditures during the upswings of 
the business cycle, that is, government expenditure increases with output growth during 
expansionary periods. Conversely, we find countercyclical fiscal spending during the downswing 
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of the business cycle with government spending increasing with slower economic growth during 
recessionary periods. Based on conventional theoretical wisdom, fiscal policy must be either 
acyclical or countercycalical during both phases of the business cycle. Therefore, we concluded 
on fiscal authorities only applying correct fiscal policies during the ‘bad times’ of the business 
cycle whilst applying wrong fiscal policies during the ‘good times’.   
 
Our second important finding concerns the optimal rates of taxation of which we observe that 
the growth maximizing tax rates are at lower values compared to the revenue-maximizing tax 
rates for all sub-categories of revenue collections. In other words, we find evidence of South 
African fiscal authorities being offered a trade-off between growth-maximizing and revenue-
maximizing objectives over our sample period. Moreover, we find that fiscal authorities have 
pursued growth-maximizing tax rates during the upswing of the business cycle whereas generally 
employing revenue-maximizing tax rates during recessionary periods. Notably, VAT is the only 
sub-category of revenue collections, which has been growth-maximizing in the post-crisis, 
recessionary periods. Nevertheless, our overall results indicate increased fiscal spending and 
lower tax revenue collections (growth-maximizing objectives) during the expansionary periods, 
which is evident of an overall procyclical fiscal policy. On the other hand, during recessionary 
periods fiscal authorities generally pursue revenue-maximizing objectives through higher tax 
collections (i.e. procyclical tax policy) whilst still adjusting fiscal spending to be countercyclical.  
 
So, what are the policy implication to be drawn from our study? For starters, recognizing that the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy is asymmetric over the business cycle, we advise to incorporate such 
nonlinearities in the design of fiscal policies rules used in constructing stabilizing policies. Our 
study also highlight the importance of South African revenue authorities setting correct tax 
policies and distinguishing between growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing objectives. In 
perspective, it would be ideal for tax authorities to set higher, revenue-maximizing tax rate during 
the upswing of the business and lower, growth-maximizing tax rates during the downswing of 
the business cycle. Our results specifically indicate that government has only being efficient in 
designing/designating VAT tax rates, which are ‘growth-maximizing’ during the recessionary 
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periods. Henceforth, considering that the South African economy currently in the downswing of 
the business cycle, fiscal policymakers are encouraged to ‘craft’ an array of tax rates for the 
different revenue sub-categories which are growth-maximizing and not revenue-maximizing.  
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CHAPTER 5. POST-RECESSION FISCAL, OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT MULTIPLIERS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA: A DYNAMIC SUT ECONOMY-WIDE LEONTIEF-BASED MODEL 
 
5.1. Introduction 
5.1.1.  Background, statement of problem, and aim of the study 
 
The World bank has predicted that South Africa will be one of the worst performers in sub-
Saharan Africa in 2019 with tepid growth of 1.3% (World Bank, 2018). The current fiscal stance 
reveals a declining rate in the number of taxpayers but growing government expenditure which, 
in a long-run, could affect budget sustainability (SARS, 2018). This twin challenge of low growth 
trajectory and fiscal austerity measures are impending impasses affecting economic 
development, employment creation and government revenue collection. High levels of poverty 
and unemployment (especially among the youth) and the fiscal ceiling have not only prevented 
the quest for all-inclusive, equitable and sustainable economic growth, but have also disturbed 
the structure of government expenditure with its relationship to economic growth (Robinson, 
2017).  
 
On this premise, two eminent questions emerge which this study seeks to investigate. The first 
question is: How robust are government strategic interventions in yielding high returns on 
sectoral employment, tax revenue, and GDP multipliers? How South African economy has 
responded to changes in exogenous final demand over the period prior and post-recession? The 
second question is: Which of the changes in the components of final demand (changes in 
government spending, household consumption expenditure, exports, investment spending) has 
high effects on sectors gross value added, job creation, and tax revenue generation?  
 
Unfortunately, econometric models have limitations in that they do not handle economy-wide 
analysis related to inter and intra-industry, forward and backward linkages in response to 
changes in final demand or exogenous shocks. Furthermore, the traditional input-output model 
does not specify at sector level the linkages between the supply and use of commodities (Miller 
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and Blaie, 2009). So, this study went further than the traditional input-output model by 
considering the most recent dynamic supply and use framework to measure the impact of 
selected exogenous final demand components on fiscal, labour and other macroeconomic 
variables. The study seeks to achieve four objectives.  
 
• Firstly, to provide the performance and trend analysis of labour, economic, and fiscal 
multipliers in South Africa.  
• Secondly, to compute and analyse both the supply-side tax forward linkages coefficients and 
the demand-side tax backward linkages coefficients. 
• Thirdly, to empirically investigate the impact of 5% increase in each component of final 
demand on selected fiscal, labour and other macroeconomic variables. 
• Lastly, to provide the impact of government spending on a full range of 43 endogenous 
employment multipliers. 
 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no single study in South Africa that, using SUT 
framework and economy-wide Leontief multiplier approach, has investigated the post-recession 
effects associated with the objective stated above. 
 
The importance of this study is multidimensional. It has implications for a variety of policy 
interventions, such as fiscal policy (using tax multipliers), labour policy (using employment 
multipliers), poverty and development policy (using income multipliers), investment policy (using 
investment multipliers), trade policy (using export multipliers), growth and industrial policy 
(output multipliers, gross value-added multipliers, gross domestic product multipliers, and gross 
operating surplus multipliers), small, medium and micro-sized enterprises policy (using SBS tax 
multipliers), and so on. 
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5.1.2. Brief selected literature 
 
While many researchers continue to apply the traditional input output model, there are few 
studies that have shifted to the SUT framework, including Khasib (2015) in Palestine; Temurshoev 
(2011) for selected developed countries; Mahajan (2006) in the UK; Kula (2007) in Turkey; 
Bouwer (2002) in South Africa; James (2016) in the US; and Soklis (2009) for selected developed 
countries. However, these studies were limited in that they lacked empirical applications of the 
Leontief-based SUT models. 
 
Studies that have empirical evidence in applying the Leontief-based SUT models include 
Bouwmeester and Oosterhaven (2009), Piispala (2000), Siddiqi and Salem (1995), Jackson (1998), 
Eding (1996), and Madsen and Jensen-Butler (1998). A common finding in these studies is that 
the SUT remains a good impact assessment tool for sector and industrial analysis, for analysing 
the anatomy of a specific country or region, for international trade analysis, and for investment 
development. It could also be used for policy analysis, such as fiscal policy, labour policy and 
growth policy. 
 
In South Africa, previous studies that have involved the calculation and application of multipliers 
are rare. Some of them have generally focused either on one sector, for example the mining 
sector (Stillwell, 1999), real estate (Boshoff and Seymore, 2016), the automotive sector (Kavese, 
2015) or on one type of multiplier, for example the GDP multiplier (Burrows and Botha, 2013). 
 
Stillwell (1999) estimated the influence of the mining sector on the economy over the period 
1971 to 1993, while Burrows and Botha (2013) used input-output tables to calculate GDP Type I 
and Type II multipliers for the reference years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. 
They found that GDP multipliers declined over the period reviewed. 
 
In India, Tariyal (2016) used the inter-industry input-output tables of the Indian economy, 
obtained from World Input-Output Database (Timmer et al, 2015) for the period 1995-2009 to 
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investigate Industry-Specific Multipliers to Identify Key Industries of Indian Economy. During the 
period under review, output and employment multipliers declined. The results from the 
multipliers analysis revealed that food, beverages and tobacco, textiles and textile products, 
leather, leather and footwear, rubber and plastics, and machinery had high Type I output 
multipliers. However, food, beverages and tobacco had high Type II output multipliers for all the 
years under study. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing, food, beverages and tobacco, tex-
tiles and textile products, wood and products of wood and cork, hotels and restaurants and 
private households with employed persons had high values of Type I and Type II employment 
multipliers for most of the years under study. 
 
In developing countries, Zaman and Surugiu (2012) used the traditional input output model to 
examine the effect of taxes in Romania. They found that most sectors with universal vocation, 
like electricity, gas, water, education, public administration were characterised by strong tax 
propagation effects. 
 
5.1.3 Gap in the literature and uniqueness of the study 
 
Not a single study using SUT Leontief multipliers has looked at the effect of taxes or fiscal policy 
in South Africa. This study will fill that gap by providing forward and backward tax multipliers. 
There are other gaps in the literature. For example, previous studies that applied Leontief-based 
multiplier models for the South African economy generally focused either on one sector, for 
example the mining sector (Stillwell, 1999), real estate (Boshoff and Seymore, 2016), the auto-
motive sector (Kavese, 2015), or the agriculture sector (Phoofolo, 2018); or their analysis was 
static, based on a single year. Examples include the study by Davis and Thurlow (2013) and that 
by Cloete and Rossouw (2014). There are other studies that focused only on a few aggregated 
generic multipliers. For example, the study by Burrows and Botha (2013) focused only on the GDP 
multiplier for South Africa, while Phoofolo (2018) measured output and GVA multipliers, and 
income and employment multipliers. Further-more, in all the above-mentioned studies, only one 
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shock in the exogenous variable was performed, which then narrowed policy intervention due to 
a limited number of multipliers used in the model. 
 
This study fills these gaps in many ways, Firstly, by extending the model over 62 different 
economic sectors. Secondly, by splitting the analysis over two distinct periods (prior recession 
and post-recession). Thirdly, by providing a full range of 47 endogenous employment multipliers. 
Lastly, by diversifying the number of scenarios and simulations from fiscal, labour and macro-
economic. The manner in which the gaps are filled is what set this study apart and distinguish it 
from the rest. 
 
5.2. Methodological framework, data and model specification 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
In this section, the SUT is defined. Explanations are provided of how the database was 
constructed, how the matrices were balanced, and how the model was calibrated. The 
methodology used to develop the SUT is in line with the most recent 2008 System of National 
Accounts (2008 SNA) released by the United Nations. Hence, the SUT-Leontief model complies 
with the United Nations’ 2008 SNA and international best practices (United Nations, 2009). 
 
Detailed and comprehensive manuals on the compilation of supply and use tables and their 
application are provided by Eurostat (2008), the United Nations (2010 and 2017), Miller and Blair 
(2009) and Statistics SA (2017). These manuals provide a methodological framework not only 
about the construction of the SUT, but also on the conversion of SUTs into a macroeconomic 
model for policy intervention. Many researches nationwide are based on the methodology 
prescribed in these manuals. 
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5.2.1.1 Definition of the SUT 
 
The supply and use tables (SUT) were traditionally referred to as rectangular input-output tables 
or make and use tables. The SUT provides a record of economic data in a matrices format, which 
shows how supplies of different kind of goods and services originate from domestic industries 
and imports, and how these supplies are allocated between various intermediate inputs and final 
demand, including exports (Eurostat, 2008). 
South Africa’s SUT framework is consistent with the recent United Nations 2008 System of 
National Accounts (SNA 2008), the revised 2008 European System of Accounts (ESA 2008), and 
the United Nations’ new handbook on the compilation of the SUT released in 2017, therefore, 
international best-practices. The results of this study can then be compared with other countries 
world-wide without questioning the methodology followed to develop the South African SUT. 
 
5.2.1.2 Usefulness of the SUT  
 
The uses of SUT are multiple and their statistical and analytical importance has increased with 
time, especially in response to new emerging issues such as the vision 2050, and globalisation 
and sustainable development, with its three pillars of social, economic and environmental 
development. 
 
• The SUT serves to identify industries and sectors with high comparative and competitive 
advantages; to determine inter-industry conflicts through multipliers, to assess backward 
and forward linkages; and to assess the number of jobs sustained by sector through 
infrastructure projects (Eurostat, 2008) 
• The SUT serves as the basis for compiling a range of accounts, like environmental and 
satellite accounts, government accounts including taxation, and labour and tourism 
accounts (United Nations, 2017). 
• The SUT provides base structures for modelling and the basis for different types of 
analytical uses at micro and macro levels, including economic analyses; impact 
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assessment and policy analyses; sensitivity analyses and the impact of taxation changes; 
industrial and sectoral analyses; local government-type investment planning like 
construction projects, shopping centres, new motorways, and rural planning. 
• The SUT can either be converted into a Leontief-based model or be used as a base 
structure for other models, like the social accounting matrix (SAM, Leontief-based 
model), computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, environmental analyses, supply-
side based models and micro-simulations. 
• SUT is the appropriate framework for benchmarking macroeconomic data. When 
statistical discrepancies exist among the macroeconomic aggregates, or when statistical 
information is incomplete or contradictory, they are easily identified and rectified within 
the SUT framework. SUTs allow for the data confrontation of different sources (Mahajan, 
2006). 
 
Statistics South Africa uses the SUT as a coordinating framework for economic statistics as well 
as an accounting framework for ensuring the numerical consistency and coherency of data 
obtained from various sources. Through this framework, weaknesses in the economic data can 
easily be detected (Bouwer, 2002). More importantly, the SUT framework is used by Statistics SA 
for deriving the national GDP through all three methods - the production approach, the income 
approach and the expenditure approach (Statistics SA, 2009). 
 
Moreover, Miller and Blair (2009) consider the SUT as an analytical tool which is easily converted 
into a macroeconomic model useful for policy analysis, investment choice and industrial strategy. 
The economy-wide model developed from the SUT framework presents the monetary flow of 
goods and services in an economy, with inter-industry relationships. It incorporates international 
trade (imports and exports) and economic agents, like government, enterprises and households 
(Robison, 2009). The model is used to assess the robustness of national policies and the strategic 
framework. 
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5.2.2 The data used to compile the SUT Leontief-based model 
 
The data used to compile the SUT Leontief-based model was collected from two main data 
sources, namely Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) and the South African Revenue Services (SARS). 
From Stats SA, data were collected from the national account statistics and from the labour 
account statistics. The nine supply and use tables from 2007 to 2015 were all collected from the 
National Account Statistics.  
 
From the SA Revenue Services (SARS), tax data were collected, including company tax (number 
of taxpayers and tax assessed in millions of rands); VAT (number of vendors; payments in millions 
of rands); PAYE tax; and SBC tax (number of taxpayers, and tax assessed in millions of rands). 
 
5.2.3 Layout of a simplified supply and use framework for South Africa 
 
Following Miller and Blair (2008), and using the standard notations, the format of the simplified 
South African SUT is presented in Table 5.1 below. This format has also been used with slight 
modifications by various authors (Bouwmeester and Oosterhaven, 2009; Piispala, 2000; Siddiqi 
and Salem, 1995; Jackson, 1998; Eding, 1996; Madsen and Jensen-Butler, 1998). The SUT is made 
up of two tables: the supply table and the use table. 
 
The supply table comprises four matrices which provide information about the origin of goods 
and services in the economy, imports of goods and services, trade and transport margins, and 
taxes less subsidies on products. It shows that the total supply (Dic) for industry (i) and com-
modities (c) has two origins, namely domestic (Pic) and foreign (Mic) (Piispala, 2000). 
The use table contains three main matrices. The first matrix is intermediate consumption ex-
penditure (Y ic), which comprises the input cost of goods and services produced within the eco-
nomy. The second matrix is the components of final demand (F ic), which include household 
consumption expenditure, government consumption expenditure, fixed capital formation, 
changes in inventory, and exports (X ic). Lastly, there are the components of value added (W ic), 
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which include compensation of employees, taxes on products (excluding import duties), subsi-
dies on products, gross operating surplus and mixed income, and consumption of fixed capital 
(Piispala, 2000). 
 
Table 5.1: Layout of a simplified supply and use framework for South Africa 
A B C D E F G H I J K
TOTAL 
DOMESTIC 
SUPPLY IMPORTS
Taxes less 
Subsidies on 
Products
TRADE AND 
TRANSPORT 
MARGINS
TOTAL 
SUPPLY 
(Purchasers' 
Prices)
INDUSTRIES
SUPPLY TABLE
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
TOTAL 
SUPPLY 
(Basic Prices)
A B C D E F G H I J K TOTAL USE
Exports
TOTAL FINAL 
DEMAND
Intermediate Consumption Expenditure Final Demand
Government, Household, 
Investment, etc
D
INDUSTRIES
TOTAL INDUSTRY OUTPUT 
P M
USE TABLE
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
S
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
TOTAL USE 
(Purchasers' 
Prices)
Gross Value Added
Compensation of employees
Taxes less subsidiees
Gross Operating Surplus
P
R
O
D
U
C
T
S
Y X D
W
TOTAL INDUSTRY OUTPUT   
F
TOTAL INDUSTRY INPUT 
T
T
  
Source: Adopted from Miller and Blair (2008) and the SNA 2008 
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Following the double entry accounting principles, total supply of goods and services must balance 
with total demand of goods and services (Boomsma, 1992). The process of balancing the supply 
and use tables simultaneously can only be achieved if the following identities for all products (c) 
and all industries (i) balance: 
 
)()(
11
icic
n
ic
icicicicic
n
ic
ic MFYDTSTTMP ++==+++ 
==
                (1) 
 
where Pic  =  Domestic output of commodity c in industry i, 
 Mic = Import of commodity c in industry i, 
 TTic = Trade and transport margin of commodity c in industry i, 
 TSic = Taxes and subsidies on products of commodity c in industry i, 
 Dic = Total supply at purchasers’ prices of commodity c in industry i, 
 Fic = Final consumption expenditure of commodity c in industry i, and 
 Yic = Intermediate consumption expenditure of commodity c in  Industry i. 
 
The first identity in Equation 1 comprises the supply and demand of goods and services. 
From the supply side, Equation 1 shows that total supply (Dic) of commodity c by industry i equals 
total domestic supply (Pic) plus imports (Mic) plus trade and transport margin (TTic) plus taxes less 
subsidies on products (TSic). 
From the demand side, the total supply (Dic) of commodity c by industry i is also equal to inter-
mediate consumption expenditure (Yic) plus total final demand (Fic) which also includes exports 
Mic . 
The second identity in Equation 2 shows that the total output of (Tic) is equal to the intermediate 
consumption expenditure (Yic) plus components of gross value added (Wic). Put differently, the 
gross value added is equal to the output less the cost of production. 
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The third identity in Equation 3 contains the components of gross value added, namely com-
pensation of employees (CEic), gross operating surplus (OSic), taxes less subsidies on products 
(TSic) and taxes less subsidies on production (tsic). 
) ts (TS  )OS  CE( icicicic +++=icW                        (3) 
Substituting Equation 3 into Equation2 yields: 
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5.2.3.1 SUT and GDP estimations 
 
The SUT combines into a single framework the three approaches to estimate GDP according to 
the production approach, the income approach and the expenditure approach. 
 
• The production approach:  
GDP    = 
==
+−
n
ic
icic
n
ic
ic TSYP
11
)(                 (5) 
GDP = Output (at basic prices) - Intermediate consumption + Taxes less subsidies on 
products 
 
• The income approach: 
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GDP = Compensation of employees + gross operating surplus + other taxes less subsidies 
on production + taxes less subsidies on products 
• The expenditure approach:  
 GDP =  )(
1
icic
n
ic
ic MXF −+
=
         (7) 
GDP = Final consumption expenditure + Exports - Imports 
 
Having dealt with the three approaches, it became apparent that each method yields the same 
estimate of the South African GDP at market prices (see Equation 8). 
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              (8)  
This means that irrespective of whether the income, production, or expenditure method is used, 
the value of GDP should be the same and each method should lead to the same value of GDP (Vu, 
2011). 
 
5.2.4. Inter-industry linkages, forward and backward linkages 
 
The way goods and services flow within the economy is an indication that economic agencies do 
not operate in isolation (Leontief, 1936). More recently, linkage analysis methods have again 
attracted increasing attention from policy analysts throughout the world. With regard to the 
measurement of linkage coefficients, there are two main methods used to examine the 
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interdependency between the production and cost structures of the economy (Miller and Blair, 
2009). Both methods, that is, the Chenery-Watanabe method and the Rasmussen method, also 
known as the backward linkage and forward linkage of industries, are applied to South Africa’s 
SUT Leontief-based model. 
The Chenery-Watanabe method is derived from the input coefficient, a demand-driven model 
that attempts to supply a quantitative evaluation of backward and forward linkages for the 
economy’s production structure. 
The backward linkages of an industry j are defined as (Miller and Blair (2009): 

==
==
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i
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i j
ijc
j a
x
x
BL
11
                   (9) 
where  c
jBL  denotes the backward linkage of industry j,  
xij is the magnitude of industry i’s output used as production input by industry j,  
xj is industry j ‘s output and aij is the input coefficient of industry j to industry i 
The forward linkages of an industry i are defined as (Miller and Blair (2009): 
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The flaw in this method is that the coefficients measure only the initial effect generated by 
interdependencies between industries. These coefficients yield the direct backward and forward 
linkages. 
The Rasmussen method is based on the Leontief inverse matrix (I-A) 1, and is used to measure 
inter-industry linkages. 
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The backward linkage 
jBL  reflects the effect of an increase in final demand of industry j on 
overall output; in other words, it measures the extent to which a unit change in the demand for 
the product i of industry j causes production increases in all industries. 

=
=
n
i
ijj gBL
1
          (11) 
where gij is the ijth element of the Leontief inverse matrix. 
The forward linkage R
jFL  measures the magnitude of the increase in output in industry i, if the 
final demand in each industry were to increase by one unit; in other words, it measures the extent 
to which industry i is affected by an expansion of one unit in all industries (Miller and Blair (2009). 
In this study, we use both forward and backward multipliers, but in most instances, I will only be 
reporting the backward multipliers. 
 
5.2.5. Limitation of the model 
 
The SUT Leontief-based model does also have some limitations. It assumes constant return to 
scale and full employment (Miller and Blair, 2009). The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012) 
highlights the following inherent shortcomings and limitations of multipliers for economic impact 
analysis: 
 
The first limitation is the lack of supply-side constraints. This shortcoming implicitly assumed that 
the economy has no supply-side constraints, which implies that every extra output can be 
produced in one area without taking resources away from other activities, thus overstating 
economic effects. 
 
The second limitation relates to fixed ratios for intermediate inputs and production by which it is 
assumed that there is a fixed input structure in each industry and fixed ratios for production. 
Consequently, impact analysis using multipliers can be seen to describe average effects, not 
marginal effects.  
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The third limitation is the absence of budget constraints. This is critical in most Third World and 
in most developing countries. Assessments of economic impacts using multipliers that consider 
consumption-induced effects (Type II multipliers) implicitly assume that household and 
government consumption is not subject to budget constraints. In addition to this, the model 
assumes no allowance for purchasers’ marginal responses to change. In other words, economic 
effect analysis using multipliers assumes that households consume goods and services in exact 
proportions to their initial budget shares. For example, the household budget share of some 
goods might increase as household income increases. 
 
Finally, prices for goods and services and prices for labour are fixed. Constraints on the availability 
of inputs, like skilled labour, require prices to act as a rationing device. In assessments using 
multipliers, where factors of production are assumed to be limitless, this rationing response is 
assumed not to occur. Prices are assumed to be unaffected by policy and any crowding-out 
effects are not captured (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). 
 
The above limitations can be relaxed either in the social accounting matrix or the computable 
general equilibrium models (Phoofolo, 2018). 
 
However, it is vital to mention that micro-simulations from the supply and use framework remain 
a powerful tool of measuring the effect of say, an additional R1 increase in government spending 
on households of different income group, race, gender, occupation and age groups. 
 
The applications of the SUT model at sectoral level are designed to achieve these purposes: to 
identify industries and sectors with high comparative and competitive advantages; to determine 
inter-industry effects through multipliers, to assess backward and forward linkages; and lastly, to 
assess the number of jobs sustained by sector through infrastructure projects (Eurostat, 2008). 
The tool is also useful to simulate the impact of a fiscal expansion through a hypothetical 1% 
increase in government expenditure and its effects on growth, employment, poverty reduction, 
investment and productivity 
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5.3. Empirical results 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
This section focuses on the results and presents key findings of the dynamic SUT Leontief-based 
model for South Africa. The results are grouped in four sets: 
 
• The first set of results captures simulation trends over a nine-year period (2007-2015) to 
reflect changes in post-recession tax multipliers and other generic multipliers such as: income 
multiplier, output multiplier, gross domestic product (GDP) multiplier, gross value-added 
(GVA) multiplier, gross operating surplus (GOS) multiplier, gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) or investment multiplier, fixed capital stock (FCS) multiplier and export multipliers. 
 
• The second set of results shows the sectors that will generate more tax when there is a shock 
in the economy. For example, given a hypothetical R1-million increase in final demand, the 
second set of results provides tax multipliers, including both the tax forward linkage 
coefficients and the tax backward linkage coefficients for each economic sector in 2007 and 
in 2015. Tax multipliers include: company tax; value-added tax (VAT); pay as you earn (PAYE) 
tax; and Small Business Corporation (SBC) tax multipliers 
 
• The third set of results is presented in four different scenarios, assessing what happens to 
different tax multipliers and other generic multipliers over the period 2007-2015 if: 1) exports 
increase by 5%; 2) government spending increases by 5%; 3) household consumption 
expenditure increases by 5%; and 4) total investment increases by 5%. 
 
• The last set of findings is static. It exhaustively presents labour empirical results under 43 
different employment multipliers depicting the number of jobs to be created when 
government spending increases by a hypothetical R1 million. 
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Employment multipliers are firstly disaggregated to display the effect on economic sectors, skill 
level, province, occupation, level of education, and by Expanded Public Works Programmes 
(EPWP). Secondly, employment multipliers are further derived and presented in such a way as to 
distinguish effects between formal and informal employment multipliers; rural and urban 
employment multipliers; youth and adult employment multipliers. 
 
Given the limited number of studies done in South Africa and abroad in the field of the dynamic 
SUT Leontief-based model, the results of this study will not always be compared with similar 
studies in the literature. 
 
5.3.2 Simulations  
 
5.3.2.1 Model 1: Trend analysis of Type I and Type II multipliers for South Africa: 2007-2015 
 
In collectively summarising the findings of the study, it is firstly noted that over the long run 
(2007-2015), as shown in Table 5.2 below, the effect of R1 invested in the South African economy 
had a positive multiplier effect on growth, tax, employment and poverty. However, the most 
important observation noted in this study is the significant decline in fiscal multipliers, 
employment multipliers, output and income multipliers over the period 2007-2015. These results 
imply that the inter-sector multiplier effect has weakened over the post-recession period. This 
finding justifies the low growth path that has persisted since the economic meltdown in 2008 
(national Treasury, 2018). 
So the effect of the average R1 spent in the South African economy yielded a smaller return in 
terms of economic effect throughout the economy in 2015 (post-recession) than it did in 2007 
(pre-recession). This suggests that the inter-industry links and industry-consumer links weak-
ened. 
The result of this study supports the finding by Burrows and Botha (2013), who investigated the 
changing input-output multipliers in South African for the 1980-2010 period and found a decline 
in GDP and output multipliers. Contrary to these findings, in the study by Bekhet (2011) on 
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Output, Income and Employment Multipliers in Malaysian Economy over four periods (1983, 
1987, 1991 and 2000) and using the Malaysian input output tables, he found increasing output, 
income and employment multipliers. 
Trend analysis of individual Type I and Type II multipliers are presented in Table 5.2 below. It 
shows that apart from PAYE tax multipliers, all other tax multipliers – companies tax, VAT and 
SBS tax – declined during the period under review. This suggests that PAYE is the most sustainable 
tax in the economy. Only PAYE tax multipliers increased, the rest decreased. 
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Table 5.2: Overall trend analysis of generic multipliers for South Africa (2007-2015) 
 Multipliers: 2007 to 2015 Type I & II 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Fiscal multipliers 
Company tax: number of tax 
payers 
Type I  0.475 0.461 0.460 0.405 0.364 0.253 0.203 0.181 0.159 
Type II 0.781 0.750 0.777 0.685 0.622 0.458 0.362 0.326 0.290 
Company tax: tax assessed  
(R million) 
Type I  0.104 0.105 0.086 0.077 0.081 0.070 0.070 0.067 0.063 
Type II 0.172 0.170 0.146 0.131 0.139 0.125 0.125 0.121 0.114 
VAT: number of vendors 
Type I  0.405 0.461 0.328 0.278 0.244 0.188 0.170 0.156 0.149 
Type II 0.674 0.750 0.565 0.480 0.427 0.345 0.308 0.286 0.276 
VAT: payments (R million) 
Type I  0.129 0.105 0.129 0.122 0.121 0.106 0.105 0.106 0.104 
Type II 0.214 0.170 0.220 0.208 0.209 0.191 0.187 0.192 0.190 
PAYE tax (R million) 
Type I  0.081 0.093 0.111 0.117 0.126 0.114 0.116 0.123 0.126 
Type II 0.133 0.152 0.188 0.199 0.218 0.203 0.205 0.219 0.228 
SBC tax: number of taxpayers 
Type I  0.066 0.069 0.072 0.068 0.066 0.052 0.048 0.045 0.041 
Type II 0.108 0.111 0.122 0.114 0.112 0.096 0.086 0.081 0.074 
SBC Tax: tax assessed (R million) 
Type I  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Type II 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Employment multipliers 
Total employment (number)  
Type I  9.358 8.769 8.380 7.233 6.843 5.382 5.086 4.763 4.711 
Type II 15.472 14.362 14.233 12.326 11.770 9.847 9.172 8.726 8.720 
 Total formal employment 
(number)  
Type I  7.754 6.783 6.392 5.603 5.242 4.201 3.897 3.590 3.476 
Type II 12.885 11.180 10.933 9.606 9.061 7.612 6.977 6.530 6.392 
Formal employment: skilled 
(number)  
Type I  1.812 1.642 1.556 1.368 1.289 1.034 0.966 0.905 0.858 
Type II 3.019 2.710 2.665 2.353 2.236 1.882 1.737 1.653 1.586 
Formal employment: semi-skilled 
(number)  
Type I  3.916 3.427 3.236 2.842 2.668 2.104 1.943 1.784 1.714 
Type II 6.430 5.583 5.472 4.815 4.563 3.797 3.462 3.228 3.134 
Formal employment: low skilled 
(number)  
Type I  2.026 1.714 1.600 1.393 1.285 1.064 0.988 0.901 0.903 
Type II 3.436 2.887 2.796 2.438 2.262 1.933 1.778 1.649 1.672 
Informal employment (number)  
Type I  1.605 1.986 1.988 1.630 1.601 1.180 1.189 1.173 1.235 
Type II 2.587 3.183 3.300 2.720 2.709 2.234 2.195 2.196 2.329 
Other multipliers 
Gross fixed capital formation   
Type I  0.305 0.345 0.337 0.294 0.292 0.257 0.269 0.271 0.270 
Type II 0.509 0.571 0.575 0.504 0.505 0.457 0.475 0.485 0.488 
Fixed capital stock  
Type I  3.608 3.786 3.979 3.736 3.641 3.221 3.237 3.308 3.322 
Type II 6.046 6.288 6.862 6.452 6.337 5.757 5.737 5.929 6.024 
Gross value added  
Type I  1.210 1.205 1.271 1.256 1.263 1.131 1.117 1.113 1.120 
Type II 2.008 1.984 2.169 2.141 2.170 2.021 1.975 1.995 2.032 
GOS/mixed income 
Type I  0.619 0.619 0.651 0.639 0.636 0.566 0.549 0.536 0.532 
Type II 1.026 1.017 1.107 1.083 1.086 1.012 0.971 0.961 0.967 
Taxes less subsidies on products 
Type I  0.142 0.126 0.124 0.128 0.138 0.131 0.134 0.136 0.141 
Type II 0.247 0.218 0.224 0.229 0.249 0.233 0.236 0.241 0.253 
Imports 
Type I  0.442 0.480 0.379 0.381 0.408 0.421 0.448 0.445 0.431 
Type II 0.762 0.825 0.676 0.676 0.730 0.739 0.779 0.780 0.761 
Income and output multipliers                     
Income multiplier 
Type I  0.569 0.568 0.598 0.594 0.605 0.544 0.547 0.554 0.564 
Type II 0.947 0.938 1.024 1.020 1.046 0.972 0.966 0.993 1.021 
Output multiplier Type I  2.958 2.960 3.050 3.004 2.962 2.758 2.742 2.736 2.733 
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Type II 5.023 5.003 5.335 5.248 5.222 4.934 4.860 4.910 4.960 
Source: Own computation derived from the dynamic SUT model 
Note:  Type I = Direct and indirect effect  Type II = Economy-wide effect 
 
From the first set of simulation results in Table 5.2 It can be inferred that, based on the reference 
years 2007 and 2015, an additional R1 million worth of exogenous final demand injection into 
the South African economy through direct and indirect effects on production would have 
generated an average of the following values throughout the entire economy, which in this case, 
yield positive but declining results over time. Example: 
• Fiscal effect on company tax assessed would have been R104 000 in 2007 (R63 000 in 2015); 
VAT payment: R129 000 in 2007 (R104 000 in 2015); PAYE tax: R81 000 in 2007 (R126 000 in 
2015); and SBS tax would have fluctuated around R1 000 throughout the period under review. 
• Labour effect in terms of employment creation suggests that in 2015 there would have been 
a total of 4.7 jobs created, of which 3.4 would have been in the formal sector and 1.2 in the 
informal sector. Of the 3.4 jobs in the formal sector, 0.8 would have been for high and skilled 
labour, 1.7 for semi-skilled labour and 0.9 for low or unskilled labour. Effect on employment 
creation in 2015 would have been lower than that in 2007. Total employment in 2007 would 
have been 9.3 jobs created of which 7.7 jobs would have been in the formal sector and 1.6 
jobs in the informal sector. Of the 7.7 jobs in the formal sector, 1.8 would have been for high 
and skilled labour, 3.9 for semi-skilled labour and 3.4 for low or unskilled labour. 
• Economic effect on total output would have been R2.9 million in 2007 (R2.7 million in 2015); 
gross value added: R1.2 million in 2007 (R1.1 million in 2015); income in the form of 
compensation of employees: R569 000 in 2007 (R564 000 in 2015), but the income to 
shareholders (gross operating surplus) would have been R619 000 in 2007 (R532 000 in 2015) 
and imports R442 000 in 2007 (R431 000 in 2015). These results show that for every R1 
injected in the South African economy, the effect was low for compensation of employees 
pre-recession, at workers’ disadvantage. In 2015, after the recession, the situation has 
changed, and the impact is now low for GOS, at a disadvantage to the capital owners. 
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5.3.2.2 Model 2: Tax multipliers: Tax forward and backward linkage coefficients 
 
The second set of simulation results focuses on supply-side Tax Forward Linkage Coefficients and 
demand side Tax Backward Linkage Coefficients effects for different sectors of the economy. 
Given a hypothetical R1-million increase in final demand, which economic sector would have 
yielded high tax multipliers?  Simulation results in Table 5.3 reveal that the trade industry had 
high tax backward linkage coefficients and the finance industry had high forward linkage 
coefficients both in 2007 and 2015. So domestic wholesale and retail sales together with inter-
national trade should be targeted to stimulate tax generation in the South African economy. 
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Table 5.3: Comparing tax backward and forward sector tax multipliers in 2007 and 2015 
Tax backward coefficients (2007 - Tax multipliers)     
 Company tax: 
Number of 
taxpayers 
Company tax: 
Tax assessed 
 (R million) 
VAT: Number 
of vendors 
VAT: Payments 
(R million) 
PAYE tax  
(R million) 
SBC tax: 
Number of 
taxpayers 
SBC tax: Tax 
assessed  
(R million) 
Agriculture 0.409 0.064 1.094 0.164 0.070 0.064 0.001 
Mining 0.164 0.115 0.138 0.093 0.077 0.022 0.000 
Manufacturing 0.193 0.067 0.187 0.074 0.034 0.033 0.000 
Energy 0.230 0.097 0.170 0.087 0.060 0.037 0.001 
Construction 0.763 0.100 0.605 0.200 0.101 0.138 0.002 
Trade 3.490 0.605 2.920 0.760 0.365 0.623 0.006 
Transport 0.565 0.156 0.450 0.169 0.084 0.091 0.001 
Finance 1.030 0.194 0.785 0.251 0.185 0.105 0.001 
Government 0.360 0.065 0.289 0.090 0.084 0.048 0.001 
        
Tax forward coefficients (2007 - Tax multipliers)     
 Company tax: 
number of 
taxpayers 
Company tax: 
tax assessed  
(R million) 
VAT: number 
of vendors 
VAT: payments 
(R million) 
PAYE tax  
(R million) 
SBC tax: 
number of 
taxpayers 
SBC tax: tax 
assessed  
(R million) 
Agriculture 0.338 0.064 0.746 0.128 0.058 0.052 0.001 
Mining 0.209 0.100 0.173 0.090 0.068 0.029 0.000 
Manufacturing 0.308 0.097 0.307 0.111 0.056 0.049 0.001 
Energy 0.218 0.081 0.167 0.077 0.053 0.032 0.000 
Construction 0.588 0.092 0.471 0.159 0.082 0.101 0.001 
Trade 0.704 0.130 0.583 0.161 0.083 0.117 0.001 
Transport 0.485 0.119 0.391 0.136 0.071 0.076 0.001 
Finance 0.846 0.158 0.644 0.204 0.149 0.089 0.001 
Government 0.309 0.060 0.249 0.079 0.065 0.040 0.001 
 
 
Tax backward coefficients (2015 - Tax multipliers)     
 Company tax: 
number of 
taxpayers 
Company tax: 
tax assessed  
(R million) 
VAT: number 
of vendors 
VAT: payments 
(R million) 
PAYE tax  
(R million) 
SBC tax: 
number of 
taxpayers 
SBC tax: tax 
assessed  
(R million) 
Agriculture 0.213 0.059 0.475 0.135 0.111 0.053 0.001 
Mining 0.057 0.056 0.053 0.066 0.094 0.014 0.000 
Manufacturing 0.067 0.035 0.063 0.051 0.046 0.020 0.000 
Energy 0.075 0.039 0.053 0.089 0.101 0.022 0.000 
Construction 0.382 0.066 0.226 0.157 0.138 0.130 0.002 
Trade 1.719 0.586 1.627 0.979 0.842 0.567 0.008 
Transport 0.200 0.108 0.171 0.146 0.156 0.057 0.001 
Finance 0.354 0.134 0.329 0.235 0.309 0.069 0.001 
Government 0.133 0.037 0.098 0.069 0.181 0.031 0.001 
        
Tax forward coefficients (2015 - Tax multipliers)     
 Company tax: 
number of 
taxpayers 
Company tax: 
tax assessed  
(R million) 
VAT: number 
of vendors 
VAT: payments 
(R million) 
PAYE tax  
(R million) 
SBC tax: 
number of 
taxpayers 
SBC tax: tax 
assessed  
(R million) 
Agriculture 0.169 0.054 0.330 0.110 0.099 0.043 0.001 
Mining 0.070 0.052 0.064 0.067 0.088 0.018 0.000 
Manufacturing 0.113 0.057 0.113 0.084 0.081 0.032 0.001 
Energy 0.061 0.032 0.047 0.067 0.077 0.017 0.000 
Construction 0.243 0.056 0.159 0.115 0.104 0.078 0.001 
Trade 0.209 0.075 0.198 0.125 0.114 0.064 0.001 
Transport 0.145 0.071 0.129 0.103 0.111 0.039 0.001 
Finance 0.279 0.108 0.262 0.187 0.245 0.054 0.001 
Government 0.103 0.034 0.083 0.059 0.121 0.024 0.000 
Source: Own computation derived from the dynamic SUT model 
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Contrary to this study’s findings, the study by Zaman and Surugiu (2010) on Propagation effects 
of taxes in Romania: An input-output analysis investigated tax policy effects backward and 
forward for the years 2000 and 2006. They concluded that the industries with universal vocation, 
serving all the other industries of the national economy, like electricity, gas, water, education, 
and public administration, were characterised by a strong tax effect. 
 
As mentioned earlier, apart from PAYE tax, most tax multipliers in all sectors were high in 2007 
prior to the recession and were low in 2015 after the recession. For example, using backward tax 
multipliers as in Table 5.3, a hypothetical R1-million increase in final demand would have resulted 
in an economy-wide yield of R70 000 PAYE tax from the agriculture industry in 2007 compared 
with R111 000 in 2015. VAT payments in agriculture would have a yield of R164 000 in 2007 and 
135 000 in 2015. 
 
5.3.2.3 Model 3:  Effect of a 5% increase in exogenous variables on different taxes and other 
endogenous variables 
 
The third set of results presents four different scenarios that assessed, over the period 2007-
2015, the effect of 5% increase in exogenous variables, such as exports (Scenario 1), government 
spending (Scenario 2), household consumption expenditure (Scenario 3), and total investment 
(Scenario 4) on endogenous variables (such as taxes, employment, gross domestic fixed 
investment, compensation of employees (CoE) gross operating surplus (GoS), taxes less subsidies 
on products, fixed capital  stock, and imports). Appendix A provides more details for each 
scenario and tax multipliers. 
 
In all four scenarios, simulation results presented in Table 5.4 and Appendix A are consistently 
aligned with those shown in the first and second sets of results in terms of declining multipliers 
over the period under review. Another finding is that a 5% increase in all exogenous variables has 
a higher economy-wide effect on imports than it has on other endogenous variables. 
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Example, in the first scenario, a 5% increase in exports leads to a 5.08% increase in imports. In 
the second scenario, a 5% increase in household consumption expenditure leads to a 10.03% 
increase in imports. In the third scenario, a 5% increase in government spending leads to a 1.69% 
increase in imports. In the last scenario, a 5% increase in investment leads to a 3.78% increase in 
imports. Results of low effect in the third scenario (5% increase in government spending) are in 
line with prior expectations, in the sense that the bulk (75%) of government spending (on 
education, health, and social welfare) has little effect on imports. Moreover, an increasing 
demand for goods and services by households (in second scenario) triggers a high demand for 
production and intermediate inputs. Firms react by importing final goods or intermediate inputs 
to satisfy the demand. 
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Table 5.4. Impact of a 5% increase in exogenous variables: The four scenarios
Scenario 1: 
5% increase in exports 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Companies Tax: Number of tax payers 3.37% 3.74% 3.02% 3.04% 3.21% 2.65% 2.73% 2.78% 2.76%
Companies Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 4.11% 4.76% 3.78% 3.77% 4.07% 3.62% 3.78% 3.73% 3.63%
VAT Tax: Number of vendors 3.53% 3.74% 3.18% 3.23% 3.44% 2.97% 3.04% 3.10% 3.08%
VAT Tax: Payments (R million) 3.76% 4.76% 3.37% 3.41% 3.64% 3.22% 3.31% 3.38% 3.30%
PAYE Tax (R million) 3.61% 3.90% 3.10% 3.08% 3.20% 2.88% 2.90% 2.98% 2.94%
SBC Tax: Number of taxpayers 3.26% 3.59% 2.97% 2.99% 3.17% 2.51% 2.58% 2.60% 2.58%
SBC Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 3.35% 3.73% 3.07% 3.06% 3.24% 2.75% 2.81% 2.87% 2.84%
Employment (Number): Total 3.12% 3.36% 2.76% 2.77% 2.94% 2.40% 2.43% 2.41% 2.43%
Employment (Number): Formal: Total 3.15% 3.40% 2.78% 2.78% 2.95% 2.52% 2.56% 2.57% 2.60%
Employment (Number): Formal: Skilled 2.75% 3.03% 2.44% 2.43% 2.56% 2.13% 2.14% 2.15% 2.17%
Employment (Number): Formal: Semi-skilled 3.47% 3.79% 3.13% 3.15% 3.34% 2.86% 2.90% 2.92% 2.94%
Employment (Number): Formal: Low skilled 2.93% 3.05% 2.46% 2.47% 2.62% 2.31% 2.36% 2.36% 2.43%
Employment (Number): Informal 2.96% 3.22% 2.70% 2.74% 2.92% 1.95% 1.99% 1.93% 1.97%
Gross fixed capital formation 3.86% 4.40% 3.73% 3.76% 3.97% 3.79% 3.81% 3.92% 3.81%
Fixed capital stock 3.68% 4.11% 3.39% 3.42% 3.62% 3.40% 3.47% 3.60% 3.56%
Gross value added 3.50% 3.89% 3.17% 3.14% 3.35% 3.01% 3.05% 3.11% 3.05%
Compensation of employees 3.13% 3.48% 2.86% 2.85% 3.01% 2.73% 2.78% 2.82% 2.82%
GOS / mixed income 3.86% 4.30% 3.50% 3.44% 3.71% 3.31% 3.35% 3.44% 3.32%
Taxes less subsidies on products 4.12% 4.59% 3.81% 3.89% 4.19% 4.11% 4.23% 4.27% 4.29%
Imports 4.72% 5.24% 4.42% 4.47% 4.75% 4.85% 4.99% 5.08% 5.08%
Scenario 2: 
5% increase in household expenditure 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Companies Tax: Number of tax payers 9.31% 9.01% 9.45% 8.97% 9.08% 7.81% 7.58% 7.44% 7.44%
Companies Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 9.75% 9.29% 9.98% 9.57% 9.68% 8.97% 8.86% 8.71% 8.73%
VAT Tax: Number of vendors 9.48% 9.01% 9.76% 9.45% 9.59% 8.60% 8.43% 8.27% 8.27%
VAT Tax: Payments (R million) 9.49% 9.29% 9.84% 9.50% 9.67% 8.80% 8.57% 8.48% 8.42%
PAYE Tax (R million) 9.36% 9.02% 9.35% 8.86% 8.85% 8.24% 7.99% 7.92% 7.84%
SBC Tax: Number of taxpayers 8.47% 8.14% 8.76% 8.37% 8.51% 6.92% 6.75% 6.57% 6.57%
SBC Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 8.76% 8.48% 9.09% 8.62% 8.78% 7.69% 7.38% 7.24% 7.25%
Employment (Number): Total 7.78% 7.40% 7.91% 7.58% 7.66% 6.37% 6.19% 5.95% 6.05%
Employment (Number): Formal: Total 7.88% 7.49% 7.95% 7.62% 7.67% 6.69% 6.52% 6.34% 6.45%
Employment (Number): Formal: Skilled 7.50% 7.30% 7.61% 7.21% 7.26% 6.27% 6.06% 5.88% 5.95%
Employment (Number): Formal: Semi-skilled 8.31% 7.97% 8.57% 8.21% 8.29% 7.14% 6.97% 6.79% 6.90%
Employment (Number): Formal: Low skilled 7.45% 6.83% 7.20% 6.96% 6.98% 6.28% 6.16% 5.97% 6.16%
Employment (Number): Informal 7.26% 7.07% 7.76% 7.42% 7.61% 5.23% 5.14% 4.81% 4.97%
Gross fixed capital formation 9.00% 8.81% 9.54% 9.16% 9.13% 8.58% 8.30% 8.15% 8.09%
Fixed capital stock 9.20% 8.97% 9.53% 9.17% 9.18% 8.64% 8.39% 8.30% 8.31%
Gross value added 8.28% 7.98% 8.49% 8.05% 8.10% 7.31% 7.08% 6.99% 7.00%
Compensation of employees 7.62% 7.39% 7.83% 7.50% 7.52% 6.79% 6.61% 6.50% 6.56%
GOS / mixed income 8.92% 8.54% 9.14% 8.58% 8.70% 7.83% 7.56% 7.51% 7.47%
Taxes less subsidies on products 9.47% 9.06% 9.77% 9.75% 9.70% 9.96% 9.75% 9.57% 9.61%
Imports 9.72% 9.21% 10.13% 10.12% 10.00% 10.34% 10.13% 10.01% 10.03%
Scenario 3: 
5% increase in government expenditure 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Companies Tax: Number of tax payers 2.25% 2.24% 2.64% 2.61% 2.67% 1.78% 1.82% 1.82% 1.80%
Companies Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 2.11% 2.01% 2.50% 2.53% 2.56% 1.81% 1.82% 1.83% 1.84%
VAT Tax: Number of vendors 2.15% 2.24% 2.56% 2.56% 2.63% 1.78% 1.81% 1.80% 1.79%
VAT Tax: Payments (R million) 2.13% 2.01% 2.58% 2.60% 2.67% 1.84% 1.85% 1.85% 1.85%
PAYE Tax (R million) 2.43% 2.53% 2.97% 2.98% 3.07% 2.28% 2.31% 2.33% 2.32%
SBC Tax: Number of taxpayers 1.98% 1.95% 2.37% 2.36% 2.43% 1.55% 1.58% 1.56% 1.55%
SBC Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 2.04% 2.02% 2.43% 2.45% 2.59% 1.77% 1.83% 1.78% 1.79%
Employment (Number): Total 2.20% 2.24% 2.66% 2.66% 2.74% 1.97% 1.99% 1.99% 1.95%
Employment (Number): Formal: Total 2.29% 2.35% 2.76% 2.77% 2.84% 2.13% 2.15% 2.16% 2.13%
Employment (Number): Formal: Skilled 2.62% 2.70% 3.11% 3.10% 3.19% 2.44% 2.47% 2.48% 2.45%
Employment (Number): Formal: Semi-skilled 2.06% 2.08% 2.51% 2.51% 2.58% 1.82% 1.84% 1.85% 1.82%
Employment (Number): Formal: Low skilled 2.40% 2.50% 2.90% 2.90% 2.98% 2.38% 2.39% 2.40% 2.36%
Employment (Number): Informal 1.74% 1.85% 2.30% 2.26% 2.37% 1.40% 1.49% 1.47% 1.48%
Gross fixed capital formation 2.26% 2.23% 2.66% 2.62% 2.64% 1.96% 2.00% 2.00% 2.01%
Fixed capital stock 2.47% 2.49% 2.90% 2.90% 2.94% 2.19% 2.20% 2.20% 2.17%
Gross value added 2.34% 2.33% 2.76% 2.77% 2.83% 2.13% 2.14% 2.14% 2.13%
Compensation of employees 2.44% 2.47% 2.87% 2.87% 2.95% 2.27% 2.29% 2.29% 2.26%
GOS / mixed income 2.22% 2.18% 2.64% 2.66% 2.69% 1.97% 1.98% 1.97% 1.97%
Taxes less subsidies on products 1.90% 1.82% 2.18% 2.23% 2.21% 2.01% 2.04% 2.05% 2.02%
Imports 1.68% 1.58% 1.99% 2.07% 2.03% 1.68% 1.71% 1.72% 1.69%
Scenario 4: 
5% increase in Gross Fixed Capital Investment 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Companies Tax: Number of tax payers 2.86% 3.25% 3.42% 3.04% 3.04% 2.50% 2.59% 2.57% 2.60%
Companies Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 2.96% 3.38% 3.56% 3.09% 2.99% 2.60% 2.77% 2.74% 2.69%
VAT Tax: Number of vendors 2.92% 3.25% 3.39% 3.02% 2.96% 2.49% 2.56% 2.54% 2.57%
VAT Tax: Payments (R million) 3.04% 3.38% 3.54% 3.11% 3.05% 2.61% 2.69% 2.67% 2.67%
PAYE Tax (R million) 2.74% 3.02% 3.08% 2.67% 2.57% 2.19% 2.23% 2.21% 2.22%
SBC Tax: Number of taxpayers 2.94% 3.25% 3.47% 3.08% 3.08% 2.52% 2.64% 2.62% 2.64%
SBC Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 3.04% 3.33% 3.60% 3.11% 3.00% 2.52% 2.62% 2.62% 2.59%
Employment (Number): Total 2.56% 2.75% 2.85% 2.51% 2.47% 1.97% 2.01% 1.98% 2.02%
Employment (Number): Formal: Total 2.50% 2.71% 2.80% 2.46% 2.40% 1.98% 2.03% 1.98% 2.02%
Employment (Number): Formal: Skilled 2.12% 2.37% 2.43% 2.11% 2.06% 1.65% 1.66% 1.62% 1.65%
Employment (Number): Formal: Semi-skilled 2.81% 3.07% 3.19% 2.80% 2.75% 2.27% 2.33% 2.29% 2.31%
Employment (Number): Formal: Low skilled 2.30% 2.39% 2.44% 2.16% 2.10% 1.78% 1.84% 1.80% 1.84%
Employment (Number): Informal 2.86% 2.91% 3.05% 2.73% 2.74% 1.94% 1.97% 1.95% 2.02%
Gross fixed capital formation 2.69% 3.05% 3.20% 2.84% 2.75% 2.42% 2.46% 2.43% 2.40%
Fixed capital stock 2.55% 2.90% 3.03% 2.67% 2.58% 2.25% 2.30% 2.30% 2.31%
Gross value added 2.51% 2.82% 2.94% 2.55% 2.46% 2.09% 2.14% 2.15% 2.15%
Compensation of employees 2.31% 2.60% 2.70% 2.37% 2.29% 1.96% 2.02% 2.02% 2.04%
GOS / mixed income 2.72% 3.05% 3.17% 2.74% 2.64% 2.23% 2.27% 2.30% 2.28%
Taxes less subsidies on products 3.44% 3.85% 4.01% 3.70% 3.55% 3.32% 3.49% 3.47% 3.48%
Imports 3.59% 3.93% 4.14% 3.82% 3.65% 3.57% 3.75% 3.79% 3.78%
Exports
Household consumption expenditure
Government consumption expenditure
Investment
 
Source: Own computation derived from the dynamic SUT model 
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Consequently, the second scenario, which dealt with a 5% increase in household expenditure, 
would ultimately yield higher multiplier effects than in other three scenarios. For example, when 
household spending rises by 5%, most taxes (company tax, VAT, PAYE tax, and SBC taxes) increase 
by over 7%, compared with 3% in scenario 1 with a 5% increase in exports, resulting in a total 
employment rise of about 6%, more specifically among semi-skilled labour at 6.9%. Amazingly, 
GoS rises by 1 percentage point above CoE, which implies that the increase in household 
consumption expenditure benefits more shareholders than it does workers. 
 
In all four scenarios, a 5% increase in all exogenous variables yielded higher employment mul-
tipliers for semi-skilled workers than for high and skilled workers, low- and unskilled workers, and 
workers in formal and informal sectors. Most semi-skilled workers are in the middle-income class. 
So an initiative that causes a shock in any of the exogenous variables will have a greater effect on 
the middle class than on the lower and upper classes. 
Finally, Investment has an economy-wide multiplying effect on itself. In the fourth scenario, a 5% 
increase in gross fixed capital investment leads to a 2.4% increase in investment. 
 
5.3.2.4 Model 4:  A full range of 43 employment multipliers  
 
The last set of findings is presented in a static SUT model calibrated for the 2015 reference year. 
Table 5.5 and Annexure B present labour empirical results exhaustively under 43 different 
employment multipliers, depicting the number of jobs to be created with a hypothetical R1-milli-
on increase in final demand. Put differently, this scenario reveals the areas where jobs will be 
created in the South African economy given a shock in exogenous variable that increases final 
demand by R1 million. The economy-wide effect (Type II) on employment multipliers is sum-
marised: 
 
• Gender disparity is observed with 5.2 jobs for males against 4.5 jobs for their female 
counterparts. 
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• Sluggish youth employment disadvantaged at 3.9 jobs against 5.7 jobs for adults, implying 
that the pace of fighting youth unemployment will persistently remain slow. 
• The economy will create more jobs for workers with less than secondary (3.2 jobs) and 
secondary completed (3.0 jobs) than for workers with tertiary education (1.9 jobs). These 
employment multipliers pose a huge challenge for a knowledge-based economy geared 
toward the fourth industrial revolution. Low employment multipliers  amongst workers 
with tertiary education can affect innovation and development negatively. 
• More jobs are created in the formal economy (6.6 jobs) than in the informal sector (1.6 
jobs). This is commendable since employment in the formal sector is more sustainable 
than in the informal sector. 
• Spatial distribution of employment multipliers reflects areas with more economic 
activities, namely Gauteng with 3.1 jobs, KwaZulu-Natal with 1.6 jobs, and the Western 
Cape with 1.4 jobs. Gauteng has the potential to remain an economic hub of the country. 
The high employment multiplier in Gauteng is one of the main reasons why more people 
migrate to the province. Other reasons may be attributed to the high urbanisation rate. 
• There is a correlation between a high urbanisation rate and employment rate. This is 
revealed by employment multipliers in urban areas (7.3 jobs) being higher than those in 
the rural areas (2.3 jobs) 
• Since it was established earlier that the South Africa economy creates more jobs for 
people with less than secondary education, this observation implies that more workers 
will hold low occupations in their working place. So employment multipliers by occupa-
tion are high for workers in elementary occupations (1.7 jobs), sales and services workers 
(1.4 jobs), domestic workers (1.3 jobs), and clerks (1.0 jobs) compared with workers in 
managerial positions (0.4 jobs). 
• The study also looked at employment multipliers within the Expanded Public Works 
Programmes (EPWP). Contrary to earlier findings with a higher employment multiplier 
among men than among women, the EPWP employment multipliers, although negligible 
(less than one job), are somewhat higher among women than among their male 
counterparts. However, they remain higher among adults than among the youth. 
103 
 
 Table 5.5.  Detailed employment multipliers for South Africa (2015) 
Employment multipliers (RSA - 2015) 
Type I and Type II multipliers 
Initial    
effect 
First 
round  
Direct 
effect 
Indirect 
effect 
Direct & 
indirect 
effect 
Induced 
effect 
Economy-
wide effect 
1. Employment - Male 1.119 0.523 1.642 1.573 3.215 2.001 5.217 
2. Employment - Female 0.869 0.383 1.252 1.156 2.407 2.066 4.473 
3. Employment - Youth 0.797 0.373 1.171 1.131 2.301 1.605 3.907 
4. Employment - Adult 1.190 0.533 1.723 1.598 3.321 2.462 5.783 
5. Employment by education - No schooling 0.050 0.021 0.070 0.063 0.133 0.110 0.243 
6. Employment by education - Less than primary 0.150 0.061 0.211 0.187 0.397 0.309 0.706 
7. Employment by education - Primary completed 0.084 0.035 0.119 0.107 0.225 0.176 0.401 
8. Employment by education - Less than secondary 0.661 0.307 0.967 0.917 1.885 1.339 3.224 
9. Employment by education -Secondary completed 0.623 0.300 0.922 0.896 1.818 1.202 3.020 
10. Employment by education -Tertiary 0.397 0.172 0.569 0.525 1.094 0.882 1.976 
11. Employment - Formal 1.380 0.632 2.012 1.901 3.913 2.696 6.609 
12. Employment - Informal 0.334 0.162 0.496 0.519 1.015 0.603 1.618 
13. Employment - Agriculture 0.111 0.047 0.158 0.119 0.277 0.345 0.621 
14. Employment - Domestic workers 0.163 0.065 0.228 0.190 0.417 0.424 0.841 
15. Employment - Western Cape 0.291 0.133 0.424 0.393 0.818 0.626 1.444 
16. Employment - Eastern Cape 0.174 0.073 0.247 0.224 0.471 0.360 0.831 
17. Employment - Northern Cape 0.038 0.015 0.053 0.046 0.099 0.077 0.176 
18. Employment - Free State 0.102 0.044 0.146 0.131 0.277 0.217 0.494 
19. Employment - KwaZulu-Natal 0.322 0.144 0.466 0.438 0.904 0.678 1.581 
20. Employment - North West 0.118 0.048 0.166 0.146 0.312 0.215 0.527 
21. Employment - Gauteng 0.630 0.308 0.938 0.924 1.862 1.264 3.126 
22. Employment -Mpumalanga 0.148 0.072 0.220 0.215 0.435 0.302 0.737 
23. Employment - Limpopo 0.163 0.069 0.232 0.212 0.444 0.329 0.774 
24. Employment -Urban areas 1.497 0.702 2.199 2.109 4.308 3.047 7.355 
25. Employment - Non-Urban 0.490 0.205 0.695 0.620 1.314 1.021 2.335 
26. Employment - Manager 0.161 0.000 0.161 0.164 0.324 0.157 0.482 
27. Employment - Professional 0.098 0.079 0.177 0.166 0.342 0.274 0.617 
28. Employment - Technician 0.184 0.042 0.225 0.198 0.424 0.357 0.781 
29. Employment - Clerk 0.211 0.079 0.290 0.290 0.580 0.441 1.022 
30. Employment - Sales and services 0.311 0.102 0.413 0.397 0.810 0.537 1.347 
31. Employment -  Skilled agriculture 0.012 0.154 0.166 0.160 0.326 0.345 0.671 
32. Employment -  Craft and related trade 0.246 0.006 0.251 0.220 0.471 0.175 0.646 
33. Employment – Plant and machine operator 0.166 0.085 0.251 0.250 0.501 0.292 0.793 
34. Employment -  Elementary 0.471 0.091 0.562 0.525 1.087 0.674 1.761 
35. Employment -  Domestic worker 0.128 0.217 0.346 0.290 0.636 0.697 1.332 
36. Employment -  Skilled labour 0.443 0.120 0.563 0.528 1.091 0.789 1.879 
37. Employment – Semi-skilled labour 0.945 0.426 1.371 1.317 2.688 1.790 4.478 
38. Employment -  Low skilled labour 0.599 0.309 0.908 0.815 1.723 1.371 3.094 
39. EPWP - MALE 0.015 0.005 0.021 0.016 0.036 0.028 0.065 
40. EPWP - FEMALE 0.029 0.008 0.037 0.026 0.063 0.060 0.123 
42. EPWP - YOUTH 0.017 0.006 0.023 0.018 0.041 0.038 0.079 
43. EPW28.P - ADULT 0.027 0.007 0.034 0.023 0.058 0.049 0.107 
Source: Own computation derived from the dynamic SUT model 
EPWP = Expanded Public Work Programmes 
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5.4. Conclusion, policy interventions and recommendation 
 
This study went further than the traditional input-output model by considering the most recent 
dynamic supply and use framework, and micro-simulation models to measure the impact of 
exogenous final demand on selected fiscal, labour and macroeconomic variables. It provided 
performance and trends analysis of tax multipliers, growth and employment multipliers, and 
other generic multipliers for South Africa for the period 2007 to 2015. The methodology used to 
develop the SUT is in line with the most recent 2008 System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) and 
international best practices (United Nations, 2009).  
 
In terms of the research finding, the study had four objective and results were presented in a 
model per each objective. One of the most important observations from the first model was the 
significant decline in the tax multipliers, GDP and output multipliers, employment multipliers and 
other generic multipliers over the 2007-2015 period. This finding implies that during post-
recession era, the effect of the average R1 invested in the economy, although positive, yielded a 
smaller return in terms of tax revenue, job creation and economic growth. At sector level, the 
results show that the inter-industry links and industry-consumer links have weakened. At policy 
level, this could exacerbate the low-growth that has persisted during the post-recession period. 
Low growth is correlated to low revenue generation and fiscal unsustainability. 
 
The second set of results showed that apart from PAYE tax, all other tax multipliers declined over 
the period under review. This implies at a policy level that the recent fiscal austerity measures 
being implemented in South Africa may be prolonged for a little while which, if not addressed, 
could affect service delivery for poor households and delay the quest for all-inclusive, equitable 
and sustainable economic growth envisaged in the National Development Plan and South African 
Vision 2030. In terms of backward tax multipliers, simulation results showed that the trade sector 
had the highest VAT multipliers compared with other sectors. 
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The third set of simulations were presented in four different policy scenarios. The results showed 
that the scenario with policy interventions that seeks to stimulate more household consumption 
expenditure yield high economy-wide growth, employment and tax multipliers than other three 
scenarios with strategic policies intervention that seek to stimulate either export, government 
spending or investment. This result confirms that South Africa’s economy is rather more 
consumption-driven than export-driven. 
 
Since the democratic dispensation, employment creation has remained at the heart of all South 
Africa’s government policies. The fourth set of results quantifies the areas where jobs will be 
created given a shock in exogenous variables. It reveals gender disparities, fewer jobs for youth 
compared to adults, fewer jobs in informal than formal, few jobs in rural than urban. Most jobs 
will be created 1) for people with less than secondary school than people with other education 
levels; 2) for people with elementary occupation than for people in other occupations; 3) for 
semi-skilled workers than for high, low or unskilled workers; and 4) in Gauteng than in other 
provinces. 
 
Findings of this study could be used for strategic plans in the country. Empirical results are ap-
propriate for policy interventions, such as fiscal policy (using tax multipliers), labour policy (using 
employment multipliers), poverty and development policy (using income multipliers), investment 
policy (using investment multipliers), trade policy (using export multipliers), growth and 
industrial policy (output multipliers, gross value added multipliers, gross domestic product 
multipliers, and gross operating surplus multipliers), small, medium and micro-sized enterprises 
policy (using SBS tax multipliers), and so on. 
 
The model used in this study will be converted into a social accounting matrix which will be used 
for the construction of a computable general equilibrium model for South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 6. EXPANSIONARY FISCAL POLICY EFFECTS ON GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT, POVERTY 
AND INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: SAM AND CGE ANALYSIS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
6.1.1 Background, statement of the problem, and aim of the study 
 
The recent world bank report on “overcoming poverty and inequality in South Africa” launched 
in March 2018 reveals that South Africa is the most unequal country in the world, with post-
recession slow growth trajectory and high levels of poverty (World bank, 2018). Poverty has 
multiple dimensions and its depths can vary when assessed by age (Youth v Adult), race (African 
v non-African), income (less privileged v privileged households), education (primary v tertiary), 
and by area (Urban v non-urban). The World Bank report argues that poverty in South Africa has 
a “strong spatial dimension” which demonstrates the enduring legacy of apartheid, and setback 
of marginalised group of people. The groups worst affected by poverty are black South Africans‚ 
youth unemployed‚ the less educated people‚ female-headed households‚ large families and 
children. For example, the top 1% of South Africans own 70.9% of the country’s wealth while the 
bottom 60% only controls 7% of the country’s assets. More than half of South Africans (55.5%) 
people live below the national poverty line of R992 per month (World bank, 2018). A Gini 
coefficient of 0.63 in 2015 makes South Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world 
(IHS, Regional Explorer, 2018).  
 
Findings from the World Bank report are being echoed by South Africa’s Planning Commission, 
and in the recent NDP and Vision 2030, ascertaining that South Africa is trapped in a dual hitch 
of poverty and inequality on the one side, and post-recession low growth trajectory on the other 
side (National Treasury, 2016). Despite the effective use of fiscal policy, high spending on a social 
programme and its role of achieving redistribution, these challenges have persistently remained 
at high levels (National Treasury, 2017). The research question posed in this study is whether it 
is possible for the government’s policymakers to concurrently achieve the objectives stated in 
107 
 
the NDP and Vision 2030 of high economic growth and fair income redistribution under the 
current constraint of fiscal austerities. This challenge purely appears as a constraint optimisation 
problem. In this constraint optimisation problem, stimulating high economic growth is the object-
ive function that must be maximised under the constraints of fiscal austerity and poverty re-
duction. 
 
Econometric models like VAR, VECM, ARDL have a common limitation in that they do not provide 
economy-wide solutions to the constrained optimisation problem. For this reason, the researcher 
used a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that is designed to solve 
constrained optimisation problems (Löfgren, 2002). Given the South African context of poverty 
and inequality among the marginalised group of people and side-lined areas, the researcher also 
used the social accounting matrix (SAM), a tool that shows how income is generated in the 
economy and how that income is redistributed (Pyatt & Roe, 1977).  
 
Apart from limitations of econometric models to solve constrained optimisation problem, 
economy-wide empirical studies that apply input-output, SUT, SAM and CGE models to assess 
the effect of government strategies on socio-economic variables have failed to reflect the 
dynamics of selected marginalised groups of people and marginalised areas. Due to the apartheid 
system, black households were historically marginalised from the mainstream economy. Even 
now, after 20 years of democracy, poverty and inequality have not been reversed among black 
households. The analysis of poverty and inequality must show the economy-wide effects of racial, 
gender, age disparities and spatial incongruences. Secondly, disparities between urban and non-
urban, formal and informal, skilled and unskilled are prominent in South Africa and the impact 
assessment must quantify how these variables respond to changes in government spending. 
 
This aim of this study is to investigate the impact of government spending on growth, 
employment, poverty and inequality. It assesses the effect that expansionary fiscal policy has on 
marginalised group of people and side-lined areas in South Africa.  
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6.1.2 Brief selected literature 
 
Despite the pressing need, only a few studies have been conducted in the field of fiscal policy 
using the CGE model. For example: Mabugu, Robichaud, Maisonnave, and Chitiga (2013) used an 
intertemporal computable general equilibrium model to investigate the consequences of an 
expansive fiscal policy designed to accelerate economic growth in South Africa. The result shows 
that increasing taxes mitigates the effect on debt but has negative economic effects. Increased 
investment spending improves GDP and reduces debt in all finance schemes. 
 
Teguh (2011) examined the effectiveness of fiscal policies on alleviating the incidence of poverty 
in Indonesia. Using a CGE and micro-simulation model analysis, the study found that the 
progressive transfer financed either by increasing the VAT rate or by increasing the income tax 
rate is not effective in alleviating poverty. The rationale of this finding is that progressive transfer 
and VAT have an inflationary effect that worsens the welfare of the poor. In addition, it was found 
that government expansion on education, health, and infrastructures financed by an increasing 
income tax rate significantly reduces the incidence of poverty. 
 
Lumengo (2007) conducted a study on the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth, income 
distribution and poverty alleviation in South Africa. The research used a mixed method of the 
computerised general equilibrium (CGE) model and the structured vector auto regressive (SVAR) 
model to examine whether fiscal policy contributes to the achievement of the goals contained in 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy. It also sought to ascertain whether 
the South African government is able simultaneously to reach a fair redistribution of income, 
fiscal discipline and sustained economic growth. The study found that it was possible for the 
government of South Africa to concurrently achieve the objectives of resource redistribution, 
high output growth and balanced-budget constraint under conditions of full employment in the 
labour market. 
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Lumengo, Erero and Gupta (2016), using a CGE model, investigated the effect of activity tax in 
the property-owning and subletting of fixed property sectors on the South African economy. They 
found that increasing taxation in the property sector reduces demand for all types of labour in 
South Africa. More importantly, the simulation results of their study show that a tax increase in 
the property sector reduces economic activity in the country and offsets a possible increase in 
government revenue. So they recommended that the South African government be cautious 
about resorting to an increase in tax in the property sector to raise its revenue. 
 
Erero and Gavin (2015) used a dynamic CGE model to assess the effect of the dividend tax in 
South Africa. They argued that the implementation of the policy shock on its own would have a 
positive macroeconomic effect. The study showed that increasing the dividend tax would have a 
minute but positive effect on most macroeconomic variables in the immediate year of 
implementing dividend tax rate increases. For example, an increase in GDP by 0.0585% in 2013 
and by 0.5085% in 2018 would be seen respectively. 
 
Wolff and Zacharias (2007), in assessing the effects of United States public spending and taxation 
on households, incorporated public expenditures into a wealth-adjusted measure of income. The 
study found that poverty levels and overall income inequality declined significantly. 
 
Recently, the World Bank embarked on a study on “overcoming poverty and inequality in South 
Africa”. It employed a dynamic CGE model to assess the impact of investment on poverty and 
inequality. Simulation results shows positive impact on poverty reduction but not impact on the 
gini-coefficient, implying that inequality in the long run is unaffected. The study concluded that 
South Africa will not reach the target set in the 2030 NDP of eliminating poverty and inequality. 
 
6.1.3. Gap in the literature and relevance of the study 
 
A thorough analysis of the literature surveyed reveals a gap whereby none of the studies looked 
at the impact of fiscal policy on marginalised group or side-lined area. To close this gap, the SAM 
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is extended to include external matrices for micro-simulations that enable analysis of vulnerable 
groups like young people, black households, rural communities and the informal sector. A new 
extended SAM is used as a database for the CGE model. These additional features add a new 
dimension to strategic policy, one of inequality and inclusivity. The CGE was calibrated with a 
recent SAM (2015) which better represents the current structures and dynamics of the South 
African economy. 
 
In terms of the current NDP’s inclusive economy ideology, the study empirically quantifies the 
outcome gaps resulting from government interventions, showing for example the effect of 
expansionary fiscal policy on marginalised groups, on youth v adults, urban v non-urban, skilled 
v unskilled, and poor v non-poor households. When it comes to the NDP’s quest for reducing 
poverty and inequality, the CGE model provides the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on the 
Gini-coefficient. And for macroeconomic policy, the CGE simulation results provide a series of 
macroeconomic variables like GDP, investment and employment – and shows how these 
variables respond to changes in fiscal instruments. 
 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no single study in South Africa that has used 
an economy-wide impact assessment to address the four areas mentioned. 
 
Policy simulations in this study were guided by what was stated in the introduction that poverty 
has multiple dimensions and its depths can vary when assessed by age (Youth v Adult), race 
(African v non-African), income (less privileged v privileged households), education (primary v 
tertiary), and by area (Urban v non-urban) which forms the basis of simulations conducted in this 
study. Quantifying the impact of expansionary fiscal policy on vulnerable group of people is 
critical for monitoring progress of “inclusive economy” strategy of the NDP. To achieve the 
research objectives set in this study, six policy simulations were conducted: 
• The first scenario aimed at assessing the extent to which an additional R1 government 
spending reaches the targeted audience, that is, the poor households, especially among Black 
households. 
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• The second scenario assessed the effect of government spending on youth employment. 
• The third scenario sought to ascertain the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on employment 
in urban and non-urban areas. 
• The fourth scenario comprised respectively a 5% and a 10% increase in government spending 
and the effect on macroeconomic and socioeconomic variables. 
• The fifth scenario focused on the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on household 
consumption. 
• The last scenario contrasts the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on people employed with 
primary education v people employed with tertiary education. 
 
The study is structured as follows: Section 2 presents data and methodological framework. It 
discusses different functional forms underpinning the behavioural equations of economic agents 
in a CGE model, how the model was calibrated, and highlights the macro-closures in the model. 
Section 3 presents various simulations and results. Findings are grouped under two sets. The first 
comprises micro-simulation results from the SAM. The second set is made up of simulations and 
scenarios from the CGE model. The last section concludes the study. 
 
6.2. Data and methodological framework.   
 
The researcher used Statistics South Africa’s 2015 Supply and Use Tables as input data to compile 
a new SAM. The methodology used in this study is consistent with the latest 2008 System of 
National Accounts (2008 SNA) released by the United Nations. Hence, the SAM-Leontief models 
complied with the United Nations’ 2008 SNA and international best practices (United Nations, 
2009). Employment multipliers were computed in line with the international Labour organisation 
recommendations. (ILO, 2015) 
 
The standard SAM was extended to include external matrices that disaggregate households by 
race (African, white, Coloured, and Indian), employment by age (youth and adults), education 
(primary v tertiary), and by areas (urban and non-urban) for micro-simulation purposes (Quantec 
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Research, 2012). This uniqueness sets this study’s model apart from other models found in the 
South African literature. Hence, the CGE was calibrated with a recent and modified SAM which 
better represents current structures and dynamics of the South African economy. 
 
Moving from SAM to CGE was achieved on the one side, by including the function forms such as 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, the constant elasticity of transformation (CET), the 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES), and on the other side, by incorporating the behaviour of 
institutions like households, government and private firms into the CGE model (Humphrey, 
(1997). 
 
Following the standard CGE model developed by Löfgren et al (2001), the researcher constructed 
a dynamic CGE model to use for policy analysis. The model is solved through a set of linear and 
non-linear equations using GAMS software. The model was calibrated from the disaggregated 
2015 SAM. The data used in the model comprised mainly the disaggregated SAM, other sets of 
income elasticities for households and commodities, trade elasticity for commodities, and 
external matrices four households and labour. The economic optimisation behaviour and the 
production and consumer decisions were captured by parameters, through optimising first-order 
conditions subject to a set of constraints. Using the SAM in the CGE model enabled transfer of 
these structural and optimisation behavioural features into the CGE model, making it an applied 
CGE model. Adding time dimensions, and a set of time series elasticities, makes it a dynamic CGE 
model (Taylor, 1974). 
 
As background to CGE modelling, it is important to understand how goods and services are 
produced, and how industries and institutions interact in the economy. The CGE literature refers 
extensively to what is known as the multi-level or nested production function, by the 
combination of capital (K) and labour (L).  The CGE model comprises a set of behavioural 
equations that first need to be specified, then solved numerically and simultaneously. The 
specification is instrumental to the type of solution anticipated in the model. So CGE modellers 
are confronted by the important task of linking the behavioural equation to the true functioning 
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of the economy to be analysed as accurately as possible (Humphrey, 1997). Since the CGE model 
requires reconciling the behaviour of different sectors for a general equilibrium solution, the 
functional form representing the behaviour of different economic agents is discussed in this 
paper along with the appropriate institutions, factors and specific economic sectors of the South 
African economy (Kehoe, 1998). 
 
Household optimisation behaviour:  The household aims to sell its endowed factors to the firms 
to earn income in the form of wages and salaries. Households also derive other income in the 
form of rent or interest from the supply of capital. From all income received, households will 
spend the money on certain commodities of their choice. The household is assumed to choose 
the consumption that maximises their utility, and in this case, it is assumed that the utility 
function (Equation 1) is the Cobb–Douglas type presented as follows (Boehringer et al, 2003): 
U = Ac ⁡𝑪𝟏
𝒂𝟏  𝑪𝟐
𝒂𝟐⁡⁡𝑪𝟑
𝒂𝟑 ⁡…⁡⁡𝑪𝑵
𝒂𝒏 ⁡⁡= Ac ∏ 𝑪𝒊
𝒂𝒊𝑵
𝒊=𝟏       (1) 
where: 
Ac is a scaling parameter, and the exponent parameters ai are the share of each good in 
expenditure on consumption so that a1 + … + an  =  1. 
 At this stage, prices of goods and factors are assumed to be given in the household utility maxi-
misation problem. The household maximises its utility subject to its budget constraint in this 
manner: 
Maximise Uh (C1 + … + Cn )  =  ∏ 𝑪𝒊
𝒂𝒊𝑵
𝒊=𝟏   = household utility function to be maximised 
subject to 
∑ 𝑷𝒊
𝒄
𝒊 Ci  =  ∑ 𝑷𝒉
𝒇
𝒉 Fh   = the budget constraint to equilibrate total expenditure 
and total income. 
where: 
 Ci consumption of the i-th good (Ci ≥ 0), 
𝑷𝒊
𝒄   demand price of the i-th good ( 𝑷𝒊
𝒄 ≥ 0), 
𝑷𝒉
𝒇
   price of the h-th factor (𝑷𝒉
𝒇
⁡≥ 0), 
Fh endowments of the h-th factor for the household, 
Uh household utility function 
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αi    share parameter in the utility function (0≤αi ≤1, _i αi =1). 
This optimisation problem can be solved using the Lagrange multiplier ϕ defined in Equation 2 as 
follows: 
L (Ci  ; ϕ) = ∏ 𝑪𝒊
𝒂𝒊𝑵
𝒊=𝟏  + ϕ (∑ 𝑷𝒉
𝒇
𝒉 Fh  -⁡∑ 𝑷𝒊
𝒄
𝒊 Ci )      (2) 
 
 
Firms or producer optimisation behaviour: The firms have one single objective, that is to 
maximise profit. In case the firm’s total cost is made up of two input costs (intermediate cost and 
factor cost), it will maximise profit πj by choosing levels of intermediate inputs Xij and primary 
factors Vij to produce output Yi, subject to the constraint of its production technology φj  
(Boehringer et al, 2003). This is shown in Equation 3 below: 
 
Maximise πj  = Pj Yj - ∑ 𝑷𝒊𝑵𝒊=𝟏 ⁡𝑿𝒊𝒋 - ∑ 𝑷𝒊
𝑭
𝒇=𝟏 ⁡𝑽𝒊𝒋
      (3) 
Xij , Yfi 
 
Subject to Yi  = φj (X1j , …, XNj ;  V1j , …, VFj ) 
 
However, the firm can also maximise its profits πj subject to its production technology constraint 
φj under given output Yi and only the factor input Fh,j . Again, by employing a Cobb–Douglas-type 
function type in Equation 4, the firms will maximise profit as follows: 
Maximise πj  = 𝑷𝒊
𝒛 Yj -  ∑ ⁡𝑭𝑭𝒇=𝟏 𝒉𝒋
       (4) 
Xij , Yfi 
 
subject to 
Yj =  φj ⁡∏ 𝑭𝒉,𝒋
𝒂𝒊𝑵
𝒊=𝟏⁡⁡    
This optimisation problem can be solved using the Lagrange multiplier δj defined in Equation 5 
as follows: 
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Lj(Yj  ; Fh,j  ; δj) = (𝑷𝒊
𝒛 Yj -  ∑ ⁡𝑭𝑭𝒇=𝟏 𝒉𝒋
) + δj ( φj ⁡∏ 𝑭𝒉,𝒋
𝒂𝒊𝑵
𝒊=𝟏⁡⁡   - Yj ) (5) 
 
Market-clearing conditions in the CGE model: The optimisation problems explained so far have 
shown how households and firms determine their demand and supply of goods and factors as a 
result of their optimisation behaviour, which at this stage is not dependent on other agents’ 
decisions but only on the given good and factor prices (Boehringer et al, 2003). Firstly, there is 
no guarantee that the prices assumed by the households are the same as those assumed by the 
firms. Secondly, there is no guarantee that total supply will necessarily be equal to total demand 
for each good and for each factor in the economy. So, to ensure the market equilibrium of each 
good and factor in terms of quantity and price, it was necessary to impose the following market 
clearing conditions in the CGE model: 
 
• Ci = Yi   ∀i  is the market-clearing condition for the i-th good, which ensures equality of 
its demand and supply quantities in the economy. 
• ∑ Vhj =   ∑ Fh is the market-clearing condition for factors indicating that the total demand 
for each factor must be equal to its given endowments. In other words, the sum of 
demand quantities for the h-th factor must equal the sum of endowments of each factor 
given in the economy. 
• 𝑷𝒊
𝒛 = ⁡𝑷𝒊
𝒄  ∀i   is the market-clearing condition that equates to the firm’s supply price of 
the i-th good 𝑷𝒊
𝒛 to the corresponding demand price for the household 𝑷𝒊
𝒄. 
 
The CGE analysis mimics the real economic world and treats all markets simultaneously, and the 
effect of a policy shock in a specific market is translated to other markets (Donzelli, 2006). In 
reality, actions in one market are transmitted to other markets. Similarly, actions in one 
institution are conveyed to other institutions as well as other markets. For example: an increase 
in households’ income through compensation of employees (wages and salaries) will affect taxes 
received by government (pay-as-you earn = PAYE tax). As households spend the additional 
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income on goods and services, firms will react by increasing production output to meet the new 
demand. Both households and firms will pay VAT for each item purchased. 
These interactions between markets and institutions are well modelled in the CGE. So, the CGE 
is categorised among tools suited for general equilibrium analysis (Luenberger, 1995). A CGE 
analysis is considered as an economy-wide model that includes feedback between demand, 
income and production structure, and where all prices adjust until decisions made in production 
are consistent with decisions made in demand (Dervis and Robinson, 1982). 
CGE and macroeconomic closure rules: As in econometric models, in the CGE model, exogenous 
variables and exogenous variables must be chosen carefully. The choice is more complex in CGE 
models because these models often contain more variables than equations, implying that some 
variables must be kept outside the model as exogenous variables; while the remainder of the 
variables are determined by the model as endogenous variables. The choice of which variables 
are to be exogenous is called the model closure rules or macroeconomic adjustment rules (Shoven 
& Whalley, 1984). 
 
In selecting macro closure rules, the study attempted not to deviate much from the anatomy and 
structure of South Africa’s economy. For example, the determination of factor market closures 
was guided by the realities in the labour market, such as the oversupply of unskilled labour and 
undersupply of highly-skilled labour. So the factor market closures used in this study assumed 
that tertiary-educated (highly skilled) labour is fully employed and activity specific. It assumed 
that the unemployment rate is high among people with less than primary education (low-skilled) 
labour; hence, the factor market closure allowed for mobility of these factors of production. As 
far as the CGE model is concerned, this type of factor market closures implies that the change in 
the supply of labour will occur in the low-skilled category, but not in the high-skilled labour 
category. Also, it is assumed that the wage rate of low-skilled labour is fixed at real wage level. 
The real wage was included in the model as the initial wage level multiplied by the consumer 
price index relative to the initial CPI level. 
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The model also assumed that capital is fully employed and activity-specific. So both capital and 
highly skilled labour may not move between activities. For fully employed factors, the wage levels 
will vary to clear the market. 
The model assumed a savings-driven investment closure, which implies that the savings level will 
determine investment. This savings-driven investment closure is supported by Nell (2002), who 
argued that the marginal propensity to save will be fixed for all non-government institutions, 
while capital formation is flexible. 
It is assumed that government instruments (like tax rates) are regarded as exogenous variables. 
 
The CPI published by Statistics SA was considered in this model as the numeraire. 
 
6.3. Empirical results 
Findings presented in this section are grouped under two sets. The first comprises three micro-
simulation results from the SAM. The second set contains three scenarios from the CGE model. 
 
6.3.1. Policy and micro-simulation from the SAM 
 
Three policy micro-simulations were run with the social accounting matrix. The first comprised 
government strategies of reducing poverty and inequality in the South Africa. The second dealt 
with labour policy of job creation for the youth and reducing the youth unemployment rate. The 
third concerned the inclusive growth strategy advocated in the NDP-Vision 2030 in which both 
urban and non-rural areas need to take part in the mainstream economy. 
 
6.3.1.1 Scenario 1:  Simulation of the effect of an additional R1 income on households of 
different income groups and race 
 
One of the main roles of the SAM is to show, on the one side, how income in the country is 
generated, and on the other side, how it is distributed. For the scenario, the economy-wide SAM-
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Leontief multiplier-based model was used to assess the extent to which an additional R1 in 
government expenditure reaches the targeted audience, in this case poor households. The model 
assumed a balanced-budget in which additional revenue in the fiscus is spent. 
 
In this scenario, households were disaggregated by population groups (African, white, Coloured 
and Indian). They were further classified into three categories: the upper class (rich), the middle 
class, and the low class (poor). In this scenario, the researcher sought to investigate the extent 
to which the government ensures that an additional R1 in the fiscus reaches the people targeted. 
The results show that only a very small portion reaches them, so income inequality might remain 
a challenge in the country. 
 
To simplify the results and interpretation, Table 6.1 below assumed that R100 was generated in 
the national fiscus and spent in the economy. Simulation results show that the gap between the 
lower class and the upper class is wider than the gap between whites and Africans. In other 
words, the income gap is greater than the racial gap. 
 
The results in Table 6.1 are summarised below for every R100 generated in the fiscus. 
• In terms of race, almost half (R48.66) ends up in the hands of whites, and the other three 
population groups share the rest, of which the Africans’ share accounts for R38.27. This result 
indicates that Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy might struggle to achieve its 
objectives if almost half the income generated in the economy is still landing in the hands of 
the few white households. 
• In terms of income class, households in the upper class receive R63.37 compared with R7.50 
received by households in the lower class. The results suggest that income is still unevenly 
distributed, and consequently, the gap between the poor and the rich is not narrowing. 
Hence, income inequality will persist. This could also be one of the reasons why the pace of 
reducing poverty in South Africa is very low. 
• Individually, in terms of the 12 income groups, households in the lowest income group, 1, 
receive R1.55 compared with R31.97 for households in the upper income group, 12. Put in 
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population group perspective, a black household in the lowest income group, 1, receives 
R1.45 compared with R25.8 for white households in the upper income group, 12. This is an 
indication that wealth still remains in the hands of the few rich white households; not yet 
reaching the majority or Africans in the lower class. 
• The “inclusive economy” strategy of the NDP in terms of race and income is far of reach due 
to high disparities shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: The impact of an additional R100 income on households of different income groups and race 
Income 
class 
Income 
group 
African Coloured Indian white Total  Total 
(RSA) 
 
low 
(poor) 
Inc. 1          1.45           0.01           0.08           0.00           1.55   
7.50 
 
Inc. 2          1.10           0.01           0.06           0.02           1.19  
Inc. 3          1.70           0.02           0.13           0.03           1.87  
Inc. 4          2.53           0.03           0.25           0.08           2.90  
 
 
middle 
class 
Inc. 5          2.53           0.03           0.24           0.09           2.89   
 
29.14 
Inc. 6          2.99           0.06           0.29           1.18           4.52  
Inc. 7          3.67           0.14           0.53           1.23           5.57  
Inc. 8          4.07           0.29           0.68           1.13           6.17  
Inc. 9          5.01           0.77           1.69           2.51           9.98  
 
high (rich) 
Inc. 10          5.53           1.33           0.61           5.39         12.86   
63.37 Inc. 11          4.45           1.35           1.54         11.20         18.54  
Inc. 12          3.23           1.85           1.09         25.80         31.97  
         Total (RSA)        38.27           5.88           7.19         48.66      100.00  100.00 
Source: Micro-simulation results from the RSA SAM Model, 2015 
 
This result affirms the World Bank findings that categorise South Africa among the most unequal 
countries in the world (World Bank, 2018). Hence, the Gini coefficient that measures income 
inequality has for decades remained high around 0.63 (IHS, Regional Explorer, 2018). 
 
How are such results possible? One explanation can be that although Africans receive grants and 
tenders from the government, at the end of the day, the money ends up in the hands of whites 
or/and people in the high-income class who, until now, still own the bulk of productive 
infrastructure and equipment. 
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6.3.1.2 Scenario 2:  Employment micro-simulation of the effect of fiscal expansion on youth 
employment 
 
In this second scenario, the SAM was extended by constructing an external matrix that 
disaggregated employment into two age groups: youth (15-34) and adult (35-64). The aim was to 
ascertain whether fiscal expansion affects youth employment in strategic sectors. In terms of the 
shock in the SAM, the model hypothetically assumed a R1-million increase in government 
spending to assess the economy-wide effect on employment creation for youth and for adults. 
Macro-simulation results of Leontief multipliers are presented in Figure 6.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.1: Demand-side employment multipliers in simulating the effect of fiscal expansion on youth 
employment 
 
Source: Micro simulation results from the RSA SAM Model, 2015 
 
The results in Figure 6.1 reveal that fiscal expansion favours adults more than it does for the 
youth. The demand-side employment Leontief multipliers are higher for adults than for the 
youth. For example, the government sector, the biggest employer that accounts for more than 
22% of total employment in the country, will generate 2.826 jobs for the youth against 5.783 jobs 
for adults.  
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The result suggests that the  “inclusive economy” strategy of the NDP in terms age is not attained 
due to high disparities shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
According to Statistics SA’s 2016 Community Survey, the youth (aged 15-34) in South Africa 
account for 36% of the total population and adults (35-64) account for 26% of the total 
population. The two categories above fall within the working age population. Although the youth 
are the majority in the working age population, fiscal expansion has a greater effect on adults 
(5.783 jobs) and less effect on the youth (3.907). The reason for low job creation among the youth 
is cited by the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2018) as mainly being a lack of appropriate 
skills and experience. Youth employment multipliers are recorded in the trade sector, followed 
by the community services sector. This implies that increasing government spending will create 
jobs for the youth mainly in the wholesale and retail trade sector. 
 
6.3.1.3. Scenario 3: Employment micro-simulation of the impact of fiscal expansion on em-
ployment in urban and non-urban areas 
 
In this third scenario, the SAM was extended by constructing an external matrix that disaggre-
gated employment by two area types: urban and non-urban area. The aim was to ascertain 
whether fiscal expansion affects employment in South Africa’s urban and non-urban areas in line 
with the inclusive growth strategy advocated in the NDP (Vision 2030).  
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Figure 6.2: Demand-side employment multipliers in simulating the effect of government spending on 
employment in urban and non-urban areas 
  
Source: Micro simulation results from the RSA SAM Model, 2015 
 
In terms of the shock in the SAM, the model hypothetically assumed a R1-million increase in 
government spending to assess the economy-wide impact on employment creation in urban and 
non-urban areas. Micro-simulation results of Leontief multipliers are presented in Figure 6.2. 
 
The findings in Figure 6.2 reveal that fiscal expansion has higher demand-side employment Leon-
tief multipliers in urban areas than in non-urban areas. In South Africa, about 60% of the popu-
lation resides in urban areas. Micro-simulation results show that a hypothetical R1-million in-
crease in government spending will lead to 7.355 jobs in urban areas compared with 2.355 jobs 
in non-urban areas. In urban areas, employment multipliers are high in three sectors: community 
services, finance and trade, whereas in non-urban areas, employment multipliers are high in the 
agriculture sector. 
 
The results support the theory that poor people in rural areas spend their money on food, leading 
to high employment multipliers in agriculture. In urban areas, households spend more on bond 
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repayments and vehicle repayments, which attract a lot of bank interest. This explains the high 
multipliers in the finance sector. 
 
High multipliers noticed in the previous scenario and in the current scenario can be justified as 
follows: government spending on goods (especially purchases made in health and education, 
which take place in both urban and non-urban areas) has a high multiplying effect on the trade 
sector. Also, when government transfers grants to households these households use it for shop-
ping for various items, leading again to a high multiplying effect on the trade sector. 
 
6.3.2 Simulations and results from the dynamic CGE model 
 
Two policy simulations were run with the contemporaneous dynamic CGE model to assess the 
effect of expansionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables. The first scenario assumed a 5% 
and a 10% increase in government spending, with the results provided over the period 2018 to 
2020. The second scenario focuses on impact on employment for people with different levels of 
education.  All results were compared relative to the base (2015) value which is referred to here 
as business as usual scenario. The model is presented in real terms in the sense that only relative 
prices affect real variables. The numéraire in this model is the CPI. Furthermore, all real variables 
are expressed in labour-efficiency units, so as to disentangle the dynamics resulting from the 
exogenous growth of the population from the dynamics induced by policy shocks. 
 
Expansionary fiscal policy here refers to government spending regarding three items: govern-
ment final consumption expenditure, government spending on its investment, and government 
transfer payments. In terms of financing mechanism, the model has assumed a balanced budget. 
As the government increases its investment spending and transfers to households, it is anti-
cipated that demand for goods and services in the economy will rise, firms will respond to the 
increased demand by producing more output and employ more people. Newly employed people 
receive wages and salaries, others are beneficiaries of government transfers. Household income 
will be spent, creating second waves of demand for goods and service. Again, firms will respond 
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to the increased demand by producing more output and employ more people. Consequently, tax 
on commodities will increase, VAT will increase, and household income tax, pay-as-you-earn 
(PAYE) tax will also increase to compensate for the new spending. In this way, the government 
cannot run into a budget deficit, making fiscal policy sustainable over time.  
 
6.3.2.1 Scenario 1: Effect of expansionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables 
 
Tables 6.2a and 6.2b provide the simulation results for selected macroeconomic variables, with 
the effect of a 5% increase in government spending presented in Table 6.2a, and a 10% increase 
in government spending in Table 6.2b. The results quantifying the effect of these two shocks are 
reported as percentage changes between the values in the baseline run (2015) and the policy run 
(2018 to 2020) for each variable, so as to reflect the effect of the policy shock. 
 
Evidence from Tables 6.2a and 6.2b reveals that expansionary fiscal policy has a positive effect 
on the reported macroeconomic variables over the entire period of 2018 to 2020. For example, 
with a 5% increase in government spending, GDP will increase by 0.0059%, 0.0685%, and 
0.1363% respectively in 2018, 2019 and 2020. But with a 10% increase in government spending, 
GDP will increase by 0.0090%, 0.1024%, and 0.2036% respectively in 2018, 2019 and 2020. The 
results show that changes in the base year are progressive. The effect is slight in 2018 and larger 
in 2020, which implies that GDP responds to government spending with a lag period. 
These results are fairly similar to findings in the study by Mabugu, Robichaud, Maisonnave, and 
Chitiga (2013), where expansionary fiscal policy had a positive but very slight effect on GDP. 
The effect of government spending on government revenue is positive, but minute. Increases of 
5% and 10% in government spending yield respectively 0.006% and 0.009% government income 
in 2018. But the effect increases from the base year respectively to 0.0743% and 0.1112% in 
2019. The result shows an increase in absorption which in fact should lead to an increase in taxes, 
and consequently enhance government revenue. 
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Since the primary shock is at the level of the government raising its pending investment and 
transfer payments to households, the immediate effect should be visible investment and 
household consumption expenditure. Under both scenarios, that is 5% and 10% expansionary 
fiscal policy, results show a more positive and higher effect on investment than on household 
consumption. These results are not surprising. The main reasons are embedded in the role of 
government. As far as businesses and firms are concerned, the government can for example 
invest in infrastructure that improves conditions for businesses to create value and develop 
innovative business ideas (Decaluwé, Savard, & Thorbecke, 2005). Hence, as government 
expenditures on investment rise, they increase total infrastructure and output and severe effects. 
Table 6.2a:  Macroeconomic variables (base values and percentage change) 
Expansionary fiscal policy - Scenario 1 - with 5% increase in government spending 
Variables Description Base (2015)           
(R billion) 
2018 2019 2020 
ABSORP Absorption 3 158 0.0058 0.0678 0.1349 
PRVCON Private consumption 
expenditure 
2 410 0.5690 0.4519 0.3440 
FIXINV Investment 827 0.7012 0.6895 1.6743 
DSTOCK Government stock -5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
GOVCON Government consumption 
expenditure 
828 0.0018 0.0543 0.1031 
EXPORTS Exports 1 229 0.2984 0.3713 0.4379 
IMPORTS Imports 1 273 0.2876 0.3573 0.4206 
GDPMP GDP at market prices 3 063 0.0059 0.0685 0.1363 
YGX Government income 905 0.0006 0.0743 0.1416 
      
Gini coefficient 0.63 -0.00483 -0.00467 -0.00451 
Source: Simulation results from the CGE model, 2015 
 
Table 6.2b:  Macroeconomic variables (base values and percentage change) 
Expansionary fiscal policy - Scenario 2 - with 10% increase in government spending 
Variables Description Base (2015)            
(R billion) 
2018 2019 2020 
ABSORP Absorption 3 158 0.0089 0.1014 0.2016 
PRVCON Private consumption 
expenditure 
2 410 0.8535 0.6782 0.5171 
FIXINV Investment 827 1.5510 1.9337 2.0109 
DSTOCK Government stock -5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
GOVCON Government consumption 
expenditure 
828 0.0028 0.0814 0.1543 
EXPORTS Exports 1 229 0.4477 0.5570 0.6565 
IMPORTS Imports 1 273 0.4314 0.5358 0.6306 
GDPMP GDP at market prices 3 063 0.0090 0.1024 0.2036 
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YGX Government income 905 0.0009 0.1112 0.2118 
      
Gini coefficient 0.63 -0.0072 -0.0071 -0.0067 
Source: Simulation results from the CGE model, 2015 
 
In this model, the Gini coefficient was used to measure the effect of policy changes on income 
distribution or income inequality. In the base year, South Africa’s Gini coefficient was 0.63. The 
Gini coefficient lies between zero and one, where zero indicates perfect equality and one perfect 
inequality (Shoven & Whalley, 1992). 
An interesting result from the model is that government spending contributes positively (but 
close to zero) to the reduction of income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. However, 
the effect is very small, almost negligible. For example, a 5% increase in government spending 
only leads to 0.00483% reduction in inequality. The results from the CGE model confirm the 
results obtained from the SAM model, where it was concluded that spending additional income 
in the fiscus does not reach poor households.  
This result also affirms findings from the World Bank report on “overcoming poverty and 
inequality in South Africa” which, using a dynamic CGE model in assessing the impact of 
investment on poverty and inequality concluded Zero changes in Gini-coefficient. 
6.3.2.2 Scenario 2: Effect of expansionary fiscal policy on household consumption expenditure 
Tables 6.3a and 6.3b provide the simulation results for disaggregated real household consump-
tion expenditure, with the impact of a 5% increase in government spending presented in Table 
6.3a, and a 10% increase in government spending in Table 6.3b. As it was in the previous simula-
tion, results quantifying the effect of these two shocks are reported as percentage changes be-
tween the values in the baseline run (2015) and the policy run (2018 to 2020) for each household 
decile, in order to reflect the effect of the policy shock. In the first column of Table 6.3, 
households in deciles 0 to 4 are categorised as POOR while all the other households are catego-
rised as NON-POOR. 
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The results show in both simulations that government spending has a positive effect, especially 
on high income households in decile 10. Similarly, the effect is higher for NON-POOR households 
than it is for POOR households. For example, with a 5% increase in government spending, POOR 
households’ consumption expenditure increases by 0.0301% compared with 0.0685% of their 
counterpart NON-POOR households’ consumption expenditure in 2018 and, in 2020, it rises 
slightly to 0.0362% and to 0.0832% respectively for POOR and NON-POOR households. 
Again, these results from the CGE model are in perfect harmony with those obtained from the 
SAM model. Macro-simulation results from the SAM indicated that for every additional R100 
income generated and spent by the government, households in the upper class receive R63.37, 
compared with R7.50 received by households in the lower class. These results suggest that in-
come is still unevenly distributed, and consequently the gap between poor and rich is not nar-
rowing. Similar results are shown in Table 6.3. For example, in 2018, a 5% increase in government 
spending will affect the first decile’s household consumption expenditure to rise by 0.0106%, 
compared with 0.2705% for the last decile. It can be concluded that the current fiscal expansion 
favours the rich households more than the poor households. 
 
Table 6.3a:  Disaggregated real household consumption expenditure (base values and percentage 
change) 
Expansionary fiscal policy - Scenario 1 - with 5% increase in government spending 
Variables Description Base (2015)             
(R billion) 
2018 2019 2020 
POOR POOR HOUSEHOLDS             415      0.0301      0.0323      0.0362  
Hhd-0 10% of population - 1st decile               41      0.0106      0.0189      0.0277  
Hhd-1 10% of population - 2nd decile               71      0.0124      0.0196      0.0284  
Hhd-2 10% of population - 3rd decile               87      0.0232      0.0254      0.0309  
Hhd-3 10% of population - 4th decile               99      0.0318      0.0376      0.0382  
Hhd-4 10% of population - 5th decile             117      0.0355      0.0395      0.0424  
NPOOR NON-POOR HOUSEHOLDS          1 995      0.0685      0.0788      0.0832  
Hhd-5 10% of population - 6th decile             135      0.0407      0.0512      0.0593  
Hhd-6 10% of population - 7th decile             164      0.0426      0.0516      0.0603  
Hhd-7 10% of population - 8th decile             229      0.0551      0.0632      0.0691  
Hhd-8 10% of population - 9th decile             436      0.0582      0.0647      0.0739  
Hhd-90 5% of population - 10th decile             514      0.0673      0.0771      0.0806  
Hhd-91 1% of population - 10th decile               64      0.0696      0.0805      0.0859  
Hhd-92 1% of population - 10th decile               74      0.0718      0.0839      0.0911  
Hhd-93 1% of population - 10th decile               90      0.0743      0.0878      0.0924  
Hhd-94 1% of population - 10th decile             109      0.0862      0.0907      0.1017  
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Hhd-95 1% of population - 10th decile             178      0.0867      0.1075      0.1208  
ALL Hhd ALL HOUSEHODS          2 410      0.0504      0.0582      0.0671  
Source: Simulation results from the CGE model, 2015 
 
Table 6.3b:  Disaggregated real household consumption expenditure (base values and percentage 
change) 
Expansionary fiscal policy - Scenario 2 - with 10% increase in government spending 
Variables Description Base (2015)             
(R billion) 
2018 2019 2020 
POOR POOR HOUSEHOLDS             415      0.0843      0.0904      0.1013  
Hhd-0 10% of population - 1st decile               41      0.0295      0.0527      0.0772  
Hhd-1 10% of population - 2nd decile               71      0.0342      0.0540      0.0781  
Hhd-2 10% of population - 3rd decile               87      0.0669      0.0731      0.0889  
Hhd-3 10% of population - 4th decile               99      0.0863      0.1020      0.1036  
Hhd-4 10% of population - 5th decile             117      0.0969      0.1078      0.1157  
NPOOR NON-POOR HOUSEHOLDS          1 995      0.1971      0.2269      0.2397  
Hhd-5 10% of population - 6th decile             135      0.1137      0.1430      0.1656  
Hhd-6 10% of population - 7th decile             164      0.1158      0.1404      0.1639  
Hhd-7 10% of population - 8th decile             229      0.1476      0.1693      0.1851  
Hhd-8 10% of population - 9th decile             436      0.1573      0.1747      0.1994  
Hhd-90 5% of population - 10th decile             514      0.1898      0.2173      0.2271  
Hhd-91 1% of population - 10th decile               64      0.1934      0.2238      0.2387  
Hhd-92 1% of population - 10th decile               74      0.2024      0.2366      0.2570  
Hhd-93 1% of population - 10th decile               90      0.2076      0.2455      0.2583  
Hhd-94 1% of population - 10th decile             109      0.2410      0.2536      0.2843  
Hhd-95 1% of population - 10th decile             178      0.2705      0.3062      0.3614  
ALL Hhd ALL HOUSEHODS          2 410      0.1409      0.1625      0.1874  
Source: Simulation results from the CGE model, 2015 
 
6.3.2.3 Scenario 3: Effect of expansionary fiscal policy on employment 
 
The aim of this last scenario was to ascertain whether an increase in government spending would 
contribute to creating jobs for high skilled labourers. Before providing the simulation results, it is 
important to refresh the assumptions made in the CGE model concerning labour as a major factor 
of production. The factor market closures used in this study assumed that tertiary-educated 
(high-skilled) labour applies to the fully employed and is activity-specific. It also assumed that the 
unemployment rate is high among people with less than primary education (low-skilled). So the 
factor market closure allows for mobility of these factors of production. 
 
The assumptions made are reflected in the simulation results shown in Table 6.4. For example, 
the shock of a 5% increase in government spending in 2018 is associated with a high employment 
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growth rate of 0.0515% among employees with primary education levels (low-skilled) compared 
with 0.0194% among employees with tertiary education levels (high-skilled). The effect is positive 
and progressive, rising by 0.0429 of a percentage point between 2018 and 2019 for employees 
with primary education levels. 
South Africa’s labour market is overpopulated with low-skilled labour, which does not contradict 
the type of factor market closures in the model that allow for mobility of factors of production in 
the low-skilled category, meaning that the change in the supply of labour will occur in the low-
skilled category, while the labour market assumption for high skilled was fully employed and 
activity-specific. 
 
Table 6.4a:  Disaggregating employment by levels of education (base values and percentage change) 
Expansionary fiscal policy - Scenario 1 - with 5% increase in government spending 
Variables Description Base (2015) 
(million) 
2018 2019 2020 
flab-p Employed with primary education            3 696     0.0515     0.0944     0.0944  
flab-m Employed with middle-education            5 969     0.0456     0.0664     0.0785  
flab-s Employed with secondary education            4 029     0.0296     0.0365     0.0408  
flab-t Employed with tertiary education            1 996     0.0194     0.0249     0.0286  
Source: Simulation results from the CGE model, 2015 
 
Table 6.4b:  Disaggregating employment by levels of education (base values and percentage change) 
Expansionary fiscal policy - Scenario 2 - with 10% increase in government spending 
Variables Description Base (2015) 
(million) 
2018 2019 2020 
flab-p Employed with primary education            3 696     0.1091     0.2013     0.2175  
flab-m Employed with middle-education            5 969     0.0911     0.1327     0.1569  
flab-s Employed with secondary education            4 029     0.0596     0.0734     0.0820  
flab-t Employed with tertiary education            1 996     0.0374     0.0480     0.0552  
Source: Simulation results from the CGE model, 2015 
 
The inference for this simulation is that, moving forward deep into the fourth industrial 
revolution, government spending should in future be strategically geared toward creating more 
jobs in the high-skilled category so that the economy can respond to rapid changes in technology. 
As for now, the results show that an increase in government spending has a greater effect on 
130 
 
low-skilled labour than on high-skilled labour. The OECD (2014) report indicated that as 
technology progresses, low-skill routine jobs will soon become redundant and some occupations 
obsolete. 
 
6.4. Conclusion and policy recommendation 
 
This aim of this study was to investigate the impact of government spending on growth, 
employment, poverty and inequality. It assesses the effect that expansionary fiscal policy has on 
marginalised group of people and side-lined areas in South Africa. It employed a social accounting 
matrix (SAM) to construct an economy-wide Leontief multiplier base model, micro-simulation, 
and a contemporaneous dynamic general equilibrium (CGE) model, and to assess the effect of 
expansionary fiscal policy on marginalised group of people contrasted by age (Youth v Adult), 
race (African v non-African), income (less privileged v privileged households), education (primary 
v tertiary), and by area (Urban v non-urban). The parameters of the CGE equations were 
calibrated to observed data from the social accounting matrix, the 2015 SAM. In selecting macro 
closure rules, the study attempted not to deviate much from the current structure of South 
Africa’s economy. The CPI was considered in this model as the numéraire. In this way, the 
simulations were valued in real terms. 
 
Findings were presented in two sets, the first comprised three micro-simulation results from the 
SAM. The second set included three scenarios from the dynamic CGE model. 
Under microsimulations from the SAM, the first scenario assessed the extent to which an 
additional R1 in government spending reaches the targeted audience, that is the poor 
households. Simulation results showed that the gap between the lower and upper classes is wider 
than the gap between whites and Africans. In other words, the income gap is greater than the 
racial gap. Findings reveal that additional Rands in the fiscus were not reaching the targeted 
audience. The findings demonstrate why policies aiming at reducing inequality have not managed 
to achieve the desired outcome. 
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The second scenario examined the effect of government spending on youth employment. For 
youth, fiscal expansion has high employment multipliers in two sectors: trade and community 
service. The overall result found that fiscal expansion favoured adults more than it did the youth. 
The demand-side employment Leontief multipliers were higher for adults than for the youth. 
Simulation results show, for example, that the government sector – the biggest employer 
accounting for more than 22% of total employment in the country – will generate 2.826 jobs for 
the youth against 5.783 jobs for adults.  
 
The third scenario sought to ascertain whether expansionary fiscal policy has an effect on spatial 
employment disparities. The gap for urban employment multipliers was 7.3 against 2.3 for non-
urban areas. This could be one of the main reasons for the increase in high net migration into the 
big cities, especially the metros. Although many people in non-urban areas benefit from 
government social services, government spending still has limited effect on employment in non-
urban areas. Although the RDP and NDP advocate an inclusive economy, the employment effect 
of government spending still favours urban areas more than non-urban areas. This in turn 
exacerbates other ills of the exodus to the metros – high unemployment rates in big cities, high 
demand for services in big cities and metros and underused facilities in non-urban centres. 
 
Using the dynamic CGE model, the study undertook three scenarios. The first scenario simulated 
the effect of a 5% and a 10% increase in government spending. The CGE models showed a positive 
effect on all selected macroeconomic variables. For example, with a 5% increase in government 
spending, simulation results showed that GDP would increase by 0.0059%, 0.0685%, and 
0.1363% respectively in 2018, 2019 and 2020. But with a 10% increase in government spending, 
GDP would increase by 0.0090%, 0.1024%, and 0.2036% respectively in 2018, 2019 and 2020. 
These increases in GDP are minuscule, suggesting that this low growth path outlook could 
continue in the near future. Low GDP is associated with low tax revenue and low employment 
generation, which could hinder efforts to reduce unemployment.  
It was also found that government spending had a positive (but close to zero) effect on the 
reduction of income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. However, the effect was very 
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small and insignificant. For example, a 5% increase in government spending leads to only a 
0.00483% reduction in inequality. The minute and insignificant change in the Gini coefficient 
implies that efforts to address inequality are not attaining the desired outcome. This 
demonstrates why, after 20 years of democracy, inequality in the country has remained among 
the highest in the world (World Bank, 2014). It also shows that the NDP will struggle to reach its 
2030 target of eliminating poverty and inequality. 
 
Close to zero Gini-coefficient impact in the first scenario was confirmed in the second scenario 
that showed that expansionary fiscal policy benefits NON-POOR households more than POOR 
households. As a result, the government strategy of reducing poverty has not brought the desired 
outcome because the gap between POOR and NON-POOR has not narrowed at the pace 
anticipated. The increase in poor households erodes the fiscal base, increases the demand for 
social services (leading to rising government spending) and diminishes the possibility of achieving 
a better life for all outcome as advocated by the RDP and NDP. 
 
In the last scenario, the results showed that more jobs are created among unskilled labour than 
among high-skilled labour. This could jeopardise future growth as the country moves into the 
fourth industrial revolution. Government spending should in future be geared strategically 
towards creating more jobs in the high-skilled category so that the economy can respond to rapid 
changes in technology. 
 
The study reckons that fiscal policy instruments, although they are effective tools that the 
government uses to achieve macroeconomic, microeconomic, and socioeconomic objectives; as 
well as the government’s role of redistribution of income, these tools have not amply reduced 
poverty and inequality in South Africa. In line with the social inclusion strategy of the RDP in 1994, 
and the inclusive economy strategy of the NDP in 2014 which are to narrow the gaps associated 
with the legacy of apartheid, this study concluded that effect of government spending has had a 
minimal effect on historically marginalised groups of people and marginalised areas. This is why 
a tortoise pace in reducing poverty and inequality has persisted. So, the study recommends that 
133 
 
governments should follow a priorities-based government spending policy which fits well with 
the current situation of the country. Moreover, South Africa needs to adopt international 
standards and best practices of “science-based strategic” rather than that of “evidence-based 
strategy” and ensure that only programmes that have proved to be effective be financed in the 
fiscal budget. 
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CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this study was to assess the effect of public spending on economic growth, employ-
ment and poverty reduction. The paradox of a colossal budget size, high levels of poverty and 
inequality and declining growth have led to controversies around the dual role of fiscal policy in 
stimulating economic growth and income redistribution. The need for the government to address 
growing social imbalances amid a contracting economy is a puzzle that for a decade has remained 
unexplained. 
 
This study sought to contribute to the debate over the fiscal policy-macroeconomic policy nexus 
by responding to contemporaneous questions, like: Are South Africa’s fiscal instruments sus-
tainable? What is the optimal tax in South Africa? Does government spending contribute to the 
achievement of macro-economic and socio-economic objectives? How does government spend-
ing respond to GDP during economic expansion and during economic contraction? To respond to 
these questions, empirical analysis was carried out. The study employed four types of empirical 
approaches to investigate the effect of government spending on macro-economic and socio-
economic objectives. These methods were: 1) the nonlinear autoregressive distributive lag (N-
ARDL); 2) The economy-wide Leontief approach calibrated on the supply and use tables (Dynamic 
SUT model); 3) a partial general equilibrium approach based on the Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) used for micro-simulations; and lastly (4) a contemporaneous dynamic computable 
general equilibrium approach. 
 
The study started by introducing the problem statement, the research objectives and the 
methodological frameworks. It proceeded by presenting the gap in the literature, providing the 
rationale and relevance of the study, and highlighting salient contributions that the study adds 
to the board of knowledge. 
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After introducing the topic and its aim, the study proceeded by responding to specific research 
questions and the corresponding research objectives. Starting with macroeconomic objective of 
growing the economy and reducing unemployment, Chapter 2 looked at the relationship be-
tween economic growth and unemployment, testing the extent to which Okun’s law holds in the 
nine provinces of South Africa. It was hypothesised firstly, that government spending should 
stimulate growth which translate into addressing the major challenge of unemployment. 
Secondly, given the historical background of apartheid that led to spatial inequality, policy efforts 
in addressing the country’s high unemployment and low economic growth dilemma should be 
concentrated at a provincial level. The study employed the nonlinear autoregressive distributive 
lag (N-ARDL) cointegration model to empirically investigate the long-run and short-run 
cointegration relationship between economic growth and unemployment, and to address the 
issue of an aggregation bias and disparities among different provinces. 
 
The increasing post-recession trend in government spending and decline in government revenue 
led to the next question of whether a fiscal budget is sustainable in South Africa. This question of 
fiscal budget sustainability addressed in Chapter 3 is crucial, especially in the post-recession era, 
where low growth and fiscal austerity measures are constraints to achieving National 
Development Goals. Hence, the aim of the chapter was to ascertain whether individual provincial 
governments have attained higher levels of budgetary sustainability in both the short and the 
long run. To achieve this goal, the study applied an econometric model, the nonlinear auto-
regressive distributive lag (N-ARDL) cointegration model to analyse the relationship between 
government expenditure and government revenue. The N-ARDL model was preferred because it 
incorporates the unique feature of identifying whether increase or decreases in provincial 
budgets will improve or deteriorate the ability of provincial government authorities to sustain 
their respective budgets over the short and long run. 
 
After clarifying these fundamental issues regarding macroeconomic objectives and fiscal sustai-
nability, the next step was to assess in Chapter 4 the extent to which changes in fiscal instruments 
(government spending and government revenue) affect economic growth. More importantly, on 
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the expenditure side, the chapter focused on how government spending responds to GDP during 
economic expansion and during economic contraction. On the revenue side, the chapter assessed 
the optimal tax in South Africa. To achieve the objectives set out in this chapter, Wagner and 
Scully’s hypotheses were tested in the South African context.  
 
The study investigated the cyclicality of fiscal expenditure by estimating NARDL regressions of 
the different versions of Wagner’s law during different phases of the business cycle. Empirical 
results sought to show the extent to which the cyclicality of fiscal activity possibly diverges when 
the economy is on the upswing or when the economic cycle is on the downswing phase. On the 
revenue side, the study estimated optimal growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tax rates 
by estimating ARDL regressions for ‘Scully’s’ growth maximizing model. 
 
The first part of the study – chapters 2 to 4 –used econometric techniques to evaluate the effect 
of fiscal instruments on economic growth. Since econometric tools are not equipped for 
economy-wide impact assessments, the second part of the study used Leontief multiplier-based 
models (dynamic SUT and SAM models), microsimulations, and a dynamic general equilibrium 
(CGE) model to provide economy-wide effect of fiscal instruments on macroeconomic, micro-
economic and socioeconomic variables. 
 
Chapter 5 empirically examined post-recession (2007–2015) effects of government spending on 
economic growth, employment, taxes, and investment. A dynamic SUT economy-wide Leontief 
multiplier-based model was used for three impact scenarios. This chapter adds a new dimension 
to the study. As a result of exogenous changes in final demand (like an increase or decrease in 
government spending), results will indicate, among the 64 economic sectors, which one will 
contribute to high economic growth in terms of value addition; which sector will create more 
jobs, which sector will generate additional income for workers (in terms of compensation of 
employees); in which sector investment will be created; and which types of taxes will gain more 
revenue. More importantly, the results are indicative of specific sectors to be targeted for 
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economic growth, employment creation, boosting investment, income and tax revenue creation. 
Each of these elements has direct policy implications. 
To complete the study in term of employment creation, the study went one step further by 
generating multipliers depicting the effect of government spending on employment by gender, 
by race, by province, by economic sector, by type of employment (formal or informal), by 
province (multipliers for all the nine provinces of south Africa), and by occupation. In this way, 
the research provides a variety of multipliers useful for a range of strategic labour policy 
interventions. 
 
Chapter 6 dealt with the extent to which expansionary fiscal policy affects the economy. The 
chapter was crafted bearing in mind South Africa’s historical background of apartheid, implying 
that any meaningful impact assessment model ought to reflect the dynamics of marginalised 
groups and marginalised areas. In the spirit of an inclusive economy, government strategic 
interventions must concurrently address the sidelined without neglecting the bourgeoisie. 
Hence, Chapter 6 employed a micro-simulation model based on the social accounting matrix 
(SAM), and a contemporaneous dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) to examine the 
effect of expansionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic, microeconomic and socioeconomic 
variables. For the benefit of other scholars, the chapter demonstrated the methodology of 
various stages that lead to the CGE model, including the integrated economic accounts (IEA), the 
construction of the supply and use tables (SUT), and finally the SAM that is used as a database 
for developing a CGE model. 
To achieve the research objectives set out in Chapter 6, policy simulations were conducted of 
which the first three were done using the SAM and the last two using the dynamic CGE model. 
The first scenario assessed the extent to which an additional R1 in government spending reaches 
the targeted audience – the poor households. The second scenario examined the effect of 
government spending on youth employment. The third scenario sought to ascertain whether 
expansionary fiscal policy has an effect on spatial employment disparities. The fourth and fifth 
scenarios simulated the outcomes of a 5% and a 10% increase in government spending on se-
lected macroeconomic variables. 
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The study ends with Chapter 7, containing a conclusion, and policy recommendations, and high-
lights further areas of future research. 
 
7.2 Summary of empirical findings 
 
Chapters 2 to 6 were designed to respond to specific research questions, each question being 
embedded in a specific research objective. The summary of empirical findings is presented below 
for each research objective. 
 
The first objective was to investigate the validity of Okun’s law in each of South Africa’s provinces. 
This objective sought to assess the relationship between growth and unemployment in the nine 
provinces of South Africa. The empirical results showed that in most provinces, over the short 
run, economic growth assisted in reducing unemployment, more noticeably during upswings of 
the economic cycle and recovering from vulnerabilities presented during downswings in the 
business cycle. From a policy point of view, the results indicate that the Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal were the most efficient provinces in translating increased economic activity into 
reducing the unemployment rate over both long and short run. 
 
The second objective was to ascertain whether fiscal budgets in South Africa’s nine provinces are 
sustainable. This objective aimed at gauging the relationship between government revenue and 
government expenditure in South Africa’s nine provinces. Findings revealed mixed results. To 
achieve budget sustainability, certain provinces need to increase their budgets while other 
provinces need to reduce their budgets. It was concluded that overall, the “one-rule-fits-all” 
strategy suggested by previous South African studies provided limited information for provincial 
governments as these provinces require different strategies in improving the sustainability of 
their respective budgets. 
 
The third objective was to investigate the validity of both Wagner’s law and Scully’s theory in 
South Africa. With Wagner’s law, the objective was to empirically evaluate the relationship 
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between growth and government spending. With Scully’s theory, the objective was to empirically 
assess the relationship between government revenue (taxes) and economic growth and then 
estimate the optimal tax in South Africa.  
From the empirical investigation of cyclicality of fiscal expenditure for all six versions of Wagner’s 
law, and the optimal growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing tax rates of Scully’s model, two 
main findings emerged. The first empirical finding showed evidence that cyclicality of fiscal 
revenues was asymmetric in nature, with South African fiscal authorities pursuing procyclical 
fiscal expenditures during the upswings of the business cycle, that is, government expenditure 
increases with output growth during expansionary periods. Moreover, the study also discovered 
that countercyclical fiscal spending during the downswing of the business cycle with government 
spending increased with slower economic growth during recessionary periods.  
The second empirical finding dealt with the optimal rates of taxation. The most important finding 
was that the growth maximizing tax rates were at lower values compared to the revenue-
maximizing tax rates for all sub-categories of revenue collections. Other findings are summarised 
below: 
• There was evidence of South African fiscal authorities being offered a trade-off between 
growth-maximizing and revenue-maximizing objectives over our sample period.  
• Fiscal authorities have pursued growth-maximizing tax rates during the upswing of the 
business cycle whereas generally employing revenue-maximizing tax rates during 
recessionary periods.  
• VAT was the only sub-category of revenue collections, which has been growth-maximizing in 
the post-crisis, recessionary periods.  
• Increased fiscal spending and lower tax revenue collections (growth-maximizing objectives) 
during the expansionary periods, which implied evident of an overall procyclical fiscal policy.  
• During the recessionary periods, fiscal authorities generally pursued revenue-maximizing 
objectives through higher tax collections (i.e. procyclical tax policy) whilst still adjusting fiscal 
spending to be countercyclical.  
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The fourth objective was to assess the effect of public spending on economic growth, 
employment creation, taxes or revenue generation, poverty alleviation, and investment 
stimulation. This objective added a new dimension to the econometric study by specifying fiscal 
instrument impacts on the 62 economic sectors. Detailed results in appendix B provide 47 
different types of multipliers for 62 different economic sectors in South Africa. Each of the 47 
multipliers will specify which one of the 62 sectors should be targeted for specific policy. For 
example, GVA, employment, compensation of employees, tax, and investment multipliers had 
indications of which sector to target respectively for economic growth, employment creation, 
poverty alleviation, tax generation and investment upliftment. To simplify results, four 
simulations were conducted, and a summary of the empirical findings for each scenario is 
presented below. 
 
The first scenario estimated the effect of changes in exogenous final demand (like government 
spending) on selected taxes and on all 62 economic sectors’ output, gross value added, 
compensation of employees, and gross operating surplus. In summarising the findings, the 
analysis showed one most important observation, namely a significant decline in the tax, output, 
employment and other generic multipliers over the 2007-2015 period. This shocking result 
implied that during the post-recession era, the effect of the average R1 invested in the economy, 
although positive, yielded a smaller return in terms of tax revenue, job creation and economic 
growth. At sector level, the results showed that inter-industry links and industry-consumer links 
have consequently weakened. At policy level, this could exacerbate the low-growth that has 
persisted during the post-recession period. Low growth is correlated with low revenue genera-
tion and fiscal unsustainability. 
 
The second scenario looked at how changes in exogenous final demand affect employment 
multipliers. The analysis disaggregated the results to show the effect of government spending on 
employment for all 64 sectors, skill levels, nine provinces, occupation and level of education, and 
through Expanded Public Works Programmes (EPWP). As expected, the results showed for 
example, high employment multipliers in the most affluent provinces like Gauteng, the Western 
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Cape and KwaZulu-Natal; but undesired high employment multipliers for workers with less than 
secondary levels of education and very low employment multipliers among workers with tertiary 
education. Policy on skills development is concerned about the advent of the fourth industrial 
revolution and everyone would desire to see the outcome of government spending affecting 
more high-skilled workers able to respond to changing technology. 
 
To address the issue of disparity in the country, employment multipliers were further derived 
and presented in such a way to display disproportions of effect. The results revealed for example, 
gender gap employment multipliers of 5.2 for male against 4.5 for female; age gap employment 
multipliers of 5.7 for adult against 3.9 for youth; and lastly an employment type gap of 6.6 for 
formal against 1.6 for informal. 
 
The third scenario measures the effect of changes in exogenous final demand on taxes. Under 
this third scenario, four simulations were conducted: a 5% increase in government spending, a 
5% increase in export, a 5% increase in investment, and a 5% increase in household spending 
with the aim of assessing their post-recession (2007-2015) effect on selected individual taxes and 
on other macroeconomic variables. The results reveal that the simulation of a 5% increase in 
household consumption expenditure has a greater effect on individual taxes than other simu-
lations of 5% increases in government consumption expenditure, export or investment. Put dif-
ferently, policies that stimulate household consumption expenditure should be targeted to boost 
high tax revenue levels in the country. 
 
Lastly, the study contrasts, at economic industry level, tax backward multipliers against tax for-
ward multipliers in terms of: company tax; value-added tax (VAT); pay as you earn (PAYE) tax; 
and Small Business Corporation (SBC) tax multipliers over the post-recession period and finds 
that the trade industry had high tax backward linkage coefficients and the finance industry had 
high forward linkage coefficients in both 2007 and 2015. The study suggested that domestic 
wholesale and retail sales, together with international trade, should be targeted to stimulate tax 
generation in the South African economy. 
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The fifth objective was to demonstrate the hierarchy of compilation approaches leading to the 
CGE model: that is from the National Accounts (with the use of Integrated Economic Accounts) 
to the SUT (including the traditional input output model), from the SUT to the SAM; and from the 
SAM to the CGE model. This section was more methodological in its approach and no empirical 
evidence was required. It demonstrated fully the extent to which the methodology used in this 
study was consistent with the latest 2008 System of National Accounts (2008 SNA) released by 
the United Nations. Hence, both the dynamic SUT and the SAM-Leontief models complied with 
the United Nations’ 2008 SNA and international best practices (United Nations, 2009). 
 
The sixth objective was to assess the effect of government spending on welfare, poverty and 
vulnerable groups. The effect analysis was disaggregated by: age group (youth v adults); area 
(rural v non-rural); skills levels (low-skilled v high-skilled labour); population groups (black or 
African v other population groups); and by income groups (poor households v non-poor house-
holds) with the aim of empirically quantifying effect disparities in these different groups. Three 
scenarios were conducted, and a summary of the empirical results is presented below. 
 
The first scenario assessed the extent to which an additional R1 in government spending reaches 
the targeted audience, that is the poor households. Simulation results showed that the gap 
between the lower and upper classes is wider than the gap between whites and Africans. In other 
words, the income gap is greater than the racial gap. Findings reveal that additional rands in the 
fiscus are not reaching the targeted audience. The findings demonstrate why policies aiming at 
reducing inequality have not managed to achieve the desired outcome. 
 
The second scenario examined the effect of government spending on youth employment. For 
youth, fiscal expansion has high employment multipliers in two sectors: trade and community 
service. The overall result found that fiscal expansion favoured adults more than it did the youth. 
The demand-side employment Leontief multipliers are higher for adults than for the youth. 
Simulation results show, for example, that the government sector – the biggest employer 
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accounting for more than 22% of total employment in the country – will generate 2.826 jobs for 
the youth against 5.783 jobs for adults. The results show in Appendix B the sectors that generate 
more employment when government spending increases. Policies aiming to stimulate 
employment and reduce poverty and unemployment should focus on the trade sector and com-
munity services which empirically yielded high levels of employment multipliers. 
 
The third scenario sought to ascertain whether expansionary fiscal policy has an effect on spatial 
employment disparities. The gap for urban employment multipliers was 7.3 against 2.3 for non-
urban areas. This could be one of the main reasons for the increase in high net migration into the 
big cities, especially the metros. Although many people in non-urban areas benefit from 
government social services, government spending still has limited effect on employment in non-
urban areas. Although the RDP and NDP advocate an inclusive economy, the employment effect 
of government spending still favours urban areas more than non-urban areas. This in turn 
exacerbates other ills of the exodus to the metros – high unemployment rates in big cities, high 
demand for services in big cities and metros and underused facilities in non-urban centres. 
 
The seven and last objective was to examine the effect of public spending on both macro-
economic and socioeconomic variables. Using the dynamic CGE model, the study undertook two 
scenarios. A summary of the findings is presented below. 
 
The fourth and fifth scenarios simulated the effect of a 5% and a 10% increase in government 
spending. The CGE models showed a positive effect on all selected macroeconomic variables. For 
example, with a 5% increase in government spending, simulation results showed that GDP would 
increase by 0.0059%, 0.0685%, and 0.1363% respectively in 2018, 2019 and 2020. But with a 10% 
increase in government spending, GDP would increase by 0.0090%, 0.1024%, and 0.2036% 
respectively in 2018, 2019 and 2020. These increases in GDP are minuscule, suggesting that this 
low growth path outlook could continue in the near future. Low GDP is associated with low tax 
revenue and low employment generation, which could hinder efforts to reduce unemployment.  
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It was also found that government spending had a positive effect on the reduction of income 
inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient. However, the effect was very small and insignificant. 
For example, a 5% increase in government spending leads to only a 0.00483% reduction in in-
equality. This result from the CGE model confirms the microsimulation finding in the SAM model 
that government initiatives are not reaching the targeted audience. The minute and insignificant 
change in the Gini coefficient implies that efforts to address inequality are not attaining the 
desired outcome. This demonstrates why, after 20 years of democracy, inequality in the country 
has remained among the highest in the world (World Bank, 2014). 
 
In terms of households, the study showed similarities in results obtained from the SAM model 
and from the CGE model in that expansionary fiscal policy benefits NON-POOR households more 
than POOR households. As a result, the government strategy of reducing poverty has not brought 
the desired outcome because the gap between POOR and NON-POOR has not narrowed at the 
pace anticipated. The increase in poor households erodes the fiscal base, increases the demand 
for social services (leading to rising government spending), and diminishes the possibility of 
achieving a better life for all outcome as advocated by the RDP and NDP. 
 
Finally, the results of expansionary fiscal policy also showed more jobs being created among 
unskilled labour than among high-skilled labour. So a lot of graduates are finding it difficult to 
enter the labour market for the first time. Also, given the era of the knowledge economy and the 
fourth industrial revolution, highly skilled labour is needed to respond to changes in technology. 
The finding of a considerable effect among unskilled labour suggests a mismatch between labour 
demand and supply, which may contribute to high unemployment in the country. 
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7.3 Policy implications and recommendations 
 
7.3.1  Policy implications 
 
Since the advent of South Africa’s democracy in 1994, the quest for all-inclusive growth, reducing 
poverty, inequality and unemployment through discretionary fiscal policy has been the 
cornerstone of most development policies. In attempting to address these challenges, policy-
makers have, under the democratically elected government, unveiled two main strategic 
programmes, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994 and the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in 1996 (Olsen, 2009). A decade later the 
government noticed that the problems these two policy documents meant to address persisted, 
raising the need for two other strategies, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South 
Africa (AsgiSA in 2004, followed by the New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010. To address the issues 
contained in the National Planning Commission (NPC) report, the South African government 
formulated another strategy, the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2014 and Vision 2030. 
 
The common objective of these strategic policy programmes (RDP, GEAR, AsgiSA, NGP, NDP, and 
Vision 2030) was to stimulate economic growth and investment, create employment and reduce 
unemployment, reduce poverty and inequality, and address the imbalances of the apartheid 
régime. 
 
Despite the implementation of these policies, the post-recession macro-economic position re-
veals that the average 5% growth attained while South Africa enjoyed economic expansion from 
2003 to 2006 has crumbled lately around 1%, unemployment – especially among the youth – has 
stubbornly remained high and the imbalances of apartheid are still rife in disadvantaged 
communities. 
 
This study preferred to supplement econometric tools with economy-wide impact assessment 
models (SUT, SAM and CGE) because the data and model in these tools are equipped to cover 
the entire economy in a single matrix and provide information on a variety of policies. Given the 
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scope of the SUT, SAM and CGE, empirical findings in this study could be used to inform not only 
the most recent NDP-Vision 2030, but also the public and private sectors could base their policy 
interventions on specific empirical results obtained in this study. 
 
Table 7.1 Results from SUT, SAM and CGE models and policy context  
Results  Related policy or strategy 
Output multipliers, GDP multipliers, and  
GVA multipliers for all 62 economic sectors  
Industrial policy, trade policy, investment policy,  
sector analysis, trade policy, growth policy 
Employment multipliers  Labour policy 
Skills and occupation multipliers Education policy 
Income multipliers, microsimulation 
results disaggregated by gender, age, 
race, rural v urban) 
Poverty and inequality, BBBEE policy, health policy, 
 gender policy, demographic policy, rural 
 development policy, youth policy, education policy 
Tax multipliers Fiscal policy (budgeting and tax policy) 
Investment multipliers, imports and exports  
Multipliers, 
Public-private-partnership policy, International 
 trade policy, investment strategy 
Source: Own derivation based of the scope of SUT, SAM and CGE 
 
Economy-wide models are equipped with the ability to inform a wide range of policies. In the 
case of this study, the empirical findings and the corresponding field of strategic policy inter-
ventions are presented in the table above. These findings will help South Africa’s policies, espe-
cially the NDP, to: 
• set realistic targets based on empirical multiplier effects, 
• craft a number of policy scenarios for the post-awakening development agenda, 
• reprioritise, restrategise, and if need be reform the macro-economic and fiscal stance, 
• identify sectors with the greatest economic growth effect, government revenue (tax) 
effect, employment growth effect, and investment growth effect resulting from changes 
in government expenditure, 
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• conduct scientifically based planning rather than political intuition-based planning, and 
• monitor and evaluate past policies, government programmes, and plans. 
 
From the primary purpose of the RDP (in 1994) to address the social exclusion associated with 
the legacy of apartheid, and to ensure a better future life for all citizens (David, 2004:) to the 
notion of an inclusive economy proposed in the NDP (in 2014), the policy intention has not 
changed – that is, to narrow the gaps associated with the legacy of apartheid. The overall findings 
of this study show that gender disparities, income disparity, spatial disparity between urban and 
non-urban, age disparity (youth and adults) and racial disparity have persisted over the past two 
decades. One of the possible reasons attributed to this phenomenon could be that the 
government’s policies are only addressing the symptoms of a problem (for example through 
grants) rather than actually getting at the root cause of the problem (lack of skills, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and education). 
 
7.3.2 Policy recommendations 
 
The study concludes that fiscal policy instruments are effective tools that the government uses 
to achieve macroeconomic, microeconomic, and socioeconomic objectives; as well as the gov-
ernment’s role of redistribution of income. In line with the social inclusion strategy of the RDP in 
1994, and the inclusive economy strategy of the NDP in 2014 which are to narrow the gaps 
associated with the legacy of apartheid, this study recommends that the issue of budget sus-
tainability, fiscal discipline and the ability to ensure that every R1 in the fiscus reaches the tar-
geted audience should be considered, among other things, as a top priority in the fiscal policy 
arena. 
 
• Another important recommendation, this time to South Africa’s Davis Tax Committee, is 
to expedite the implementation of a tax strategy that seeks to limit government expen-
diture and boost revenue collection through tax reforms. 
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• Building on the empirical findings, governments should follow a priorities-based govern-
ment spending policy which may fit well the current situation in South Africa. 
 
• The study suggests that every government initiative, catalytic infrastructure project and 
strategic programme needs to undergo rigorous socioeconomic impact assessment to 
ensure that every effort made by a government contributes to the achievement of specific 
objectives set by that government. The outcome of the project appraisal should de-
termine the initiatives that need to be financed by the fiscus. 
 
• Policymakers and Parliament should only consider programmes that have proved effect-
ive. They should rely solely on science-based strategy, rather than evidence-based stra-
tegy which relies on the façade. The workability should be demonstrated prior to the 
selection and financing of projects or implementing policies. Decision criteria based on 
thumb-suck strategy can be misleading – they should be avoided at all costs. 
 
• Given the advent of the fourth industrial revolution, government spending should in fu-
ture be strategically geared towards creating more jobs in the high-skilled category so 
that the economy can respond to rapid changes in technology. 
 
• Given the historical background of apartheid that led to spatial inequality, policy efforts 
towards addressing the country’s inequality should include spatial disparity. Panel ana-
lysis reveals that provinces do not respond homogeneously to policy. So the one rule fits 
all strategy is not the best option for the country. Spatial dynamics and consideration are 
essential in policy formulation. 
 
Policy implications to be drawn from Wagner and Scully empirical study are diverse. The fact that 
cyclicality of fiscal policy is asymmetric over the business cycle, policy-makers should incorporate 
such nonlinearities in the design of fiscal policies rules used in constructing stabilizing policies. 
South African revenue authorities, in setting tax policies, must distinguish between growth-
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maximizing and revenue-maximizing objectives. In perspective, it would be ideal for tax 
authorities to set higher, revenue-maximizing tax rate during the upswing of the business and 
lower, growth-maximizing tax rates during the downswing of the business cycle. Currently, South 
African government has only being efficient in designing/designating VAT tax rates, which are 
‘growth-maximizing’ during the recessionary periods. Henceforth, considering that the South 
African economy currently in the downswing of the business cycle, fiscal policymakers are 
encouraged to ‘craft’ an array of tax rates for the different revenue sub-categories which are 
growth-maximizing and not revenue-maximizing. 
 
7.4 Avenue for future research 
 
From this study many other important research avenues emerge that to be explored for further 
studies. For example: what portfolio of government spending outlays would be ideal for eco-
nomic growth to support resource constrained governments in optimal resource allocation and 
prioritisation of expenditure? To respond to this research question, the researcher could extend 
the N-ARDL regression framework and asses the effect on economic growth of government 
spending for selected key sectors like education, health and social welfare, which account for 
almost three-quarters of South African fiscal budget. Such research could be extended to com-
pare other interpretations of the Wagner hypothesis. 
 
It is also suggested that a dynamic CGE model for each of the nine provinces be made to trace 
spatial disparities, and simulations similar to those made in this study be conducted. A regional 
CGE model was beyond the scope of this research, so it limited the researcher to assessing the 
effect of government spending on youth v adult, rural v non-rural, formal v informal for each 
province. Similarly, a SAM for each province could be useful to assess the generation and distri-
bution of income across the region and, more importantly, to see how government spending in 
one province affects the economies of other provinces. 
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Annexure A: Summary of the four scenarios and their implications on taxes 
 Companies tax: Number of tax payers 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.37% 3.74% 3.02% 3.04% 3.21% 2.65% 2.73% 2.78% 2.76% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 9.31% 9.01% 9.45% 8.97% 9.08% 7.81% 7.58% 7.44% 7.44% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.25% 2.24% 2.64% 2.61% 2.67% 1.78% 1.82% 1.82% 1.80% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.86% 3.25% 3.42% 3.04% 3.04% 2.50% 2.59% 2.57% 2.60% 
          
 Companies Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 4.11% 4.76% 3.78% 3.77% 4.07% 3.62% 3.78% 3.73% 3.63% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 9.75% 9.29% 9.98% 9.57% 9.68% 8.97% 8.86% 8.71% 8.73% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.11% 2.01% 2.50% 2.53% 2.56% 1.81% 1.82% 1.83% 1.84% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.96% 3.38% 3.56% 3.09% 2.99% 2.60% 2.77% 2.74% 2.69% 
          
 VAT Tax: Number of vendors 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.53% 3.74% 3.18% 3.23% 3.44% 2.97% 3.04% 3.10% 3.08% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 9.48% 9.01% 9.76% 9.45% 9.59% 8.60% 8.43% 8.27% 8.27% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.15% 2.24% 2.56% 2.56% 2.63% 1.78% 1.81% 1.80% 1.79% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.92% 3.25% 3.39% 3.02% 2.96% 2.49% 2.56% 2.54% 2.57% 
          
 VAT Tax: Payments (R million) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.76% 4.76% 3.37% 3.41% 3.64% 3.22% 3.31% 3.38% 3.30% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 3.76% 4.76% 3.37% 3.41% 3.64% 3.22% 3.31% 3.38% 3.30% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.13% 2.01% 2.58% 2.60% 2.67% 1.84% 1.85% 1.85% 1.85% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 3.04% 3.38% 3.54% 3.11% 3.05% 2.61% 2.69% 2.67% 2.67% 
          
 PAYE Tax (R million) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.61% 3.90% 3.10% 3.08% 3.20% 2.88% 2.90% 2.98% 2.94% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 3.86% 4.40% 3.73% 3.76% 3.97% 3.79% 3.81% 3.92% 3.81% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.92% 2.73% 2.79% 2.62% 2.59% 2.65% 2.58% 2.60% 2.59% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.74% 3.02% 3.08% 2.67% 2.57% 2.19% 2.23% 2.21% 2.22% 
          
 SBC Tax: Number of taxpayers 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 8.47% 8.14% 8.76% 8.37% 8.51% 6.92% 6.75% 6.57% 6.57% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 1.98% 1.95% 2.37% 2.36% 2.43% 1.55% 1.58% 1.56% 1.55% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.94% 3.25% 3.47% 3.08% 3.08% 2.52% 2.64% 2.62% 2.64% 
          
 SBC Tax: Tax assessed (R million) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.35% 3.73% 3.07% 3.06% 3.24% 2.75% 2.81% 2.87% 2.84% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 8.76% 8.48% 9.09% 8.62% 8.78% 7.69% 7.38% 7.24% 7.25% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.04% 2.02% 2.43% 2.45% 2.59% 1.77% 1.83% 1.78% 1.79% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 3.04% 3.33% 3.60% 3.11% 3.00% 2.52% 2.62% 2.62% 2.59% 
          
 Employment (Number): Total formal and informal 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
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Scenario 1: Exports 3.12% 3.36% 2.76% 2.77% 2.94% 2.40% 2.43% 2.41% 2.43% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 7.78% 7.40% 7.91% 7.58% 7.66% 6.37% 6.19% 5.95% 6.05% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.20% 2.24% 2.66% 2.66% 2.74% 1.97% 1.99% 1.99% 1.95% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.56% 2.75% 2.85% 2.51% 2.47% 1.97% 2.01% 1.98% 2.02% 
          
          
 Employment (Number): Total formal 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.15% 3.40% 2.78% 2.78% 2.95% 2.52% 2.56% 2.57% 2.60% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 7.88% 7.49% 7.95% 7.62% 7.67% 6.69% 6.52% 6.34% 6.45% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.29% 2.35% 2.76% 2.77% 2.84% 2.13% 2.15% 2.16% 2.13% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.50% 2.71% 2.80% 2.46% 2.40% 1.98% 2.03% 1.98% 2.02% 
          
 Employment (Number): Formal- Skilled 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 2.75% 3.03% 2.44% 2.43% 2.56% 2.13% 2.14% 2.15% 2.17% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 7.50% 7.30% 7.61% 7.21% 7.26% 6.27% 6.06% 5.88% 5.95% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.62% 2.70% 3.11% 3.10% 3.19% 2.44% 2.47% 2.48% 2.45% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.12% 2.37% 2.43% 2.11% 2.06% 1.65% 1.66% 1.62% 1.65% 
 
 Employment (Number): Formal: Semi-skilled 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.47% 3.79% 3.13% 3.15% 3.34% 2.86% 2.90% 2.92% 2.94% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 8.31% 7.97% 8.57% 8.21% 8.29% 7.14% 6.97% 6.79% 6.90% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.06% 2.08% 2.51% 2.51% 2.58% 1.82% 1.84% 1.85% 1.82% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.81% 3.07% 3.19% 2.80% 2.75% 2.27% 2.33% 2.29% 2.31% 
          
 Employment (Number): Formal- Low skilled 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 2.93% 3.05% 2.46% 2.47% 2.62% 2.31% 2.36% 2.36% 2.43% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 7.45% 6.83% 7.20% 6.96% 6.98% 6.28% 6.16% 5.97% 6.16% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.40% 2.50% 2.90% 2.90% 2.98% 2.38% 2.39% 2.40% 2.36% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.30% 2.39% 2.44% 2.16% 2.10% 1.78% 1.84% 1.80% 1.84% 
          
 Employment (Number): Total Informal 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 2.96% 3.22% 2.70% 2.74% 2.92% 1.95% 1.99% 1.93% 1.97% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 7.26% 7.07% 7.76% 7.42% 7.61% 5.23% 5.14% 4.81% 4.97% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 1.74% 1.85% 2.30% 2.26% 2.37% 1.40% 1.49% 1.47% 1.48% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.86% 2.91% 3.05% 2.73% 2.74% 1.94% 1.97% 1.95% 2.02% 
          
 Gross fixed capital formation  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.86% 4.40% 3.73% 3.76% 3.97% 3.79% 3.81% 3.92% 3.81% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 9.00% 8.81% 9.54% 9.16% 9.13% 8.58% 8.30% 8.15% 8.09% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.26% 2.23% 2.66% 2.62% 2.64% 1.96% 2.00% 2.00% 2.01% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.69% 3.05% 3.20% 2.84% 2.75% 2.42% 2.46% 2.43% 2.40% 
          
 Fixed capital stock 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.68% 4.11% 3.39% 3.42% 3.62% 3.40% 3.47% 3.60% 3.56% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 9.20% 8.97% 9.53% 9.17% 9.18% 8.64% 8.39% 8.30% 8.31% 
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Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.47% 2.49% 2.90% 2.90% 2.94% 2.19% 2.20% 2.20% 2.17% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.55% 2.90% 3.03% 2.67% 2.58% 2.25% 2.30% 2.30% 2.31% 
          
 Gross value added  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.50% 3.89% 3.17% 3.14% 3.35% 3.01% 3.05% 3.11% 3.05% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 8.28% 7.98% 8.49% 8.05% 8.10% 7.31% 7.08% 6.99% 7.00% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.34% 2.33% 2.76% 2.77% 2.83% 2.13% 2.14% 2.14% 2.13% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.51% 2.82% 2.94% 2.55% 2.46% 2.09% 2.14% 2.15% 2.15% 
          
 Compensation of employees 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.13% 3.48% 2.86% 2.85% 3.01% 2.73% 2.78% 2.82% 2.82% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 7.62% 7.39% 7.83% 7.50% 7.52% 6.79% 6.61% 6.50% 6.56% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.44% 2.47% 2.87% 2.87% 2.95% 2.27% 2.29% 2.29% 2.26% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.31% 2.60% 2.70% 2.37% 2.29% 1.96% 2.02% 2.02% 2.04% 
          
 GOS / mixed income 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 3.86% 4.30% 3.50% 3.44% 3.71% 3.31% 3.35% 3.44% 3.32% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 8.92% 8.54% 9.14% 8.58% 8.70% 7.83% 7.56% 7.51% 7.47% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 2.22% 2.18% 2.64% 2.66% 2.69% 1.97% 1.98% 1.97% 1.97% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 2.72% 3.05% 3.17% 2.74% 2.64% 2.23% 2.27% 2.30% 2.28% 
          
 Taxes less subsidies on products 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 4.12% 4.59% 3.81% 3.89% 4.19% 4.11% 4.23% 4.27% 4.29% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 9.47% 9.06% 9.77% 9.75% 9.70% 9.96% 9.75% 9.57% 9.61% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 1.90% 1.82% 2.18% 2.23% 2.21% 2.01% 2.04% 2.05% 2.02% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 3.44% 3.85% 4.01% 3.70% 3.55% 3.32% 3.49% 3.47% 3.48% 
          
 Imports 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Scenario 1: Exports 4.72% 5.24% 4.42% 4.47% 4.75% 4.85% 4.99% 5.08% 5.08% 
Scenario 2: Households Consumption Expenditure 9.72% 9.21% 10.13% 10.12% 10.00% 10.34% 10.13% 10.01% 10.03% 
Scenario 3: Government Consumption Expenditure 1.68% 1.58% 1.99% 2.07% 2.03% 1.68% 1.71% 1.72% 1.69% 
Scenario 4: Investment (GDFI) 3.59% 3.93% 4.14% 3.82% 3.65% 3.57% 3.75% 3.79% 3.78% 
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Annexure B: Summary of the all the 47 multipliers for 62 economic sectors (RSA, 2015) 
 
Note: Economy-Wide Leontief Multiplier (Type II) per R1 million final demand.   
Source:  
 
The economy-wide impact model used Statistic South Africa’s National Accounts 2015 Supply and Use Tables to derive 47 multipliers for 62 
industries.  This list below provides the description of the first 15 (out of 47) multipliers: 
1 OUT Output multiplier 
2 GVA Gross value-added multiplier 
3 COE Compensation of employees or income multiplier 
4 GOS Gross operating surplus  
5 EMPL-M Employment – Male multiplier 
6 EMPL-F  Employment – Female multiplier 
7 EMPL-Y Employment – Youth multiplier 
8 EMPL-A Employment – Adult multiplier 
9 EENS Employment by education - No schooling multiplier 
10 EELP Employment by education - Less than Primary multiplier 
11 EEPC Employment by education - Primary completed multiplier 
12 EELS Employment by education - Less than Secondary multiplier 
13 EESC Employment by education -Secondary completed multiplier 
14 EET Employment by education -Tertiary multiplier 
15 EEO Employment by education – Other multiplier 
1             2             3             4             5             6             7             8             9             10           11           12           13           14           15           
OUT GVA COE GOS EMPL-M EMPL-F EMPL-Y EMPL-A EENC EELP EEPC EELS EESC EET EEO
1 Agriculture 4.715     1.895     0.843     1.024     6.690     4.493     4.726     6.456     0.609     1.417     0.764     4.170     2.605     1.477     0.140     
2 Forestry 4.994     1.989     0.943     1.005     6.672     4.789     4.731     6.731     0.626     1.357     0.783     4.359     2.651     1.561     0.124     
3 Fishing 3.478     1.750     0.727     1.000     3.148     2.350     2.121     3.377     0.153     0.498     0.227     1.937     1.630     0.995     0.058     
4 Mining of coal and lignite 3.994     1.838     0.781     1.024     3.447     2.539     2.416     3.570     0.126     0.390     0.212     1.879     2.044     1.268     0.066     
5 Mining of gold and uranium ore 4.733     2.056     1.207     0.802     4.639     3.302     3.078     4.863     0.194     0.639     0.324     2.768     2.479     1.446     0.090     
6 Mining of metal ores 4.247     1.824     0.877     0.918     3.737     2.580     2.485     3.831     0.153     0.462     0.264     2.059     2.030     1.280     0.068     
7 Other mining and quarrying 4.473     1.940     0.909     0.999     3.664     2.762     2.588     3.838     0.152     0.440     0.239     1.984     2.092     1.447     0.072     
8 Food 5.228     1.993     0.965     0.997     5.915     5.188     4.552     6.551     0.457     1.197     0.660     4.225     2.897     1.508     0.161     
9 Beverages and tobacco 4.799     1.879     0.917     0.926     4.892     4.302     3.704     5.490     0.397     0.929     0.503     3.308     2.526     1.414     0.118     
10 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 5.708     2.015     1.052     0.925     5.918     5.301     4.323     6.896     0.342     0.940     0.557     4.140     3.501     1.581     0.157     
11 Knitted, crouched fabrics, wearing apparel, fur articles 5.685     2.034     1.125     0.867     6.011     8.567     5.092     9.486     0.329     1.148     0.728     6.032     4.235     1.888     0.218     
12 Tanning and dressing of leather 4.975     1.820     0.835     0.958     4.333     3.374     3.179     4.528     0.356     0.866     0.471     2.817     1.947     1.151     0.100     
13 Footwear 5.104     1.778     0.932     0.808     3.730     3.254     2.819     4.166     0.219     0.596     0.333     2.494     2.045     1.207     0.091     
14 Sawmilling, planing of wood, cork, straw 5.293     2.129     1.052     1.038     6.166     3.949     4.214     5.900     0.385     0.911     0.525     3.793     2.890     1.489     0.121     
15 Paper 5.575     2.041     1.018     0.987     5.118     4.016     3.772     5.362     0.271     0.741     0.410     3.191     2.753     1.664     0.104     
16 Publishing, printing, recorded media 6.009     2.284     1.271     0.964     6.162     5.320     4.568     6.914     0.234     0.746     0.389     3.680     3.955     2.323     0.156     
17  Coke oven, petroleum refineries 3.658     1.367     0.578     0.765     2.166     1.439     1.414     2.191     0.085     0.240     0.129     1.102     1.209     0.804     0.037     
18 Nuclear fuel, basic chemicals 4.921     1.724     0.878     0.831     3.187     2.426     2.271     3.342     0.135     0.380     0.210     1.826     1.783     1.209     0.070     
19 Other chemical products, man-made fibres 5.553     2.040     1.103     0.899     4.847     3.919     3.579     5.188     0.194     0.582     0.327     2.875     2.853     1.834     0.100     
20 Rubber 4.853     1.782     0.907     0.847     4.458     3.189     3.085     4.562     0.217     0.565     0.327     2.592     2.444     1.408     0.094     
21 Plastic 5.395     2.086     1.207     0.847     4.579     3.710     3.399     4.890     0.178     0.552     0.305     2.942     2.638     1.576     0.097     
22 Glass 5.333     2.080     1.184     0.857     5.780     3.484     3.790     5.474     0.171     0.532     0.403     3.092     3.047     1.933     0.085     
23 Non-metallic minerals 4.514     1.725     0.827     0.868     4.796     2.761     3.155     4.403     0.199     0.613     0.432     2.710     2.213     1.266     0.125     
24 Basic iron and steel, casting of metals 5.587     1.961     0.991     0.933     4.530     2.971     2.939     4.562     0.175     0.530     0.287     2.465     2.491     1.461     0.092     
25 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 5.146     1.832     0.948     0.853     3.685     2.613     2.510     3.789     0.144     0.459     0.243     2.111     2.050     1.223     0.068     
26 Fabricated metal products 5.466     2.003     1.120     0.848     5.486     3.193     3.454     5.225     0.212     0.588     0.347     3.057     2.779     1.558     0.138     
27 Machinery and equipment 4.896     1.849     0.999     0.821     4.245     3.089     2.873     4.462     0.158     0.500     0.276     2.365     2.403     1.542     0.090     
28 Electrical machinery and apparatus 5.168     1.771     0.958     0.777     4.171     3.514     2.909     4.776     0.159     0.461     0.267     2.338     2.370     2.008     0.082     
29 Radio, television, communication equipment and apparatus 4.772     1.779     0.976     0.771     3.552     3.025     2.643     3.934     0.147     0.429     0.244     2.088     2.183     1.411     0.075     
30 Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches and clocks 4.452     1.733     0.837     0.858     3.997     3.504     2.962     4.538     0.138     0.426     0.233     2.182     2.522     1.926     0.073     
31 Motor vehicles, trailers, parts 4.972     1.640     0.901     0.710     3.724     2.746     2.609     3.862     0.142     0.413     0.244     2.111     2.188     1.293     0.078     
32 Other transport equipment 5.254     1.977     1.100     0.839     3.956     3.411     2.922     4.445     0.182     0.526     0.300     2.521     2.271     1.475     0.091     
33 Furniture 5.776     2.162     1.141     0.980     6.948     4.263     4.608     6.603     0.252     0.804     0.488     4.473     3.450     1.616     0.128     
34 Manufacturing n.e.c, recycling 3.845     1.536     0.645     0.867     3.002     2.482     2.253     3.231     0.165     0.446     0.228     1.824     1.763     0.985     0.072     
35 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 3.636     1.703     0.691     0.990     3.009     2.114     2.022     3.102     0.107     0.326     0.181     1.609     1.672     1.169     0.059     
36 Collection, purification and distribution of water 4.303     1.810     0.741     1.055     3.563     2.211     2.055     3.719     0.170     0.431     0.266     1.702     1.762     1.395     0.048     
37 Construction 4.719     1.759     0.876     0.851     6.699     3.098     4.148     5.649     0.253     0.852     0.480     3.621     2.834     1.633     0.123     
38 Wholesale trade, commission trade 4.567     1.966     0.972     0.951     4.012     3.245     2.959     4.297     0.164     0.485     0.284     2.386     2.354     1.494     0.091     
39 Retail trade 4.808     2.097     1.022     1.026     7.311     7.142     6.379     8.074     0.354     1.032     0.584     5.014     5.033     2.241     0.193     
40 Sale, maintenance, repair of motor vehicles 6.970     3.093     1.523     1.505     9.972     7.192     7.179     9.985     0.365     1.083     0.676     6.034     5.809     2.964     0.233     
41 Hotels and restaurants 4.690     1.886     0.905     0.937     6.595     7.676     6.664     7.608     0.271     0.862     0.518     5.113     5.052     2.260     0.196     
42 Land transport, transport via pipe lines 4.546     2.001     0.871     1.092     5.396     3.618     3.659     5.354     0.188     0.615     0.346     3.069     2.973     1.701     0.121     
43 Water transport 3.570     1.475     0.533     0.908     3.148     2.173     2.080     3.241     0.105     0.304     0.173     1.590     1.887     1.208     0.055     
44 Air transport 4.492     1.752     0.789     0.930     4.129     3.052     2.974     4.207     0.147     0.453     0.262     2.193     2.469     1.567     0.090     
45 Auxiliary transport 4.862     2.104     1.025     1.039     4.797     4.086     3.617     5.266     0.185     0.551     0.322     2.799     2.966     1.960     0.100     
46 Post and telecommunication 4.995     1.957     0.949     0.968     5.376     4.136     3.964     5.548     0.174     0.556     0.321     3.090     3.174     2.088     0.109     
47 Financial intermediation 4.738     2.215     1.132     1.043     3.726     3.975     3.088     4.613     0.156     0.449     0.258     2.118     2.361     2.280     0.079     
48 Insurance and pension funding 4.919     2.183     1.073     1.066     3.345     3.791     2.823     4.313     0.156     0.440     0.257     1.972     2.341     1.890     0.080     
49 Activities to financial intermediation 5.679     2.496     1.372     1.080     3.208     3.237     2.520     3.925     0.163     0.461     0.264     2.026     1.941     1.511     0.079     
50 Real estate activities 5.073     2.299     0.893     1.296     4.933     4.644     3.910     5.667     0.223     0.664     0.378     3.186     3.153     1.851     0.121     
51 Renting of machinery and equipment 6.338     2.555     1.233     1.270     7.371     5.630     5.414     7.587     0.273     0.867     0.465     4.281     4.245     2.686     0.185     
52 Computer and related activities 7.601     2.971     1.567     1.342     10.511  8.174     7.652     11.033  0.343     1.022     0.584     5.329     6.097     5.100     0.210     
53 Research and experimental development 5.508     2.553     1.222     1.291     5.959     5.607     4.635     6.930     0.251     0.747     0.455     3.615     3.607     2.757     0.134     
54 Other business activities 7.969     3.325     1.714     1.545     11.472  9.795     8.960     12.307  0.412     1.269     0.751     7.118     7.049     4.410     0.258     
55 Government 5.411     2.485     1.491     0.948     4.991     4.667     3.773     5.886     0.217     0.640     0.365     2.981     3.098     2.249     0.109     
56 Education 4.926     2.046     0.979     1.016     8.633     12.066  6.429     14.270  0.278     0.837     0.493     4.337     4.938     9.655     0.163     
57 Health and social work 5.004     2.029     1.033     0.951     6.367     9.165     5.830     9.702     0.309     0.932     0.562     4.755     4.791     4.030     0.154     
58 Sewerage and refuse disposal 5.294     2.125     1.044     1.160     5.278     4.480     4.003     5.756     0.196     0.606     0.352     3.145     3.102     2.243     0.115     
59 Activities of membership organisations 5.142     2.101     1.035     1.001     15.650  10.875  7.206     19.320  0.299     1.217     0.714     5.690     8.404     9.965     0.237     
60 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 5.507     2.086     1.053     0.975     7.785     6.394     6.072     8.106     0.242     0.727     0.407     4.110     4.862     3.679     0.152     
61 Other activities 5.276     2.058     1.017     0.977     23.435  32.523  33.128  22.831  0.906     3.066     1.636     24.627  17.929  6.554     1.241     
62 Non-observed, informal, non-profit, households, 3.790     1.784     0.790     0.971     3.357     4.702     2.826     5.234     0.327     0.901     0.491     3.086     1.946     1.180     0.128     
 Economy-wide multipliers (Type II) 
Industries
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Note: Economy-Wide Leontief Multiplier (Type II) per R1 million final demand.   
Source:  
The economy-wide impact model used Statistic South Africa’s National Accounts 2015 Supply and Use Tables to derive 47 multipliers for 62 industries.  This list below 
provides the description of the next set of multipliers: 
16 E-FORM Formal employment multiplier 
17 E-INFO  Informal Employment multiplier 
18 E-AGRIC Employment in Agriculture multiplier 
19 E-DOM Employment - Domestic workers multiplier 
20 E-WC Employment - Western Cape multiplier 
21 E-EC Employment - Eastern Cape multiplier 
22 E-NC Employment - Northern Cape multiplier 
23 E-FS Employment - Free State multiplier 
24 E-KZN Employment - KwaZulu-Natal multiplier 
25 E-NW Employment - North West multiplier 
26 E-GT Employment – Gauteng multiplier 
27 E-MPL Employment -Mpumalanga multiplier 
28 E-LMP Employment – Limpopo multiplier 
29 E-URB Employment -Urban areas multiplier 
30 E-NURB  Employment - Non-Urban multiplier 
31 E-MGER Employment – Manager multiplier 
32 E-PROF Employment – Professional multiplier 
  
16            17            18            19            20            21            22            23            24            25            26            27            28            29            30            31            32            
E-FORM E-INFO E-AGRIC E-DOME E-WC E-EC E-NC E - FS E-KZN E - NW E- GT E -MPL  E-LMP E -URB E- NURB E-MGER E-Prof
1 Agriculture 4.487      1.234      4.694      0.767      2.190      0.982      0.309      0.738      1.769      0.649      2.400      0.931      1.214      6.474      4.709      0.412      0.488      
2 Forestry 4.888      1.344      4.404      0.826      1.382      1.053      0.169      0.438      2.844      0.485      2.450      1.522      1.118      6.394      5.047      0.410      0.514      
3 Fishing 3.001      0.729      1.253      0.515      1.332      0.560      0.114      0.242      0.793      0.242      1.465      0.352      0.397      4.293      1.192      0.282      0.346      
4 Mining of coal and lignite 4.370      0.890      0.282      0.444      0.812      0.444      0.088      0.259      0.951      0.264      1.864      0.883      0.421      4.642      1.344      0.279      0.401      
5 Mining of gold and uranium ore 5.835      1.002      0.502      0.602      0.988      0.558      0.116      0.753      1.086      0.516      2.901      0.508      0.516      5.390      2.551      0.282      0.439      
6 Mining of metal ores 4.702      0.849      0.314      0.453      0.806      0.453      0.157      0.274      0.886      0.809      1.811      0.439      0.683      4.283      2.034      0.252      0.395      
7 Other mining and quarrying 4.667      0.934      0.321      0.503      0.902      0.495      0.197      0.314      0.974      0.347      2.204      0.483      0.511      5.004      1.422      0.337      0.479      
8 Food 5.665      1.304      2.189      1.945      1.951      0.942      0.237      0.693      1.820      0.615      3.004      0.844      0.998      7.731      3.372      0.354      0.503      
9 Beverages and tobacco 5.157      1.284      1.333      1.420      1.637      0.827      0.176      0.495      1.423      0.469      2.669      0.672      0.827      6.559      2.702      0.332      0.454      
10 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 6.777      1.740      1.481      1.221      1.792      1.029      0.185      0.518      2.330      0.515      3.191      0.813      0.846      8.240      2.978      0.469      0.515      
11 Knitted, crouched fabrics, wearing apparel, fur articles 9.939      3.096      0.727      0.815      2.288      1.109      0.176      0.778      4.319      0.573      3.587      0.788      0.960      11.301   3.277      0.568      0.501      
12 Tanning and dressing of leather 3.625      0.965      2.313      0.804      1.379      0.677      0.188      0.474      1.244      0.435      1.929      0.619      0.762      4.930      2.777      0.283      0.383      
13 Footwear 4.257      1.055      0.929      0.743      1.106      0.613      0.131      0.363      1.238      0.361      2.083      0.516      0.573      5.111      1.874      0.268      0.421      
14 Sawmilling, planing of wood, cork, straw 6.412      1.659      1.376      0.667      1.654      0.886      0.135      0.398      1.993      0.441      2.855      0.945      0.808      7.106      3.006      0.380      0.511      
15 Paper 5.896      1.404      1.159      0.675      1.303      0.765      0.137      0.404      1.851      0.406      2.757      0.812      0.698      6.581      2.551      0.397      0.543      
16 Publishing, printing, recorded media 8.364      1.728      0.609      0.782      1.977      0.849      0.163      0.519      2.017      0.506      3.962      0.744      0.745      9.153      2.328      0.656      0.719      
17  Coke oven, petroleum refineries 2.691      0.488      0.170      0.256      0.495      0.252      0.092      0.176      0.514      0.212      1.170      0.423      0.270      2.759      0.846      0.207      0.255      
18 Nuclear fuel, basic chemicals 3.992      0.891      0.287      0.443      0.799      0.448      0.109      0.306      0.879      0.309      1.825      0.506      0.431      4.360      1.253      0.251      0.396      
19 Other chemical products, man-made fibres 6.276      1.371      0.458      0.662      1.313      0.715      0.141      0.416      1.439      0.421      3.058      0.643      0.621      6.916      1.850      0.418      0.579      
20 Rubber 5.125      0.975      0.718      0.828      1.051      0.941      0.130      0.368      1.277      0.403      2.372      0.569      0.536      5.907      1.740      0.346      0.436      
21 Plastic 5.953      1.250      0.439      0.647      1.348      0.643      0.130      0.417      1.431      0.384      2.813      0.557      0.567      6.527      1.762      0.380      0.490      
22 Glass 7.014      1.201      0.430      0.619      1.406      0.927      0.140      0.363      1.160      0.430      3.712      0.567      0.559      7.552      1.712      0.564      0.526      
23 Non-metallic minerals 5.504      1.300      0.287      0.468      1.043      0.683      0.151      0.335      1.295      0.470      2.243      0.645      0.693      5.313      2.245      0.365      0.389      
24 Basic iron and steel, casting of metals 5.492      1.158      0.316      0.536      0.963      0.537      0.138      0.363      1.146      0.548      2.589      0.616      0.602      5.642      1.859      0.337      0.477      
25 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 4.621      0.889      0.315      0.474      0.815      0.455      0.126      0.315      0.982      0.562      1.995      0.530      0.518      4.626      1.672      0.277      0.376      
26 Fabricated metal products 6.127      1.594      0.383      0.574      1.211      0.677      0.137      0.412      1.399      0.508      3.042      0.668      0.625      6.736      1.942      0.421      0.469      
27 Machinery and equipment 5.407      1.045      0.351      0.532      1.033      0.542      0.113      0.344      1.116      0.424      2.699      0.549      0.515      5.753      1.582      0.419      0.480      
28 Electrical machinery and apparatus 5.752      1.108      0.320      0.506      1.097      0.648      0.129      0.360      1.174      0.455      2.660      0.559      0.602      5.907      1.778      0.352      0.573      
29 Radio, television, communication equipment and apparatus 4.710      1.021      0.341      0.505      0.957      0.532      0.110      0.306      1.045      0.364      2.317      0.454      0.492      5.069      1.508      0.338      0.426      
30 Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches and clocks 5.670      1.012      0.304      0.514      1.213      0.527      0.101      0.292      1.040      0.620      2.717      0.435      0.556      6.123      1.377      0.296      0.492      
31 Motor vehicles, trailers, parts 4.708      0.959      0.324      0.479      0.910      0.685      0.102      0.289      1.040      0.346      2.215      0.433      0.449      5.074      1.396      0.290      0.395      
32 Other transport equipment 5.047      1.220      0.436      0.665      1.114      0.636      0.129      0.364      1.192      0.400      2.412      0.548      0.571      5.635      1.732      0.298      0.480      
33 Furniture 7.898      1.886      0.698      0.729      1.521      0.893      0.156      0.552      2.165      0.606      3.683      0.880      0.755      8.473      2.738      0.525      0.550      
34 Manufacturing n.e.c, recycling 3.611      0.985      0.445      0.443      0.762      0.423      0.101      0.259      0.863      0.305      2.013      0.367      0.391      4.232      1.252      0.325      0.316      
35 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 3.791      0.727      0.245      0.359      0.712      0.382      0.087      0.294      0.757      0.247      1.635      0.633      0.377      3.928      1.195      0.260      0.344      
36 Collection, purification and distribution of water 4.522      0.700      0.229      0.324      0.720      0.445      0.128      0.426      0.982      0.337      1.733      0.452      0.549      4.017      1.757      0.209      0.337      
37 Construction 6.959      2.106      0.296      0.435      1.432      0.927      0.180      0.433      1.679      0.495      3.079      0.737      0.835      7.380      2.417      0.549      0.460      
38 Wholesale trade, commission trade 5.186      1.146      0.386      0.539      1.128      0.605      0.124      0.357      1.216      0.364      2.395      0.527      0.540      5.631      1.625      0.376      0.489      
39 Retail trade 9.201      4.294      0.385      0.572      1.984      1.301      0.223      0.758      2.349      0.757      4.651      1.130      1.298      11.025   3.426      0.912      0.574      
40 Sale, maintenance, repair of motor vehicles 11.866   3.664      0.571      1.064      2.468      1.436      0.313      0.919      2.775      0.923      5.732      1.273      1.325      13.431   3.733      0.922      0.918      
41 Hotels and restaurants 10.491   2.490      0.570      0.720      2.618      1.305      0.248      0.653      2.135      0.677      4.652      0.976      1.008      11.245   3.035      1.423      0.452      
42 Land transport, transport via pipe lines 6.126      2.022      0.321      0.545      1.274      0.773      0.148      0.453      1.540      0.458      2.955      0.706      0.704      6.949      2.064      0.585      0.513      
43 Water transport 3.918      0.886      0.188      0.329      0.988      0.424      0.076      0.214      1.013      0.265      1.655      0.348      0.338      4.334      0.988      0.195      0.283      
44 Air transport 5.281      1.171      0.280      0.449      1.058      0.578      0.115      0.309      1.078      0.332      2.736      0.488      0.488      5.722      1.460      0.354      0.501      
45 Auxiliary transport 6.430      1.440      0.385      0.627      1.347      0.719      0.138      0.403      1.477      0.413      3.089      0.635      0.661      7.019      1.864      0.519      0.565      
46 Post and telecommunication 7.109      1.546      0.320      0.537      1.449      0.762      0.144      0.417      1.454      0.463      3.485      0.667      0.672      7.617      1.895      0.533      0.656      
47 Financial intermediation 5.696      1.038      0.419      0.548      1.137      0.641      0.126      0.374      1.175      0.386      2.750      0.540      0.571      6.032      1.669      0.516      0.661      
48 Insurance and pension funding 5.120      0.879      0.382      0.756      1.107      0.595      0.117      0.343      1.092      0.337      2.560      0.472      0.513      5.640      1.496      0.426      0.548      
49 Activities to financial intermediation 4.385      0.952      0.493      0.615      1.004      0.553      0.115      0.329      1.039      0.342      2.075      0.483      0.505      4.899      1.547      0.295      0.474      
50 Real estate activities 6.469      2.049      0.337      0.723      1.384      0.820      0.161      0.486      1.537      0.522      3.198      0.713      0.757      7.419      2.157      0.452      0.611      
51 Renting of machinery and equipment 9.165      2.499      0.454      0.883      1.917      1.072      0.209      0.630      2.046      0.594      4.604      0.936      0.992      10.283   2.717      0.811      0.772      
52 Computer and related activities 13.772   3.214      0.623      1.076      2.955      1.425      0.268      0.812      2.680      0.819      7.354      1.164      1.209      15.182   3.502      1.334      1.729      
53 Research and experimental development 8.108      2.171      0.480      0.807      1.810      0.960      0.219      0.550      1.848      0.608      3.855      0.840      0.875      8.969      2.596      0.500      1.013      
54 Other business activities 15.524   3.858      0.662      1.223      3.182      1.737      0.334      1.004      3.386      1.099      7.351      1.586      1.589      16.844   4.422      1.105      1.492      
55 Government 6.930      1.357      0.592      0.779      1.472      0.857      0.191      0.510      1.579      0.510      3.091      0.706      0.743      7.445      2.214      0.443      0.658      
56 Education 17.517   2.255      0.373      0.555      2.735      2.181      0.363      1.065      3.515      1.047      6.132      1.689      1.972      15.431   5.267      0.973      4.123      
57 Health and social work 12.356   2.203      0.408      0.565      2.174      1.435      0.353      0.854      2.792      0.928      4.745      1.063      1.187      11.766   3.732      0.625      1.136      
58 Sewerage and refuse disposal 7.189      1.607      0.380      0.583      1.478      0.817      0.163      0.457      1.564      0.493      3.375      0.693      0.718      7.681      2.076      0.421      0.701      
59 Activities of membership organisations 19.310   6.225      0.389      0.601      3.552      2.698      0.609      1.290      3.569      1.836      9.093      2.102      1.776      21.416   5.108      1.500      4.355      
60 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 10.997   2.159      0.410      0.612      2.253      1.214      0.239      0.653      2.031      0.607      5.389      0.924      0.867      11.600   2.577      0.974      1.258      
61 Other activities 26.016   28.954   0.388      0.601      6.392      6.224      0.774      2.635      10.702   2.569      16.872   4.082      5.708      42.453   13.505   4.988      0.646      
62 Non-observed, informal, non-profit, households, 3.628      0.831      0.360      3.241      1.137      0.712      0.151      0.452      1.318      0.452      2.554      0.614      0.669      6.110      1.950      0.223      0.368      
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Note: Economy-Wide Leontief Multiplier (Type II) per R1 million final demand.   
Source:  
The economy-wide impact model used Statistic South Africa’s National Accounts 2015 Supply and Use Tables to derive 47 multipliers for 62 industries.  This list 
below provides the description of the next set of multipliers: 
32 E- PROF Employment - Professional 
33 E-TECH Employment - Technician 
34 E-CLER Employment - Clerk 
35 E-SALE Employment - Sales and services 
36 E-SAGR Employment - Skilled Agriculture 
37 E-CRAF Employment - Craft and related trade 
38 E-OPER Employment - Plant and machine operator 
39 E-ELEM Employment - Elementary 
40 E-DOM Employment -  Domestic worker 
41 E-SKIL Employment - Skilled  
42 E-SSKIL Employment -  SEMI-SKILLED 
43 E-LSKIL Employment -  LOW-SKILLED 
44 EPWP-M EPWP - MALE 
45 EPWP-F EPWP - FEMALE 
46 EPWP-Y EPWP - YOUTH 
47 EPWP-A  EPWP – ADULT 
 
 
33            34            35            36            37            38            39            40            41            42            43            44            45            46            47            
E-TECH E-CLER E-SALE E-SAGR E-CRAF E-OPER E-ELEM E-DOM E-SKIL E-SSKIL E-LSKIL EPWP-M EPWP-F EPWP-Y EPWP-A
1 Agriculture 0.500      0.759      0.979      0.779      0.381      1.046      5.861      6.402      1.400      3.944      12.263   0.077      0.166      0.098      0.142      
2 Forestry 0.540      0.823      1.025      1.469      0.366      1.163      3.623      1.230      1.464      4.846      4.853      0.079      0.203      0.124      0.155      
3 Fishing 0.423      0.492      0.561      0.708      0.283      0.430      1.038      0.730      1.052      2.474      1.768      0.029      0.199      0.318      0.469      
4 Mining of coal and lignite 0.453      0.632      0.718      0.403      0.500      0.608      1.020      0.773      1.133      2.862      1.793      0.045      0.064      0.047      0.061      
5 Mining of gold and uranium ore 0.601      0.743      0.857      0.506      0.865      1.092      1.327      1.038      1.322      4.063      2.365      0.043      0.086      0.056      0.072      
6 Mining of metal ores 0.474      0.629      0.722      0.412      0.486      0.706      1.267      0.794      1.121      2.955      2.061      0.036      0.066      0.046      0.056      
7 Other mining and quarrying 0.511      0.696      0.799      0.455      0.402      0.644      1.031      0.849      1.326      2.997      1.880      0.039      0.071      0.050      0.060      
8 Food 0.577      0.817      0.963      0.645      0.628      0.972      2.710      3.133      1.434      4.024      5.843      0.067      0.126      0.091      0.106      
9 Beverages and tobacco 0.562      0.763      0.986      0.591      0.384      0.782      1.883      2.119      1.348      3.506      4.002      0.052      0.113      0.067      0.097      
10 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 0.652      0.945      1.013      0.620      1.346      1.544      2.423      2.389      1.636      5.469      4.812      0.057      0.128      0.072      0.112      
11 Knitted, crouched fabrics, wearing apparel, fur articles 1.023      1.013      1.007      0.593      2.456      3.681      2.239      1.498      2.092      8.751      3.736      0.051      0.145      0.145      0.210      
12 Tanning and dressing of leather 0.410      0.591      0.759      0.546      0.296      0.656      2.959      3.306      1.076      2.847      6.266      0.051      0.106      0.065      0.090      
13 Footwear 0.444      0.633      0.798      0.507      0.334      0.646      1.679      1.645      1.133      2.918      3.324      0.045      0.087      0.056      0.075      
14 Sawmilling, planing of wood, cork, straw 0.544      0.807      0.985      0.722      1.204      1.216      2.046      1.381      1.436      4.935      3.427      0.054      0.117      0.075      0.095      
15 Paper 0.620      0.853      1.086      0.713      0.548      0.945      1.702      1.391      1.560      4.145      3.093      0.061      0.125      0.081      0.104      
16 Publishing, printing, recorded media 0.945      1.272      1.329      0.832      0.916      1.181      1.801      1.468      2.320      5.529      3.269      0.066      0.128      0.084      0.108      
17  Coke oven, petroleum refineries 0.281      0.364      0.412      0.234      0.259      0.430      0.598      0.455      0.742      1.698      1.052      0.021      0.037      0.025      0.032      
18 Nuclear fuel, basic chemicals 0.428      0.585      0.716      0.411      0.306      0.610      0.936      0.775      1.075      2.628      1.711      0.053      0.064      0.059      0.057      
19 Other chemical products, man-made fibres 0.702      0.935      1.083      0.694      0.422      0.906      1.558      1.190      1.699      4.041      2.747      0.056      0.098      0.068      0.084      
20 Rubber 0.609      0.687      0.780      0.488      0.508      1.005      1.296      1.313      1.391      3.468      2.609      0.072      0.079      0.055      0.095      
21 Plastic 0.623      0.787      0.977      0.579      0.414      1.175      1.498      1.093      1.493      3.934      2.591      0.053      0.095      0.066      0.080      
22 Glass 0.621      0.810      0.999      0.569      0.898      1.405      1.541      1.080      1.711      4.682      2.621      0.047      0.090      0.059      0.077      
23 Non-metallic minerals 0.476      0.611      0.735      0.410      1.101      1.047      1.423      0.770      1.230      3.904      2.193      0.035      0.080      0.043      0.071      
24 Basic iron and steel, casting of metals 0.506      0.715      0.871      0.484      0.582      0.965      1.321      0.979      1.320      3.616      2.301      0.043      0.078      0.052      0.068      
25 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 0.463      0.618      0.772      0.422      0.458      0.739      1.097      0.875      1.115      3.009      1.972      0.039      0.069      0.048      0.059      
26 Fabricated metal products 0.572      0.784      0.892      0.527      1.438      0.962      1.352      1.018      1.462      4.603      2.370      0.072      0.085      0.075      0.080      
27 Machinery and equipment 0.598      0.786      0.831      0.498      0.615      0.812      1.136      0.931      1.497      3.541      2.067      0.051      0.079      0.052      0.076      
28 Electrical machinery and apparatus 0.838      0.893      0.926      0.556      0.491      0.718      1.142      0.964      1.763      3.583      2.106      0.045      0.084      0.055      0.072      
29 Radio, television, communication equipment and apparatus 0.581      0.762      0.826      0.517      0.382      0.568      1.049      0.910      1.345      3.054      1.958      0.041      0.079      0.052      0.067      
30 Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.474      0.669      0.809      0.509      0.319      0.495      0.961      0.857      1.262      2.801      1.818      0.040      0.075      0.050      0.064      
31 Motor vehicles, trailers, parts 0.508      0.647      0.771      0.465      0.473      0.757      1.093      0.889      1.192      3.112      1.982      0.038      0.072      0.048      0.061      
32 Other transport equipment 0.557      0.753      0.967      0.587      0.458      0.659      1.181      1.134      1.335      3.424      2.316      0.050      0.099      0.064      0.084      
33 Furniture 0.624      0.959      1.077      0.665      1.610      1.429      2.128      1.334      1.699      5.740      3.462      0.055      0.106      0.070      0.089      
34 Manufacturing n.e.c, recycling 0.332      0.518      0.520      0.308      0.434      0.588      1.330      0.816      0.973      2.368      2.146      0.027      0.051      0.035      0.045      
35 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 0.419      0.549      0.607      0.333      0.417      0.556      0.842      0.651      1.023      2.461      1.493      0.035      0.050      0.034      0.050      
36 Collection, purification and distribution of water 0.459      0.591      0.593      0.325      0.423      0.904      1.157      0.652      1.004      2.835      1.810      0.028      0.053      0.034      0.047      
37 Construction 0.561      0.739      0.841      0.528      2.454      0.737      1.888      0.851      1.571      5.300      2.740      0.109      0.214      0.109      0.212      
38 Wholesale trade, commission trade 0.567      0.819      0.964      0.575      0.378      0.660      1.244      0.956      1.432      3.397      2.200      0.046      0.082      0.054      0.073      
39 Retail trade 0.792      1.915      2.788      0.652      0.880      0.780      3.898      1.012      2.278      7.014      4.910      0.053      0.103      0.070      0.085      
40 Sale, maintenance, repair of motor vehicles 1.014      1.883      2.839      1.317      2.085      1.153      2.462      1.999      2.854      9.277      4.461      0.076      0.134      0.095      0.113      
41 Hotels and restaurants 0.568      1.531      4.974      0.563      0.486      0.609      2.223      1.213      2.443      8.163      3.436      0.058      0.122      0.082      0.098      
42 Land transport, transport via pipe lines 0.589      0.943      1.112      0.634      0.493      1.497      1.358      1.016      1.688      4.679      2.374      0.048      0.087      0.056      0.078      
43 Water transport 0.489      0.866      0.687      0.358      0.346      0.493      0.820      0.611      0.967      2.751      1.431      0.025      0.045      0.030      0.040      
44 Air transport 0.667      0.804      1.021      0.525      0.518      0.564      1.167      0.849      1.522      3.431      2.016      0.041      0.074      0.048      0.066      
45 Auxiliary transport 0.774      1.170      1.102      0.637      0.429      0.762      1.553      1.076      1.858      4.099      2.629      0.057      0.098      0.079      0.075      
46 Post and telecommunication 0.787      1.177      1.314      1.000      0.540      0.715      1.343      1.182      1.976      4.746      2.526      0.067      0.107      0.075      0.097      
47 Financial intermediation 0.870      1.250      0.917      0.563      0.298      0.440      1.034      0.973      2.047      3.468      2.007      0.043      0.093      0.060      0.074      
48 Insurance and pension funding 1.008      1.060      0.784      0.469      0.251      0.399      0.908      0.866      1.981      2.963      1.774      0.037      0.077      0.049      0.063      
49 Activities to financial intermediation 0.611      0.743      0.860      0.524      0.271      0.439      1.022      1.027      1.380      2.837      2.049      0.042      0.089      0.057      0.073      
50 Real estate activities 0.725      1.051      1.482      0.875      0.464      0.695      1.488      1.288      1.788      4.568      2.776      0.050      0.100      0.065      0.082      
51 Renting of machinery and equipment 0.909      1.473      1.775      1.028      0.926      1.329      1.989      1.489      2.492      6.531      3.478      0.088      0.130      0.105      0.110      
52 Computer and related activities 2.297      2.132      2.251      1.379      1.323      1.188      2.387      2.101      5.360      8.274      4.488      0.084      0.164      0.107      0.137      
53 Research and experimental development 1.135      1.275      1.619      0.969      0.530      0.836      1.766      1.524      2.647      5.229      3.291      0.061      0.123      0.079      0.102      
54 Other business activities 1.711      2.377      4.050      1.597      1.040      1.364      3.515      2.350      4.308      10.428   5.865      0.131      0.223      0.161      0.188      
55 Government 0.834      1.183      1.526      0.830      0.407      0.652      1.500      1.369      1.935      4.599      2.869      0.081      0.147      0.090      0.132      
56 Education 4.979      1.981      2.579      0.958      0.523      0.661      2.490      1.192      10.076   6.701      3.682      0.099      0.200      0.120      0.176      
57 Health and social work 2.377      1.614      3.122      0.773      0.439      0.719      3.387      1.099      4.138      6.667      4.487      0.268      0.668      0.385      0.490      
58 Sewerage and refuse disposal 1.857      2.550      3.418      1.402      3.536      4.047      5.339      1.199      2.978      14.952   6.538      0.072      0.139      0.091      0.117      
59 Activities of membership organisations 6.618      3.894      1.820      1.074      0.476      0.614      4.342      1.205      12.474   7.879      5.546      0.351      0.499      0.083      0.764      
60 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 1.809      1.875      2.101      1.079      0.539      0.746      1.954      1.318      4.041      6.339      3.273      0.101      0.152      0.119      0.130      
61 Other activities 2.054      3.460      26.000   0.824      0.907      0.991      12.794   1.143      7.687      32.182   13.937   0.057      0.107      0.072      0.089      
62 Non-observed, informal, non-profit, households, 0.462      0.572      0.712      0.444      0.274      0.405      0.868      0.823      1.053      2.407      1.691      0.034      0.068      0.044      0.057      
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Annexure C: List of Industries and products used in the SUT Leontief based model 
 
 
P1 Agriculture P53 Non-metallic products n.e.c. I01 Agriculture
P2 Live animal P54 Furniture I02 Forestry
P3 Forestry P55 Jewellery I03 Fishing
P4 Fishing P56 Manufactured products n.e.c. I04 Mining of coal and lignite
P5 Coal and lignite P57 Wastes, scraps I05 Mining of gold and uranium ore
P6 Metal ores P58 Iron, steel products I06 Mining of metal ores
P7 Other minerals P59 Non-ferrous metals I07 Other mining and quarrying
P8 Electricity and gas P60 Structural metal products I08 Food
P9 Natural water P61 Tanks, reservoirs I09 Beverages and tobacco
P10 Meat P62 Other fabricated metal I10 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles
P11 Fish P63 Engines, turbines I11 Knitted, crouched fabrics, wearing apparel, fur articles
P12 Vegetables P64 Pumps, compressors I12 Tanning and dressing of leather
P13 Fruit and nuts P65 Bearings, gears I13 Footwear
P14 Oils and fats P66 Lifting equipment I14 Sawmilling, planing of wood, cork, straw
P15 Dairy products P67 General machinery I15 Paper
P16 Grain mill  products P68 Special machinery I16 Publishing, printing, recorded media
P17 Starches products P69 Domestic appliances I17  Coke oven, petroleum refineries
P18 Animal feeding P70 Office machinery I18 Nuclear fuel, basic chemicals
P19 Bakery products P71 Electrical machinery I19 Other chemical products, man-made fibres
P20 Sugar P72 Radio, television I20 Rubber
P21 Confectionary products P73 Medical appliances I21 Plastic
P22 Pasta products P74 Motor vehicles, parts I22 Glass
P23 Food n.e.c. P75 Ships and boats I23 Non-metallic minerals
P24 Alcohol, beverages P76 Railway and trams I24 Basic iron and steel, casting of metals
P25 Soft drinks P77 Aircrafts I25 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals
P26 Tobacco products P78 Other transport equipment I26 Fabricated metal products
P27 Textile fabrics P79 Construction I27 Machinery and equipment
P28 Made-up textile, articles P80 Construction services I28 Electrical machinery and apparatus
P29 Carpets P81 Trade services I29 Radio, television, communication equipment and apparatus
P30 Textile n.e.c. P82 Accommodation I30 Medical, precision, optical instruments, watches and clocks
P31 Knitting fabrics P83 Catering services I31 Motor vehicles, trailers, parts
P32 Wearing apparel P84 Passenger transport I32 Other transport equipment
P33 Leather products P85 Freight transport I33 Furniture
P34 Footwear P86 Supporting transport services I34 Manufacturing n.e.c, recycling
P35 Wood products P87 Postal,  courier services I35 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
P36 Paper products P88 Electricity distribution I36 Collection, purification and distribution of water
P37 Printing P89 Water distribution I37 Construction
P38 Petroleum products P90 Financial services I38 Wholesale trade, commission trade
P39 Basic chemicals P91 Insurance, pension I39 Retail  trade
P40 Fertil izers, pesticides P92 Other financial services I40 Sale, maintenance, repair of motor vehicles
P41 Paint, related products P93 Real estate services I41 Hotels and restaurants
P42 Pharmaceutical products P94 Leasing, Rental services I42 Land transport, transport via pipe lines
P43 Soap, cleaning, perfume P95 Research, development I43 Water transport
P44 Chemical products, n.e.c. P96 Legal, accounting I44 Air transport
P45 Rubber tyres P97 Other business services I45 Auxiliary transport
P46 Other rubber products P98 Telecommunications I46 Post and telecommunication
P47 Plastic products P99 Support services I47 Financial intermediation
P48 Glass products P100 Manufactured services n.e.c. I48 Insurance and pension funding
P49 Non-structural ceramic P101 Public administration I49 Activities to financial intermediation
P50 Structure non-refractory clay P102 Education services I50 Real estate activities
P51 Plaster, cement P103 Health, social services I51 Renting of machinery and equipment
P52 Articles of concrete P104 Other services n.e.c. I52 Computer and related activities
I53 Research and experimental development
I54 Other business activities
I55 Government
I56 Education
I57 Health and social work
I58 Sewerage and refuse disposal
I59 Activities of membership organisations
I60 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
I61 Other activities
I62 Non-observed, informal, non-profit, households,
List of Products (SUT disagregated to 104 Products) List of Industries (SUT disagregated to 62 Industries)
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Annexure D: Tax revenue by main revenue source, 2007 to 2016 
 
 Direct Indirect  
 Personal 
Income 
Tax (PIT)1 
Company 
Income 
Tax (CIT)1 
Dividends Tax 
(DT)/ 
Secondary 
Tax on 
Companies 
(STC)2 
Other Value-
Added 
Tax  
(VAT) 
Fuel levy Customs 
duties3 
Specific 
excise 
duties 
Other Total tax 
revenue 
R million PIT CIT DT-STC Other VAT Fuel levy Customs 
duties3 
Excise 
duties 
Other  Total  
2007/08    169 539        141 635                20 585            7 348        150 443        23 741          26 470         18 218         14 835           572 815     
2008/09    196 068        167 202                20 018            8 404        154 343        24 884          22 751         20 185         11 246           625 100     
2009/10    206 484        136 978                15 468            8 740        147 941        28 833          19 577         21 289         13 396           598 705     
2010/11    228 096        134 635                17 178            9 531        183 571        34 418          26 637         22 968         17 149           674 183     
2011/12    251 339        153 272                21 965           11 278        191 020        36 602          34 198         25 411         17 564           742 650     
2012/13    276 679        160 896                19 739           12 474        215 023        40 410          38 998         28 378         21 229           813 826     
2013/14    310 929        179 520                17 309           13 691        237 667        43 685          44 179         29 039         23 996           900 015     
2014/15    353 918        186 622                21 247           15 691        261 295        48 467          40 679         32 334         26 044           986 295     
2015/16    389 280        193 385                23 934           17 558        281 111        55 607          46 250         35 077         27 779        1 069 983     
2016/17    425 924        207 027                31 130           17 660        289 167        62 779          45 579         35 774         29 042        1 144 081     
% of total PIT CIT DT-STC Other  VAT Fuel levy Customs 
duties3 
Excise 
duties 
Other  Total  
2007/08      29.6%          24.7%                  3.6%             1.3%          26.3%           4.1%            4.6%           3.2%           2.6%            100.0%     
2008/09      31.4%          26.7%                  3.2%             1.3%          24.7%           4.0%            3.6%           3.2%           1.8%            100.0%     
2009/10      34.5%          22.9%                  2.6%             1.5%          24.7%           4.8%            3.3%           3.6%           2.2%            100.0%     
2010/11      33.8%          20.0%                  2.5%             1.4%          27.2%           5.1%            4.0%           3.4%           2.5%            100.0%     
2011/12      33.8%          20.6%                  3.0%             1.5%          25.7%           4.9%            4.6%           3.4%           2.4%            100.0%     
2012/13      34.0%          19.8%                  2.4%             1.5%          26.4%           5.0%            4.8%           3.5%           2.6%            100.0%     
2013/14      34.5%          19.9%                  1.9%             1.5%          26.4%           4.9%            4.9%           3.2%           2.7%            100.0%     
2014/15      35.9%          18.9%                  2.2%             1.6%          26.5%           4.9%            4.1%           3.3%           2.6%            100.0%     
2015/16      36.4%          18.1%                  2.2%             1.6%          26.3%           5.2%            4.3%           3.3%           2.6%            100.0%     
2016/17      37.2%          18.1%                  2.7%             1.5%          25.3%           5.5%            4.0%           3.1%           2.5%            100.0%     
% of 
GDP 
PIT CIT DT-STC Other  VAT Fuel levy Customs 
duties3 
Excise 
duties 
Other  Total tax  
2007/08        7.0%            5.9%                  0.9%             0.3%            6.2%           1.0%            1.1%           0.8%           0.6%              23.8%     
2008/09        7.7%            6.6%                  0.8%             0.3%            6.0%           1.0%            0.9%           0.8%           0.4%              24.5%     
2009/10        8.1%            5.4%                  0.6%             0.3%            5.8%           1.1%            0.8%           0.8%           0.5%              23.5%     
2010/11        8.1%            4.8%                  0.6%             0.3%            6.5%           1.2%            0.9%           0.8%           0.6%              23.9%     
2011/12        8.2%            5.0%                  0.7%             0.4%            6.2%           1.2%            1.1%           0.8%           0.6%              24.1%     
2012/13        8.3%            4.8%                  0.6%             0.4%            6.5%           1.2%            1.2%           0.9%           0.6%              24.5%     
2013/14        8.6%            5.0%                  0.5%             0.4%            6.6%           1.2%            1.2%           0.8%           0.7%              24.9%     
2014/15        9.2%            4.8%                  0.5%             0.4%            6.8%           1.3%            1.1%           0.8%           0.7%              25.5%     
2015/16        9.4%            4.7%                  0.6%             0.4%            6.8%           1.3%            1.1%           0.9%           0.7%              26.0%     
2016/17        9.7%            4.7%                  0.7%             0.4%            6.6%           1.4%            1.0%           0.8%           0.7%              26.0%     
http://www.sars.gov.za/About/SATaxSystem/Pages/Tax-Statistics.aspx 
  
158 
 
Annexure E: list of equation used in the CGE model 
1. Price Block 
No Description Formula Equation Domain 
1. Import  
price 
 
(
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(𝐿𝐶𝑈)
)  = (
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(𝐹𝐶𝑈)
)  . (
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡
𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
)  . 
(
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝐿𝐶𝑈⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟
𝐹𝐶𝑈
)  + (
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
)  
 
 
𝑃𝑀𝐶 = 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑐 ∙ (1 + 𝑡𝑚𝑐) ∙
𝐸𝑋𝑅 +⁡∑ 𝑃𝑄?́? ∙ 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑐⁡𝑐́𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑇́   
                                                                                             
 
c ∈CM 
2. Export 
price 
 
(
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(𝐿𝐶𝑈)
)  = (
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
(𝐹𝐶𝑈)
)  . (
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡
𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
)  . 
(
𝐸𝑥𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
(𝐿𝐶𝑈⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟
𝐹𝐶𝑈)
)  - (
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
)   
 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑐 =⁡𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑐 ∙ (1 −⁡ 𝑡𝑒𝑐) ∙
𝐸𝑋𝑅 −⁡∑ 𝑃𝑄?́?𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑇́ ˑ𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐⁡𝑐́  
 
c ∈CE 
3. Demand price of 
domestic 
nontraded goods 
 
(
𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
)  = (
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
)  + 
(
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) 
 
 
𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑐 =⁡𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑐 +⁡∑ 𝑃𝑄?́?𝑐?́?𝐶𝑇 ∙
𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑐⁡𝑐́   
c ∈CE 
4. Absorption  
(
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑎𝑡⁡
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠⁡𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡⁡𝑜𝑓
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥
)  = 
(
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
)  + 
(
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
) 
𝑃𝑄𝑐 ∙ (1 − 𝑡𝑞𝑐) ∙ ⁡𝑄𝑄𝑐
=⁡𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑐
∙ ⁡𝑄𝐷𝑐
+⁡𝑃𝑀𝑐
∙ ⁡𝑄𝑀𝑐  
 
c ∈ 
(CD∪CM) 
 
5. Marketed output 
value 
  
PXc ∙  QXc = PDSc ∙  QDc + PEc ∙ 
QEc 
 
c ∈CX 
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(
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠⁡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
)  = 
(
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
)  + 
(
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
) 
6. Activity Price  
(
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡⁡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑎
)  =  (
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠
)   
 
PAa = ∑  PXACac  ∙ Ɵac 
c ϵ C 
 
ɑ ∈ A 
7. Aggregate 
intermediate 
input price 
 
(
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡⁡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
)  =  
(
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑝𝑒𝑟⁡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
) 
 
PINTAa =  ∑ PQc ∙ icac a 
c ϵ C 
 
 
ɑ ∈ A 
8. Activity revenue 
and costs 
 
(
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡
(𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠)⁡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
)  = 
(
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
)  +  
(
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
) 
 
PAa ∙(1- taa)∙ QAa PVAa ∙QVAa 
+ PINTAa ∙ QINTAa 
 
 
ɑ ∈ A 
9. Consumer price 
index  
 
(
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟⁡⁡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
⁡⁡)  =  (
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠
) 
 
𝑪𝑷𝑰̅̅ ̅̅ ̅=  ∑ PQc ∙cwtsC 
c ϵ C 
 
 
10. Consumer price 
index for 
nontraded market 
output 
 
(
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟⁡⁡⁡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑⁡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
⁡⁡)  =  
(
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠
) 
 
 
DPI = ∑  PDSc ∙dwtsC 
c ϵ C 
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2. Production and Trade Block 
No Description Formula Equation Domain 
11. CES 
technology: 
Activity 
production 
function 
(
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡⁡
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
𝐴
⁡⁡)  = CES  
(
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒⁡𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
) 
𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎
=⁡𝛼𝑎∙
𝑎 (𝛿𝑎
𝑎 ∙ 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎
−𝜌𝑎
𝑎
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑎
𝑎)
∙ 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎
−𝜌𝑎
𝑎
)
−
1
𝜌𝑎
𝑎
 
 
 
 
ɑ ∈ 
ACES 
12. CES 
technology: 
value – added 
intermediate – 
input quantity 
ration 
 
(
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑⁡⁡
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
⁡⁡)  = ƒ (
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒⁡𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
) 
 
𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎
= (
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎
𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑎
⋅
𝛿𝑎
𝑎
1 − 𝛿𝑎𝑎
) 1
1
1+𝜌𝑎
𝑎
 
 
 
ɑ ∈ 
ACES 
13. Leontief 
Technology: 
Demand for 
Aggregate 
Value - Added   
 
(
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡
𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
⁡⁡)  = ƒ  (
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
𝐴
) 
 
QVAa = i𝑣𝑎𝑎 ⋅ 𝑄𝐴𝑎  
 
 
ɑ ∈ 
ALEO 
14. Leontief 
Technology: 
Demand for 
Aggregate 
Intermediate 
Input 
 
(
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡
⁡⁡)  = ƒ  (
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙
𝐴
) 
 
QINTAa = int𝑎𝑎 ⋅
𝑄𝐴𝑎 
 
 
ɑ ∈ 
ALEO 
15. Value – Added 
and Factor 
Demands 
 
(
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑜𝑓⁡
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒⁡𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑⁡
⁡⁡)  = CES (
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
𝑎
) 
𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎
= 𝛼𝑎
𝑣𝑎
∙ (∑𝛿𝑓⁡𝑎
𝑣𝑎
𝑓𝜖𝐹
⁡
∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑓⁡𝑎
⁡⁡⁡⁡−𝜌𝑎
𝑣𝑎
)
−
1
𝜌𝑎
𝑣𝑎
 
 
 
ɑ ∈ A 
16. Factor Demand  𝑊𝐹𝑓 . 
𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑎𝑓𝑎⁡ =
𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑎 ⋅ (1 −
𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑎) ⁡ ∙ ⁡𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎 ∙
 
ɑ ∈ A 
f  ∈ F 
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(
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡⁡
𝑜𝑓
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑓⁡𝑖𝑛⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎⁡
⁡⁡)  = CES 
(
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡⁡
𝑜𝑓
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡𝑓⁡𝑖𝑛⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
) 
(∑ 𝛿𝑓⁡𝑎
𝑣𝑎
𝑓𝜖𝐹′ ⋅
⁡𝑄𝐹𝑓⁡𝑎
⁡⁡⁡⁡−𝜌𝑎
𝑣𝑎
)
−1
⋅
𝛿𝑓⁡𝑎
𝑣𝑎 ⋅ 𝑄𝐹𝑓⁡𝑎
−𝜌𝑎
𝑣𝑎−1 
17 Disaggregated 
Intermediate 
Input Demand 
 
(
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡
𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
⁡⁡)  = ƒ  
(
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡
𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
) 
 
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑐⁡𝑎
= 𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑐⁡𝑎 ⋅ 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑎 
 
ɑ ∈ A 
c∈ C 
 
18. Commodity 
Production and 
allocation 
 
(
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡
(𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐)⁡
𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
)  +  
(
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
)   =   
(
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑜𝑓
⁡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
) 
 
𝑄𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐
+ ∑ 𝑄𝐻𝐴𝑎⁡𝑐⁡ℎ
ℎ⁡𝜖⁡𝐻
= 𝜃𝑎⁡𝑐 ⋅ 𝑄𝐴𝑎  
 
 
 
ɑ ∈ A 
a∈ CX 
19. Output 
aggregation 
function 
 
(
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑜𝑓
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐⁡
⁡⁡)  = CES 
⁡(
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐⁡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡⁡
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑜𝑓
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
) 
 
𝑄𝑋𝑐
= 𝛼𝑐
𝑎𝑐
⋅ (∑𝛿𝑎⁡𝑐
𝑎𝑐
𝑎𝜖𝐴
⋅ 𝑄𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐
−𝜌𝑐
𝑎𝑐
)
1
𝜌𝑎⁡
𝑎𝑐−1
 
 
 
c∈ CX 
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20. First – order 
condition for 
output 
aggregation 
function  
 
(
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡
𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
⁡⁡)  =  (
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒⁡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
) 
𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐
= 𝑃𝑋𝑐
⋅ 𝑄𝑋𝑐 (∑ 𝛿𝑎⁡𝑐
𝑎𝑐
𝑎⁡𝜖⁡𝐴′
∙ 𝑄𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐
−𝜌𝑐
𝑎𝑐
)
−1
∙ ⁡𝛿𝑎⁡𝑐
𝑎𝑐
∙ Q𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐
−𝜌𝑐
𝑎𝑐−1 
 
ɑ ∈ A 
c∈ CX 
 
21. Output 
transformation 
(CET) function 
 
(
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡
⁡⁡)  =  CET ⁡(
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡⁡⁡
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡𝑜𝑓⁡
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
) 
𝑄𝑋𝑐
= 𝛼𝑐
𝑡
⋅ (𝛿𝑐
𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐸𝑐
𝜌𝑐
𝑡
+ (1
− 𝛿𝑐
𝑡) ⋅ 𝑄𝐷𝑐
𝑝𝑐
𝑡
)
1
𝜌𝑐
𝑡
 
 
 
 
c ∈(CE 
∩CD) 
22. Export – 
domestic 
supply ratio 
 
(
⁡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡⁡
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
⁡⁡)  =  ƒ  (
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡⁡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
) 
𝑄𝐸𝑐
𝑄𝐷𝑐
= (
𝑃𝐸𝑐
𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑐
⋅
1 − 𝛿𝑐
𝑡
𝛿𝑐𝑡
)
1
𝜌𝑐
𝑡−1
 
 
 
c ∈(CE 
∩CD) 
23. Output 
transformation 
for non – 
exported 
commodities 
 
[
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
]= 
[
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡[𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑐⁡𝜖⁡(𝐶𝐷⁡ ∩ CEN)]⁡
]+[𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠⁡[𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑐⁡𝜖⁡(𝐶𝐸⁡ ∩
CDN)]] 
 
𝑄. 𝑋𝐶
= 𝑄𝐷𝐶 + 𝑄𝐸𝐶  
 
c ∈ 
(CD 
∩CEN) 
∪ 
(CE 
∪CDN) 
24. Composite 
supply 
(Armington) 
function 
 
 
[
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
]= f[
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡𝑞𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑢𝑠𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡
] 
𝑄𝑄𝐶
= 𝛼𝐶
𝑞
⋅ (𝛿𝐶
𝑞 ⋅ 𝑄𝑀𝑐
−𝜌𝑐
𝑞
+ (1
− 𝛿𝑐
𝑞) ⋅ 𝑄𝐷𝑐
−𝜌𝑐
𝑞
)
−
1
𝜌𝑐
𝑞
 
 
c ∈(CM 
∩ CD) 
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25. Import – 
domestic 
demand ratio 
 
[
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
] −⁡[
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 − 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
] 
𝑄𝑀𝑐
𝑄𝐷𝑐
= (
𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑐
𝑃𝑀𝑐
⋅
𝛿𝑐
𝑞
1 − 𝛿𝑐
𝑞)
1
1+𝜌𝑐
𝑞
 
 
 
c ∈(CM 
∩ CD) 
26. Composite 
Supply for Non-
imported 
Outputs and 
Non-Produced 
Imports 
 
[
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦
] = ⁡ [
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑢𝑠𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡[𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑐⁡𝜖⁡(𝐶𝐷⁡ ∩ CMN)]
] 
 
+ [
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠⁡[𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡
𝑐⁡ ∈ (𝐶𝐷⁡ ∩ ⁡⁡𝐶𝑀𝑁
⁡] 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑐 = 𝑄𝐷𝑐 + 𝑄𝑀𝑐  
c ∈ 
(CD ∩ 
CMN) 
∪ 
(CM ∪ 
CDN) 
27. Demand for 
Transactions 
Services 
 
(
⁡𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡⁡
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
⁡⁡)  =    (
𝑠𝑢𝑚⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠⁡⁡⁡
𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
) 
𝑄𝑇𝑐
= ∑ (𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑐⁡𝑐′
𝑐′𝜖𝐶′
∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑐′ + 𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐⁡𝑐′
∙ 𝑄𝐸𝐶′ ∙ 𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑐⁡𝑐′
∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑐′) 
 
 
c ∈CT 
 
 
 
 
3. Institution Block 
N
o 
Description Formula Equation Domain 
28. Factor Income 
(
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡⁡
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡ƒ
𝑎
⁡⁡)  =    (
𝑠𝑢𝑚⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠⁡⁡⁡
(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐⁡𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠⁡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑠
) 
 
𝑌𝐹𝑓 =
∑ 𝑊𝐹𝑓𝑎𝜖𝐴 .𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?⁡𝑎 ∙
𝑄𝐹𝑓⁡𝑎 
 
f ∈F 
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29. Institutional 
Factor Incomes 
 
(
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡
(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑖)⁡
𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡ƒ⁡
)   =  (
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡
⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡⁡ƒ⁡⁡𝑡𝑜
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑖
)   .   
(
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡ƒ⁡
⁡(𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡
⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑅𝑜𝑊
) 
 
𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑖⁡𝑓 = 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑖⁡𝑓⁡
∙ [(1 − 𝑡𝑓𝑓) ∙ 𝑌𝐹𝑓
− 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤⁡𝑓 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅] 
 
i ∈INSD 
f ∈F 
30. Income of 
domestic, 
Nongovernmen
t Institutions 
 
(
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡
(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑖)⁡
⁡
) =  (
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡⁡
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
⁡
) +  
(
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟⁡⁡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡⁡
⁡(𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
)⁡ + 
(
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠⁡
⁡(𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡
⁡𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
)  +  (
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠⁡⁡
⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚
⁡𝑅𝑜𝑊
) 
 
𝑌𝐼𝑖
=∑⁡𝑌𝐼
𝑓𝜖𝐹
𝐹𝑖⁡𝑓
+ ∑ 𝑇𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖⁡𝑖′
𝑖′∈𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺′
+𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖⁡𝑔𝑜𝑣⁡. 𝐶𝑃𝐼⁡𝑅𝐸𝑖?̇?
+ 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖⁡𝑟𝑜𝑤 ⁡ ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 
 
i ∈ 
INSDNG 
31. Infra – 
Institutional 
Transfers 
 
(
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟⁡
(𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚)⁡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑖′𝑡𝑜⁡𝑖⁡
)   =  (
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡
⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑖′
⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑖
)   
.   (
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡
⁡(𝑖′, 𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡
⁡𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
) 
 
𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑖⁡𝑖′
= 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖⁡𝑖′ ∙ (1
−𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖′)
∙ (1 − 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖′) ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑖′ 
 
i 
∈INSDN
G 
 
I’ ∈ 
INSDNG’ 
32. Household 
Consumption 
Expenditures 
(
⁡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡⁡
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
⁡⁡)  =    
(
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒, 𝑛𝑒𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡⁡⁡
𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠, 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟⁡𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
) 
 
𝐸𝐻ℎ
= (1
− ∑ 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖⁡ℎ
𝑖⁡∈⁡𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺
) ∙ (1
− 𝑀𝑃𝑆ℎ) ⋅ (1
− 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆ℎ) ⋅ 𝑌𝐼ℎ 
 
h ∈H 
165 
 
33. Household 
Consumption 
Spending on 
Marketed 
Commodities 
 
(
⁡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡⁡
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑜𝑛⁡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
⁡⁡)  =   ƒ  
(
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐, 𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠⁡(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒)
) 
𝑃𝑄𝑐 ⋅ 𝑄𝐻𝑐⁡ℎ = 𝑃𝑄𝐶 ∙
𝛾𝑐⁡ℎ
𝑚 + 𝛽𝑐⁡ℎ
𝑚 . 𝐸𝐻ℎ −
⁡∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐′𝑐′∈𝐶 ∙ ⁡ 𝛾𝑐′⁡ℎ
𝑚  - 
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐′𝑐′𝜖𝐶𝑎𝜖𝐴 ⁡ ∙
⁡𝛾𝑎⁡𝑐′ℎ
ℎ ⁡ 
 
 
 
c ∈C 
 
h ∈H 
34. Household 
Consumption 
Spending on 
Home 
Commodities 
 
(
⁡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡⁡
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑎
⁡⁡)  =   ƒ  
(
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠⁡(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒)
) 
𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶⁡𝑎⁡𝑐 ⋅ 𝑄𝐻𝐴𝑎⁡𝑐⁡ℎ =
𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐 ∙ 𝛾𝑎⁡𝑐⁡ℎ
ℎ +
𝛽𝑎⁡𝑐⁡ℎ
ℎ . (𝐸𝐻ℎ −
⁡∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐′𝑐′∈𝐶 ∙ ⁡ 𝛾𝑐′⁡ℎ
𝑚  - 
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐′𝑐′𝜖𝐶𝑎𝜖𝐴 ⁡ ∙
⁡𝛾𝑎⁡𝑐′ℎ
ℎ ⁡ 
 
 
a ∈A 
 
c ∈C 
 
h ∈H 
35. Investment 
Demand 
 
(
⁡𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
⁡⁡)  =    
(
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡⁡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
) 
 
 
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐 = 𝐼𝐴𝐷𝐽 ⋅ 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐 
 
 
c ∈ CINV 
36. Government 
Consumption 
Demand 
(
⁡𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡⁡
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡𝑐
⁡⁡)  =    
(
𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡⁡
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟⁡𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) 
 
𝑄𝐺𝑐 =⁡𝐺𝐴𝐷𝐽 ⁡ ∙ ⁡𝑞𝑔𝑐  
 
 
c ∈C 
37. Government 
Revenue 
 
(
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
(𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)⁡
⁡
) =  (
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠⁡⁡
⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠⁡⁡
) +  
(
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠⁡⁡⁡
⁡(𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡⁡
⁡𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
)⁡ + (
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒⁡⁡
⁡𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑⁡⁡
⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥
)  +  (
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦⁡⁡⁡
⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥
⁡
) + 
𝑌𝐺 =
∑ 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑖⁡𝜖⁡𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺 ∙
𝑌𝐼𝑖 + ∑ 𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓⁡𝜖⁡𝐹 ∙
𝑌𝐹𝑓 ∑ 𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑎 ∙𝑎⁡𝜖⁡𝐴 ⁡𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑎 ∙
 
166 
 
(
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡⁡
𝑡𝑎𝑥
⁡⁡
) +⁡(
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠⁡⁡⁡
⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
⁡
) +⁡(
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡
𝑡𝑎𝑥
⁡⁡
) +
⁡(
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡⁡
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
⁡⁡
) +⁡(
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟
⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚
𝑅𝑜𝑊⁡⁡
) 
𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑎 + ∑ 𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎⁡𝜖⁡𝐴 ∙
𝑃𝐴𝑎 ∙ 𝑄𝐴𝑎 +
⁡∑ 𝑡𝑚𝑐 ∙ 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑐 ∙𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑀
𝑄𝑀𝑐 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 + ∑ 𝑡𝑒𝑐 ∙𝑐𝜖𝐸
𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑐 ∙ 𝑄𝐸𝑐 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 +
∑ 𝑡𝑞𝑐 ∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑐 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑐 +𝑐𝜖𝐶
∑ 𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑔𝑜𝑣⁡𝑓 +𝑓𝜖𝐹
𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑔𝑜𝑣⁡𝑟𝑜𝑤 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 
38. Government 
Expenditure 
 
(
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡
⁡
)   =  (
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡
⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
⁡
)   +    
(
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐⁡
⁡(𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
) 
 
𝐸𝐺
=∑𝑃𝑄𝑐 ∙
𝑐𝜖𝐶
𝑄𝐺𝑐
+ ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖⁡𝑔𝑜𝑣
i⁡ϵ⁡INSDNG
∙ 𝐶𝑃𝐼 
 
     
 
 
4. System Constraint Block 
No Description Formula Equation Domain 
39. Factor Markets 
(
⁡𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡⁡
𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡ƒ⁡
⁡⁡)  =    (
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦⁡⁡
𝑜𝑓
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡ƒ⁡
) 
 
∑ 𝑄
𝑎⁡𝜖⁡𝐴
𝐹𝑓⁡𝑎 = 𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑓  
 
 
f ∈F 
40. Composite 
Commodity 
Markets 
 
(
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑒⁡⁡
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦)⁡
⁡
) =  (
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡
⁡𝑢𝑠𝑒
⁡
) +  
(
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡⁡⁡
⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡
⁡
)⁡ + (
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡⁡
⁡
)  
 
𝑄𝑄𝑐 = ∑⁡𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑐⁡𝑎
𝑎𝜖𝐴
+ ∑ 𝑄
ℎ⁡𝜖⁡𝐻
𝐻𝑐⁡ℎ
+ 𝑄𝐺𝑐
+ 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐
+ 𝑞𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑐
+ 𝑄𝑇𝑐⁡ 
 
c ∈C 
167 
 
+  (
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡⁡⁡
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
⁡
) + (
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡⁡
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
⁡⁡
) +
⁡(
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒⁡⁡⁡
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡⁡𝑢𝑠𝑒
⁡
) 
 
41. Current – Account 
Balance for the 
Rest of the World, 
in Foreign 
Currency 
 
(
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡
(𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)⁡
⁡
) +  (
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡⁡
⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠
⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑅𝑜𝑊
)  =  
(
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡⁡⁡
⁡(𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒⁡⁡
⁡
)⁡ + (
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡⁡
⁡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠
⁡𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚⁡𝑅𝑜𝑊
)  +  
(
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛⁡⁡
⁡𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
⁡
) 
∑ 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑐
𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑀
⋅ 𝑄𝑀𝐶
+ ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤⁡𝑓
𝑓⁡𝜖⁡𝐹
= ∑ 𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑐
𝑐𝜖𝐶𝐸
⋅ 𝑄𝐸𝐶
+ ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑟𝑖⁡𝑟𝑜𝑤
𝑖𝜖𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷
+ 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉 
 
42. Government 
Balance 
 
(
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
⁡
)   =  (
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡
⁡𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
⁡
)   
+    (
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
⁡𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠⁡
𝑎
) 
 
𝑌𝐺 = 𝐸𝐺 + 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑉 
 
 
43. Direct Institutional 
Tax Rates 
 
(
𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡⁡𝑡𝑎𝑥⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡⁡
𝑓𝑜𝑟
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑖
)   =  
(
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡⁡
⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡
⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
)   +    
(
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡⁡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒⁡⁡
⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
) 
 
 
𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖 ⋅ (1 + 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐽
⋅ 𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑠01𝑖)
+ 𝐷𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆
⋅ 𝑡ins01𝑖  
 
i ∈ 
INSDNG 
44. Institutional 
Savings Rates 
 
(
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠⁡⁡
𝑓𝑜𝑟
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡𝑖
)   =  
(
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒⁡𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡⁡
⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔⁡
⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
)   +    
(
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡⁡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒⁡⁡
⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
) 
 
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖 = 𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑖 ⋅ (1 +
𝑀𝑃SAD𝐽 ⋅ 𝑚𝑝𝑠01𝑖) + 𝐷𝑀𝑃𝑆 ∙
𝑚𝑝𝑠01𝑖   
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45. Saving – 
Investment 
Balance 
 
(
𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡
(𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)⁡
⁡
)  +  
(
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
⁡𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
⁡
)  +  (
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛⁡⁡
⁡(𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠⁡⁡
⁡
)⁡  =  
(
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡⁡
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
⁡
)  +  (
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡⁡
⁡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
⁡
) 
 
∑ 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖 ∙
𝑖𝜖𝐼𝑁𝑆𝐷𝑁𝐺
(1 − 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖)
∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑖 + 𝐺𝑆𝐴𝑉
+ 𝐸𝑋𝑅
∙ ⁡𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉
= ∑𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑐𝜖𝐶
∙ 𝑞𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑐  
 
 
46. Total Absorption  
(
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡⁡
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)⁡
⁡
) =  (
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡
⁡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) +  
(
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑⁡⁡⁡
⁡ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒⁡
⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
)⁡ + (
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡⁡
⁡
)  
+  (
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡⁡⁡
⁡𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
⁡
) + (
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡⁡
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
⁡⁡
) 
 
𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆
= ∑∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑐⁡𝜖⁡𝐶
∙ 𝑄𝐻𝑐⁡ℎ
ℎ𝜖𝐻
+∑∑∑𝑃𝑋𝐴𝐶𝑎⁡𝑐
ℎ𝜖𝐻𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑎𝜖𝐴
∙ 𝑄𝐻𝐴𝑎⁡𝑐⁡ℎ + ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑐⁡𝜖⁡𝐶
∙ 𝑄𝐺𝑐
+ ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑐⁡𝜖⁡𝐶
+⁡𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉⁡𝑐
+∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑐⁡𝜖𝐶⁡
⁡ ∙ 𝑞𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑐 ⁡ 
 
 
47. Ratio of 
Investment to 
Absorption 
 
(
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡
⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
)  .  (
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡⁡
⁡𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
⁡
)  =  
(
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡
⁡(𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
⁡
)⁡  +    (
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡⁡
⁡𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
⁡
) 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑆𝐻𝑅. 𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆 = ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑐⁡𝜖⁡𝐶
∙ 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐶
+⁡∑ 𝑃𝑄𝐶
𝑐⁡𝜖⁡𝐶
∙ 𝑞𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑐  
 
48. Ratio of 
Government 
Consumption to 
Absorption 
 
(
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡⁡
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
⁡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
)    .  
(
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙⁡⁡⁡
⁡𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡
⁡
)   =    (
𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡⁡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛⁡
𝑎
) 
 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑆𝐻𝑅. 𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆 = ∑ 𝑃𝑄𝑐
𝑐⁡𝜖⁡𝐶
∙ 𝑄𝐺𝑐  
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